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Abstract
The United States Air Force is an organization
operationally focused on gathering, processing, and
utilizing vast quantities of information, so much so that
it added “cyberspace” to its core missions of air and space
in 2005.

Service leaders have argued that a USAF

information revolution – its entrance into the “Information
Age” – began as early as the first computers in the 1940s
or as late as the proliferation of networks in the 1990s.
Upon close inspection, however, it becomes clear that such
assertions overlook decades of information operations and
management, and overemphasize the concept of a single
information age.

This dissertation illustrates how the Air

Force’s information age has origins dating back to the
Civil War-era, a half-century before the development of the
first air service.

Through reviewing methodological and

technological changes in information operations, it becomes
clear that the post-World War II “information age” grew
from numerous early service efforts to improve the quality,
quantity and delivery of its information.
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Introduction
By all accounts, the United States Air Force today is
optimally organized for the gathering, processing, and
utilizing of vast quantities of information.

It runs its

global, networked information environment through every
installation – and every electronic device – in its
possession and aims to develop the most informationdominant warfighting capability in existence.1

Service

leaders believe that “[w]ith today’s technology,
information and communications can be optimized like never
before, and timely information alone can make or break a
mission’s success.”2

This emphasis on electronics,

communications, and data processing – colloquially known as
“The Information Age” – has brought a new technological and
methodological dimension to a military service formerly
preoccupied with the speed and capacity of its aircraft,

"Air Force Space Command," U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet,
accessed July 1, 2013, http://www.af.mil/information/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=155.
1

"Air Force Careers," Cyberspace Operation Officer,
accessed July 03, 2013, http://www.airforce.com/careers/
detail/cyberspace-operation-officer/.
2

1

not its data pipelines.

Since the 1990s, “orchestrating

the process of getting the right information, putting it
into a usable form, and getting it where it needs to go in
a timely manner” has become a major theme in Air Force
thinking.3
The current “Information Age”, however, has origins
that stretch back many decades into the past.

The purpose

of this dissertation is to examine the evolution of
information handling in the half-century leading up to the
development of the air service and subsequently down
through and beyond the establishment of the USAF.

I review

the methodological and technological changes that occurred
as the organization out of which the air arm grew, and the
air arm itself, sought to improve the quality, quantity and
delivery of information.
The “Information Age” is a term many are familiar with
yet few can precisely define.

This lack of precision has

not stopped those military and technology experts who
attest that the United States Air Force’s history goes
hand-in-hand with the emergence of the “Information Age”,
especially in the context of the development of the first

Glenn C. Buchan, Information War and the Air Force: Wave
of the Future? Current Fad? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996),
3.
3

2

organizationally-useful computers in the 1940s and the
expansion of USAF computer operations in the following
decades.4

By 1970, after all, the air service was

officially the largest computer user of all federal
agencies in the U.S. government and its information
requirements and developments made it a technological
leader among its sister services.5
Asserting or implying that the “Information Age” began
with the rise of the modern computer, however, is open to
challenge. Some have argued that particular technological
developments in the 19th Century or even the 18th Century
heralded its coming, while others have claimed that such an
age only occurred with the growth of the internet in the
1990s.6

More helpful in the concept of multiple ages of

See Gordon T. Gould, Jr. "Computers and Communications in
the Information Age." Air University Review, May-Jun 1970,
accessed May 01, 2011, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/
airchronicles/aureview/1970/may-jun/gould.html (date
accessed: 12 Dec 12); and Neufeld, et al., Technology and
the Air Force: A Retrospective, 313.
4

Gould, Jr. "Computers and Communications in the
Information Age."
5

See Nico Stehr, "Theories of the Information Age,"
in Historical Developments and Theoretical Approaches in
Sociology, by C. Crothers, vol. II (Oxford: Eolss
Publishers, 2010); James Essinger, Jacquard's Web: How a
Hand-loom Led to the Birth of the Information Age (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004).
6
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information, and the recognition that every “age” evolved –
sometimes in complex ways – out of what came before.7

This

is certainly the case with respect to information and the
U.S. Air Force.

As for “information” itself, the meaning

is also subject to debate.8

In this dissertation, I treat

it as a single piece, or a collection of pieces, of
knowledge, intelligence, or fact, whether it be as small as
a single data figure on a ledger or as vast as a multivolume statistical report.
The dissertation unfolds as follows:


Chapter 1:

The Dawn of an Information Age, 1859-1919.

In this first chapter, I demonstrate how numerous
modifications in the Army’s information environment in
this period were not part of a centralized,
coordinated strategy by the service’s senior leaders
but instead the product of independent decisions made
at all echelons to support unit-level interests.

By

Richard J. Cox, "The Information Age and History: Looking
Backward to See Us," The Information Age and History:
Looking Backward to See Us,” accessed March 03, 2013,
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/2698/1/r_cox_1.html.
7

See "Information Definitions," Merriam-Webster, accessed
June 06, 2013, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
information; "Information," Oxford Dictionary - Online,
accessed June 06, 2013, http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/
definition/american_english/information; Nico Stehr,
"Theories of the Information Age"; and Richard J. Cox, "The
Information Age and History: Looking Backward to See Us."
8
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exposing the origins and outcomes of these changes, I
show how this information transformation was
unsystematic and occasionally myopically-focused.
Regardless of their origin, the results of these
changes were often beneficial as the organization
struggled through its reconstruction and
reorganization.

In doing so, the Army found it could

standardize its processes, refine its decision-making,
and justify its actions and relevance in the face of
bureaucratic opposition.


Chapter 2:

Information Standardization, Data

Mechanization, and Statistical Control, 1907 - 1947.
This chapter demonstrates how information management
and application played an essential role in the
development and operation of a budding air service.
discuss the myriad devices, from aviation-specific
forms to inventory and reporting systems, which
developed the information capabilities of the Army’s
air units in order to help organize and employ forces
both in-garrison and at war.

As the air arm grew,

these devices provided more timely and expansive
information generation and processing for the
service’s logistical and administrative functions as
well.

Throughout this chapter, I explain why this
5

I

information evolution occurred and demonstrate how
information was pivotal to the growth of the Air Force
and its technological development.


Chapter 3:

Early Air Force Computing and Mechanized

Data Management Programs, 1947-1955.

In this chapter,

I focus on the origins of Air Force computing and
mechanized data management and how important
individual initiative was to the service’s success.

I

explore how, through the dedication and tenacity of a
number of key individuals, change across the service’s
information environment was produced in this period.
All this is displayed by focusing specifically on the
early years of the Air Force and the contributions and
advances that helped shape the service’s operational
and organizational information landscape.


Chapter 4:

The Origins of a Data Automation System,

1953-1968.

In Chapter 4, I address the development of

the groundbreaking Standard Base Supply System (SBSS)
program.

This chapter covers the discussions and

events that led to the SBSS becoming the Air Force’s
one-and-only supply system by the highpoint of the
Vietnam War.

I further explore the important aspects

of the program’s evolution that help illuminate the

6

critical programs that followed soon after the SBSS
began.
This structure will illustrate the extent to which the
computer-driven air force “information age” was part of an
evolutionary process dating back to the years after the
Civil War; decades during which one information system, or
set of systems, succeeded and often overlapped with
another.

As will become clear, though use and integration

of the computer in the mid-20th Century marked a major
milestone for the Air Force, the roots of service
information gathering and processing can be found in a
post-Civil War “information age”.

7

Chapter 1
The Dawn of an Information Age – 1859-1919
Long before the formation of a distinct aviation
branch, its parent organization – the U.S. Army – spent
decades developing the information processes and procedures
that helped define its operating environment coming out of
the Civil War.

Through orders, manuals and regulations,

elements of the Army made conscious efforts to uniformly
apply these practices throughout their standard routines.
At the same time, the interest in applying emerging
information technologies and business machinery grew in
importance, both at the unit level and at its headquarters.
By the time the Aeronautical Division became a reality in
August 1907, information was already a critical mission
resource.

Operationally and administratively, information

application grew evermore intertwined into the
organization’s functions and training capability,
especially given the increase in overall departmental
paperwork.9

As America entered World War I in 1917, the

Direct quotations include: “[i]ncreasing the mere paper
work has always overweighted (sic) our army and stood in
the way of the comfortable supply of the soldiers,” found
in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1899., vol. 1,
9

8

regulations directing the collection, recording, storage,
exploitation, and transmission of information were not just
a function of daily operations; instead, the information
required often defined these operations as well.10
The necessity for information in Army operations began
in earnest decades earlier.

In 1881, the complete

Regulations of the Army of the United States were codified
and published into one document under the orders of the
Secretary of War.

This massive anthology, well over 1300

pages in length, contained every order, law and regulatory
article required of America’s land-based military
organization fifteen years into its post-war
reconstruction.

With more than 300 pages of governing

edicts and over a thousand pages of forms and corresponding

series 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899),
481, and “[k]nowledge of paperwork is fair; efficiency in
that direction is increasing. None of the medical officers
had any experience in paperwork prior to the SpanishAmerican War,” from Annual Report of the Surgeon General,
United States Army, to the Secretary of War (Washington:
Surgeon General's Office, 1899), 146.
For example, in the 1916 version of Manual for the
Quartermaster Corps, the fuel (coal) accounting procedures
listed in the supplies and property regulations of the
Quartermaster Corps dictate the use of Q.M.C. Forms 210 and
203 to account for total coal credits and debits [see
Manual for the Quartermaster Corps, United States Army,
1916. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), 336].
In short, these specific forms defined the process as they
were specific to the requirement and not a general form
applied as such.
10

9

direction, this compendium was the War Department’s most
comprehensive set of directive guidance in existence.

From

implementing military discipline to operating national
cemeteries, Regulations is an exhaustive document in both
its breadth and depth.11
Collections like Regulations provide readers with
insight into the Army’s operational and administrative
control methodology for a given period.

These collections

are especially helpful when exploring more specific and
detailed topics as they often provide the baseline
information required for historical investigations.
Therefore, when examining the information environment that
predated the air arm, there may be no better documents for
encapsulating all of the Army’s important and oftentimes
interconnected data management policies and procedures.

In

fact, with more than three-quarters of Regulations
dedicated to Army-specific guidance for forms, reports, and
registers, this particular document may look to some as
much an information manual as it does a regulatory one.12

Regulations of the Army of the United States and General
Orders in Force on the 17th of February, 1881. Codified and
Published by Order of the Secretary of War...(Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1881).
11

Regulations of the Army of the United States and General
Orders in Force on the 17th of February, 1881.
12

10

With such a strong emphasis on information collection
and transmission in this one document, it is surmisable
that such a systematic and thoughtful display of regulatory
control is representative of an integrated and organized
data management strategy developed by the service’s senior
leadership.

Likewise, it is just as reasonable to conclude

that these information interconnections were both planned
for, coordinated and vetted through each Army branch’s and
staff department’s chain of command.
the crux:

However, herein lies

not only is Regulations of the Army of the

United States not indicative of such conclusions, but these
conclusions are in fact invalid themselves.
Regulations was not a display of the Army’s
organizational abilities and operational foresight, was not
indicative of a service-wide coordination process, and
certainly was not the end result of an efficiency study
determining the best way to collect and distribute Army
information.

In reality, the War Department created this

document in hindsight and under orders from Congress.

On

the direction of the Appropriations Act of June 23, 1879,
and under the advisement of the Judge Advocate General, the
Secretary of War ordered the Adjutant General of the Army
to codify and publish all applicable regulations and orders

11

in one complete volume.13

A board of five senior officers

convened shortly after the congressional mandate to examine
the codification with orders to remove errors,
inaccuracies, misinterpretations, repetitions,
contradictions, or any relevant defects…but there were no
orders or discussion regarding the design of the service’s
information process nor were any of these five officers
experts in all the relevant elements covered in the
volume.14

Therefore, although it may appear that

Regulations was a major step forward for information
control, in reality it was only a nominal step in
organizing a chaotic regulatory library and correcting the
information mistakes of the past.
Regulations is a microcosm of the Army’s information
strategy during this period – a kluge of directives and
processes established separately and unified without
strategic forethought or vetting.

Although there were

significant changes to the information environment between
the Civil War and World War I, many of these changes
originated at either the branch- or unit-level and were not

13

Ibid, vii.

William Winthrop and Charles McClure, A Digest of
Opinions of the Judge-Advocates General of the
Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), 744746.
14

12

part of any master plan to manage the service’s data.
Unfortunately, efforts like Regulations help feed
overgeneralizations and misinterpretations that exist
regarding the coordination and responsibility associated
with these changes.15

It is only through a more thorough

There is no evidence to suggest that the Army ever crosscoordinated all of its information policies and procedures
between each of its organizations. This misconception is
typically inferred by those who read branch histories or
historical summations that draw lines of distinction
between specific information requirements when in reality
these lines were often blurred. At times, these
conclusions are drawn by authors who make broad
generalizations about either the lines of responsibility or
the coordinated approval of these processes. For example,
in Keith E. Bonn’s Army Officer’s Guide, the author makes
the statement that the Adjutant General Corps, which acts
on behalf of the Commanding General of the Army,
“historically [has] been given the responsibility for
developing Army personnel and administrative policies and
programs” [Keith E. Bonn, Army Officer's Guide
(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2005), 156.]. However,
given that a number of personnel and administrative
information processes were also under the direction of both
the Quartermaster and the Surgeon General, this statement
is misleading. A thorough review of the Army and
individual branch regulations, reports, manuals and
publications published between 1865 and 1919 clearly shows
examples where branches established reporting or data
recording requirements without the authority of the
Commanding General of the Army. In fact, there was such
discord between line and staff organizations that the two
were consistently at odds, especially considering that the
line worked directly for the Commanding General and the
staff for the Secretary of War. In one notable instance,
Commanding General of the Army General William T. Sherman
noted that he had “no authority, control or influence over
anything but the (line organizations)” [See American
Military History. (Washington: Center of Military History,
United States Army, 1989), 263.]. Although there were
moves to create staff organizations before the end of the
15

13

examination of the Army’s information history in this
period that the true origins of these changes can be
uncovered.
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to
demonstrate how the numerous modifications to the Army’s
information environment in the half-century following the
Civil War were not part of a centralized, coordinated
strategy by the service’s most senior leadership.

It will

show that these changes were actually driven by a series of
independent decisions made throughout the service at all
echelons, often to support the finite interests of
subordinate units.

However, by exposing both the origins

and outcomes of these changes, this chapter also shows that
while this information transformation was unsystematic and
occasionally myopically-focused, the results often proved
beneficial to an Army struggling through reconstruction and
reorganization so that it could standardize its processes,
refine its decision-making, and justify its actions and
relevance in the face of bureaucratic opposition.

century, the integration of a formal General Staff – pushed
by then Secretary of War Elihu Root in 1899 – helped add a
more sophisticated layer of organization and control of the
Army that helped alleviate several of these coordination
issues prior to World War I.
14

The Army Environment
As the Civil War came to an end, a new chapter in the
United States Army began.

The military, whose purpose and

size were debated in the years leading up to the war, faced
similar uncertainty in the post-war landscape.

With no

central purpose to match its previous wartime mission, the
Army continued to struggle with both its size and its
mission.

For decades following the war, the Army

encountered a number of critical challenges including the
occupation in the South, the French threat in Mexico,
hostilities in Indian Territory, growing constabulary and
civil engagement duties, and a number of small wars
throughout the world.

However, perhaps no challenge quite

defined the changing Army as did post-war demobilization
and reconstruction.16
The Army’s challenge during demobilization and
reconstruction was five-fold.
had to survive Congress.

First and foremost, the Army

Following the Civil War, many

congressional leaders sought to minimize the role of the
military, which in extreme cases meant rendering the armed

See Paul J. Scheips, Darkness and Light, the Interwar
Years, 1865-1898 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1971), 281-282.
16

15

services altogether useless.17

Congressmen from both

parties questioned the validity of newer post-war Army
roles, such as constabulary services, asset protection, and
election security.

By the mid-1870s, some went so far as

to claim that less than half of the Army was engaging in
legitimate purposes at all.

This “spirit of

unfriendliness” concerning the Army continued toward the
end of the decade, even as the nation’s military demands
began to increase.

In those years, some in Congress (along

with their staff) saw the military as a resource drain
whose expenditures had grave economic consequences,
including driving up inflation.

This period was marked by

Army leaders and their congressional supporters struggling
to find ways to defend the service’s existence against its
numerous critics, leaving the War Department in what one
general officer called a “condition of constant panic.”18
Second, this congressional backlash produced a force
significantly reduced from its wartime strength.

Although

Although many were Democrats from the southern states who
held animosity against the Army following it post-war
occupation, numerous Republican senators also voted for
increased military cutbacks…oftentimes for economic
reasons. See Charles A. Byler, Civil-military Relations on
the Frontier and Beyond, 1865-1917 (Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2006), 25-29.
17

Byler, Civil-military Relations on the Frontier and
Beyond, 1865-1917, 25.
18

16

the Army had been barely 18,000 strong prior to the Civil
War, service leaders felt its missions in post-war America
warranted a much more significant force.
quite the opposite.

The result was

By the time the first Reconstruction

Acts were passed in 1867, the volunteer army had nearly
ceased to exist.

In mid-1866, just over 11,000 of the one

million-plus U.S. soldiers who ended the war were still in
uniform, many of whom were either whites serving in
occupation duties or colored troop regiments.19

Despite the

Army’s reconstruction-era duties, Congress only authorized
a maximum strength of 56,815 in 1867, which was cut to
27,442 by 1876.20

This figure remained relatively constant

until the end of the century.

Congress hardly deviated

thereafter despite numerous attempts to raise and lower
troop strength and appropriate funding.

It was not until

the turn of the century and the reorganization of the Army
that authorized numbers began improving.21

By November 1865, over 800,000 troops were already
discharged and home. See Scheips, Darkness and Light, the
Interwar Years, 1865-1898, 281-282.
19

Many of the reconstruction duties had to do with the
occupation of the South, but not all [see Scheips, 282, as
well as Jerold E. Brown, Historical Dictionary of the U.S.
Army (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 39].
20

Scheips, Darkness and Light, the Interwar Years, 18651898 and Byler, Civil-military Relations on the Frontier
and Beyond, 1865-1917.
21
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The third challenge was the professionalization of the
military.

The post-war era was an introspective period in

which senior service leaders reviewed the Army’s core
missions and foundational requirements in order to best
determine its future.

From this came the perceived need

for an Army professional development system for officers.
This system involved the founding of numerous postgraduate
technical and developmental schools that educated officers
on both branch-specific and command skills.

School

development and a stronger officer corps in turn created a
requirement for the mass publication of professional Army
journals.

Through reading occupation-centric titles such

as The Journal of the United States Artillery and The
Military Surgeon, and military-centric publications such as
United Service and Army and Navy Journal, officers in the
field kept themselves professionally up to data and
followed their service’s major proceedings.

However, at

the unit level, professionalization also meant the
codification of unit processes and programs.

Professional

competence meant more at the unit level than mere schooling
in the operational arts or keeping pace with the latest in
military politics or programs.

Instead, the military took

its lessons from the Civil War by better-defining its

18

operational requirements and processes to ensure unit
activities remained consistent across the service.22
The fourth challenge was the disconnectedness between
Army staff and line organizations.

Even before the Civil

War, Army line organizations (e.g. artillery, infantry, or
cavalry) served the Commanding General of the Army whose
role it was to organize, train and equip each unit with the
single focus of combat efficiency.

They were the

“professional” Army, armed and ready to fight and win the
nation’s wars.

Supporting the line organization were the

staff departments (e.g. ordnance, signals, engineers) which
were devoted to the more scientific and technical aspects
of the service.

While the Commanding General controlled

and disciplined the Army’s territorial line commands, the
Army conducted its fiscal affairs through its staff
departments via the Secretary of War.

Naturally, the

situation was rife with potential friction and animosity,
something which did not improve during the war nor in the
dramatic drawdown that followed.

In 1874, as Congress yet

again attempted to reduce the size of the Army, Commanding
General William T. Sherman noted that he thought certain
staff officers were “no more soldiers than the men at the

Matthew Motten, "Who Is a Member of the Military
Profession?" Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 62 (2011), 14-17.
22

19

Smithsonian.”23

Although reconstruction did not solve the

disconnection, its clarity in the post-war Army defined
these issues for the senior leadership as well as the
congressional leaders who oversaw their performance.24
Finally, demobilization and reconstruction
significantly affected the technical development of the
Army, both in positive and negative ways.

On one hand, the

period was replete with technological expansion and
scientific applications.

The use of railroads for

logistical and communication purposes, the advancement of
breech-loading rifles and artillery, the development of
both field- and long-range telegraphy and telephony, and
eventually the militarization of lighter-than-air aircraft
are all examples of Army advances in the era.

On the other

hand, the period was also marked by staunch military
conservatism, a lack of fiscal resources and personnel, and
a national resistance to the technical developments of war.
The military lagged behind both industry and its European
counterparts on many technological and scientific fronts.

American Military History. (Washington: Center of
Military History, United States Army, 1989), 263.
24 For more information on issues between the line and
staff, see Scheips, Darkness and Light, the Interwar Years,
1865-1898; and Joseph G. Dawson, The Late 19th Century U.S.
Army, 1865-1898: A Research Guide (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1990), 9-15.
23

20

These mixed results put the Army in a difficult situation
leading into the twentieth century, showing that the Army
would not and could not keep up with industrial or peer
competitors so long as it lacked the proper resources and
maintained its persistent isolationist state.25
These five demobilization and reconstruction
challenges not only helped define the Army during this
period, but also clearly influenced its actions and
decisions.

With service brass and even some congressmen

clamoring for additional personnel and fiscal resources,
often to no avail, leaders across the Army took it upon
themselves to better their environment and their units any
way they could.

These improvements included changing the

way they processed and distributed their information.
Branch leaders often took it upon themselves to redesign
their area’s key processes and then formalize their
application throughout the Army, even if that meant writing
their own regulations.

Scheips, Darkness and Light, the Interwar Years, 18651898; Byron Farwell, The Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-century
Land Warfare: An Illustrated World View (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2001), 48-135; Rebecca Robbins Raines, Getting the
Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal
Corps (Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army,
1996).
25

21

Early Army Information Processes
While there were a number of military information
advancements throughout the nineteenth century, few periods
provide such a vivid picture of informational progress as
did the period of the American Civil War.

In many ways,

the Civil War was an information war, prosecuted by both
sides using both old and new methods of communication,
reconnaissance, intelligence, data collection and
reporting.

In fact, several of the war’s methodological

and technological developments were groundbreaking in that
their integration into unit operations permeated nearly all
aspects of operational endeavor.

These developments

included the founding of two new military communications
units, the addition of both tactical and strategic
telegraph communication applications, the addition of new
short-range visual signaling, an increased use of military
and commercial messenger services, photographic
communication and reporting, and lighter-than-air aerial
reconnaissance and communications ventures.26

Thanks to a

The two new military communications units were the Signal
Corps, founded in 1860, and the Military Telegraph Corps,
founded in 1861. The tactical (or short line) telegraph
was part of the Signal Corps attempt at using the Beardslee
Magneto-Electric Telegraph while the strategic (long line)
telegraphs were a greater function of the Telegraph Corps.
The new short-range visual signaling system, called the
“wig-wag,” was developed by the first Army Signal Officer,
26

22

growing reliance on information in military operations, the
Army’s information environment following the war looked
very different from the one in place just a few years
earlier.
As part of the service’s post-war reform process,
leaders in the post-war Army sought to further develop how
the organization would maintain and transfer its data.
With indicators such as the Annual Report of the Secretary
of War and its numerous sub-reports, the importance of
information to senior leaders was unmistakable.27

These

reports overflowed with quantitative and qualitative
information gleaned not only from headquarters units but
also from the Army’s remaining field units.

Obtaining what

was necessary for such documents required higher echelon
units to dictate exactly what information they needed as

Albert Myer, and was the rationale for the Signal Corps
created in 1860. See Rebecca Raines, Getting the Message
Through.
Examples of these reports include the numerous Annual
Report of the Secretary of War volumes, as well as the
individual annual reports to the Secretary of War. For
reference, see Annual Report of the Secretary of
War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881), Annual
Report of the Chief of Engineers to the Secretary of War
upon the Improvement of Cumberland River, Tennessee and
Kentucky, and of Obion and Forked Deer Rivers,
Tennessee. (Washington: s.n., 1896); Annual Report of the
Chief Signal-Officer to the Secretary of War. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1873).
27

23

well as how units should document and transmit this
information at each installation.

By and large, these

methods assumed several dominant standards that remained
consistent until the World War I.

They included the use

of:


Registers (ledgers, record books) to record operations
at military installations and between units throughout
the Army



Standardized forms or documentation formats to
annotate the transfer and documentation of information



Either handwritten or mechanically-written documents
and correspondence

The Army used orders and regulations to dictate the
service’s priorities for administrative processes.

For a

service fighting for clarity in a period of national and
organizational transition, these standards represent but a
portion of its attempt to regulate its operations during a
period of change and conflict.
Among these standards, the best documented is official
record bookkeeping.

Formally maintaining official records

grew out of the establishment of the War Department in 1789
and became an important organizational function.

For

decades before and after the Civil War, the Army’s primary
means of information documentation continued to be the
compilation of operational and administrative data in
24

record books, also referred to as ledgers or registers.
Coming in numerous shapes and sizes, these records remained
the primary method for documenting and filing information
across the spectrum of Army processes ranging from
personnel matters to logistics to combat maneuvers.
Additionally, although the Government Printing Office
maintained the capability to produce formalized, printed
copies of Army data beginning in 1861, the original ledgers
remained overwhelmingly handwritten.

Even as new

technologies allowed for recording improvements, the Army
remained faithful to the ledger system well into World War
I.28
Requirements for Army registers are strewn throughout
War Department regulations of the age and derive from the
requirements of the various service branches.

By the late

nineteenth century, these document books were an
inescapable part of standard Army administration and record
keeping procedures.

For instance, in 1895, the Army

required that all stations maintain a series of “books of
record” at each location, to include an order book,

The Government Printing Office was created in June 1860
by Congressional Joint Resolution 25 but did not begin its
operations until March 1861. See James L. Harrison, 100 GPO
Years: 1861 - 1961; A History of United States Public
Printing (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010).
28
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letters-received and letters-sent books (both with
corresponding index books), and a post council
administration book.29

Additionally, individual branches

such as the Quartermaster and Adjutant General required
ledgers that included a morning report book, guard report
book, and a Post Exchange council book.30

Meanwhile, at

lower levels on post, divisions and companies also
maintained their own records to preserve order and document
administration.

At the company level, for example,

registers included a separate company order book, books of
letters and sent, company council book, sick report book,
clothing book, morning report book, a descriptive and
deposit book, and a duty roster.

In some cases, these

ledgers became so extensive they even included descriptive
books of all public animals on post.

By the end of the

nineteenth century, the Army appeared committed to using
registers as its means of systematically documenting the
major activities at each of its posts around the world.31

Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes
No. 8. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895), 29.
29

Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes
No. 8, 29.
30

31

Ibid.
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Beyond documenting the standard logistical events at
each location, each station was additionally responsible
for maintaining a standardized and comprehensive store of
directives and regulations.

The War Department required

that post record clerks diligently maintain all downwarddirected orders and instructions to ensure each location
operated alike.

Army commanders, as required by

regulations, insisted all existing orders, letters and
correspondence affecting company personnel be likewise
maintained to ensure information standardization.32
Meanwhile, this uniformity across installations allowed for
a level of information homogeneity that made station and
unit data readily available to headquarters echelons.

By

either inquiry or up-channel reporting, this process
permitted senior leaders access to subordinate data by way
of rolls, reports, and returns on a regular basis.

For

branches such as the Quartermaster and Adjutant General,
keeping operations uniform across the department became
paramount, and Army leaders wrote additional regulations
standardizing information recording to ensure
correspondence between units remained consistent.

Record

book documentation and regulations, however, were not

32

Ibid, 37.
27

enough.

What often predicated this data recording, and

other times stood on its own, was the application of
standardized information forms.33
Official Army forms, typically numbered for simplicity
of reference, were often pre-printed documents used by
units or installations to provide or annotate information.
Although the term form usually represented the paperwork
itself, the terms form and format were often synonymous in
that the specified verbiage on a document form could
instead be written by hand on blank paper.

Overall, the

meaning and importance of forms over time were often the
guiding principles of administrative processes throughout
the Army.

For example, one Army publication emphasized

that:
The ultimate end for which a company is
created and maintained is to render perfect
service on the field of battle. To attain
this end many things are required and a
realization of the correct proportion, each
bear to the other is necessary….[efficiency
in paperwork] is required by law and
regulations and can not be slighted, nor
done in a slip-shod manner. If it is done
thoroughly and accurately at first, it ends
there....The instructions on the blank
forms have the same weight as regulations
and should be followed explicitly.34

See Regulations of the Army of the United States and
General Orders in Force on the 17th of February, 1881 and
Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes
No. 8.
33
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Prescribed forms and formats in Army administrative
operations were nothing new in the service, some dating
back to the earliest years of the War Department.

In fact,

early departmental regulations at the turn of the
nineteenth century make specific reference to blank forms
designed to illicit specific information from field
commanders.35

As the military matured, the use of these

forms grew even more prevalent and dynamic.
With improved reproduction devices and the formation
of the Government Printing Office by the early 1860s, the
department increased its capability to provide blank forms
to the Army posts across the nation.36

In addition, the

mass printing of Army regulations amplified the use of
standard forms as they became a more integral part of
normal administrative operations.

All this ensured a

Fifty Forms, Company and Regimental U.S. Army Paper Work,
with Instructions and Sample Forms (to Date, July 1,
1918) (Tacoma, WA: Pioneer Bindery & Print., 1918), 3.
34

An Act Establishing Rules and Articles for the Government
of the Armies of the United States: With the Regulations of
the War Department Respecting the Same, to Which Are Added,
the Several Laws Relative to the Army, the Militia When in
Actual Service, Volunteers, Rangers, Ordnance Department,
and the Quarter Master's and Commissary General's
Department. (Albany: Webster’s & Skinners, 1812), 115.
35

James L. Harrison, 100 GPO Years: 1861 - 1961; A History
of United States Public Printing.
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greater level of consistency in the department’s
information gathering efforts.

For example, beyond the

standard record keeping logs of the post Quartermaster, the
Army required supply customers to complete specific
requisition forms to ensure requests were officially
transmitted, logged, and acted upon.

Army Regulations from

1861, 1881, 1895, and 1916 all dictate similar paperwork
requirements for managing logistical stocks regardless of
station.37

Despite the vast changes in the military over

more than fifty years, form requirements prior to World War
I closely mirrored those of the Civil War.

Although the

forms were subject to change based on the branch or
division from which they derived, the requirement for their
use hardly changed at all.
The importance of detailed record keeping and form
management in this period cannot be understated.

Depending

See Theodore S. Case, Quartermaster's Guide Being a
Summary of the Army Regulations of 1863, and General Orders
from the War Dept. from May 1861 to April 10, 1865 Which
Affect the Quartermaster's Dept., with All General Orders
from the Quartermaster General's Office to April 10,
1865. (St. Louis: P.M. Pinckard, 1865); Regulations of the
Army of the United States and General Orders in Force on
the 17th of February, 1881 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1882); Regulations for the Army of the United
States, Appendixes No. 8, and Manual for the Quartermaster
Corps, United States Army, 1916. (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1917).
37
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on the specific Army branch, service directives frequently
dictated that unit leaders account for their activities and
resources to higher echelons on a regular basis.

These

accounts, filed either in periodic written reports or formderived bookkeeping statements, were often later compiled
into much larger volumes that were sent to either senior
military agencies or congressional committees.

The task

was often arduous and time consuming, but was nevertheless
a mandatory requirement for commanders across the War
Department.

Of all the branches and units requiring data

for operations and reports, few organizations exemplify
this requirement more than the Army’s Quartermaster.
The Quartermaster’s responsibilities in the 19th
Century remained relatively true to its Continental Army
origins in 1775.38

As the sole provider of logistical

support to the Army, its mission was naturally
administratively intensive.

Therefore, its reports and

corresponding forms required a great deal of clerical work
and administrative forbearance. For instance, general
orders required each branch officer to file an end-of-year
Quartermaster Report by the close of each fiscal period.

"Quartermaster History," US Army Quartermaster School,
Fort Lee, Virginia, accessed April 5, 2013,
http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/qm_history.html.
38
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The report was demanding; by order, it required narrative
summaries, resource compilations and calculations, and
personal assessments of condition and readiness for nearly
all logistical matters under the officer’s purview.
Moreover, regulations required the report include
additional logistical data encapsulated in thirteen
distinct branch forms.39

These forms, labeled Forms A

through M for simplicity, covered public funds,
quartermaster property, clothing and equipage,
transportation costs, lost or captured materiel, telegraph
systems, and property sold at public auction.

Upon

completion, orders required the officers to file these
reports in specific fashion without deviation – on halfsheets of “fools cap” paper, written only on one side and
fastened uniformly at the top.

With the vast amount of

required data, standardization remained key in the post-war
Army, even if only for convenience in filing.40
With forms providing so much data at each location,
the final information challenge concerned recording.
Whether the documentation medium was a record ledger, an

General Orders, Quartermaster General’s Office
1868 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1869), 60-89.
39

General Orders, Quartermaster General’s Office 1868, 6062.
40
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official memorandum, or a blank personnel request form, the
options regarding printing method changed dramatically in
the mid-1870s with the invention and consumer production of
an industry-ready typewriter.41

Once these machines became

commercially available and operationally viable, Army units
had their choice of “writing,” either by hand or machine.
Without any regulatory requirement to use one or the other,
it became incumbent upon each unit to either acquire these
machines or continue documenting and corresponding in
longhand.

The absence of service-directed guidance for

typewriter purchases (or other administrative machines, for
that matter) meant funding for these devices was deficient.
For commanders, the choice of documentation method was
their decision to make.

Therefore, despite the creation of

standardization methods such as registers and forms, how
information was recorded ensured that department-wide
consistency remained elusive.
By and large, administrators continued to rely on
handwriting as their primary means of data recording and
correspondence going into the twentieth century.

Since the

War Department never mandated mechanically-produced
writing, handwritten record books, personally scripted

Charles Edward Weller, The Early History of the
Typewriter (La Porte, IN: Chase & Shepard, Printers, 1918).
41

33

correspondence and hand-scribed orders remained a principal
form of Army documentation for decades in the postReconstruction military.

The compilation of data at each

military station remained essential to its daily
operations.

Equally important was the delivery of the

written word both on post and across locations.

As it

happened, Army regulations of the late nineteenth century
stressed the importance of written reports, directives and
correspondence.

In fact, many regulations of the period

stipulated that the appropriate transmission of information
either be originated or finalized in handwriting, without
exception.42

Even as late as 1915, Army disbursing

regulations required handwriting and prohibited the use of
mechanized printing or stamping when filling out certain
forms.43

Additionally, most pre-bound ledgers could not

accommodate machine-entered data given their construction
and configuration.

Handwriting may have been antiquated,

but it remained an important method of communicating
information well into the twentieth century.

Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes
No. 8, Manual for the Quartermaster Corps: United States
Army : 1916 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917).
42

General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations, Signal
Corps., United States Army.
43
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With the establishment of these critical
documentation methods, the United States Army determined
its own administrative, information processing future,
though without any unified, central guidance from its
commanding general.

Meanwhile, the draw of administrative

machines – most specifically, the typewriter – quickly
became a factor in the information processes of both the
military and the national government.

As the 19th century

drew to a close, machines that could “write” or “compute”
were fast becoming part of the public conscience despite
the challenge of injecting them into military operations.
Whether or not the Army applied these devices in its
information environment was no longer the military’s
concern alone.

Its ability to adapt to the most modern

administrative methods of the day became an issue both
inside the War Department and out.
Early Army Information Machinery
At the same time leaders throughout the Army were
shoring up information procedures, several additional
variables came into play as the both staff and line
branches examined the future of their administrative
environment.

These variables centered on the potential

usefulness of machines, ones specifically designed to

35

complement the growing information requirements found
throughout the industrialized world.
Beginning in the 1870s, the pages of local and national
publications were often strewn with advertisements praising
workplace improvement products.

Amidst the announcements

for specialized office furniture, groundbreaking
communication devices, and innovative writing utensils were
some for the latest industrial consumables: mechanical
office equipment.

Office machine manufacturers used these

ads to boast how their products possessed the capability to
improve workplace efficiency, generate sales volume and
increase output production.

From the paper-roll and

standard-type typewriters to damp-leaf and papyrograph
copiers, the promise of these information instruments
enticed administrators and bookkeepers from across the
industrial landscape to seek business improvement through
their use.44
Industrial corporation leaders found themselves
debating the utility of these and other office improvement
products.

The possibility of enhancing accounting,

statistical, and information management techniques proved

For the best source of these advertisements, see The
Cosmopolitan, March-August 1886, 1-415, with specific
reference to pages 403-418.
44
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alluring to many corporations, but especially to those with
a large administrative overhead.

Organizations

administratively responsible for a multitude of resources
could clearly benefit from automation and mechanization if
all the advertisements were to be believed.

The popularity

of these products in this era underscores the imagination
several of certain inventors, entrepreneurs, and companies,
each seeking success in increasing the documentation,
reproduction, and data calculation capabilities of office
machines in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Likewise, instruments such as the mechanical typewriter,
mimeograph printing machine, electrical data tabulator, and
arithmometer and comptometer mechanical calculator all
provided organizational leaders with the potential for
achieving an increase in capability.
The question facing United States Army commanders,
meanwhile, was choosing which innovations to apply, if any
at all.

In the decades following the Civil War, the

nation’s military attempted to settle into a more
conventional rhythm.

Branch organizations such as the

Adjutant General, Surgeon General, and the Quartermaster
spent a great deal of time and effort standardizing their
administrative activities and practices to best control the
information of the Army in garrison.
37

Despite record books

and standardized forms serving as a baseline for military
administrative procedures, individual War Department units
began looking to mechanical advances to improve their
information processes, especially those in the areas of
logistics, health management, administration and personnel.
Innovative equipment capable of dramatically improving the
quality of unit correspondence, interaction, and
information maintenance proved especially intriguing to
those units whose very livelihood depended on the accurate
and reliable transfer of information.

By the last decade

of the century, much to the delight of magazine
advertisers, the typewriter’s relative absence in Army
doctrine was fast being overshadowed by the willingness of
soldiers to test these mechanical devices in their units.
The Army’s use of the typewriter prior to 1890 was
sporadic at best.

In fact, mention of mechanical

typewriters in service documents before that time is
incredibly sparse, highlighting a general lack of interest
amongst service leaders in promoting their use.

In 1874,

Quartermaster General of the Army Brigadier General
Montgomery C. Meigs examined the first production model of
Sholes and Glidden’s typewriter and saw its utility for

38

future army administration.45

Thereafter, though, Army

records of the era that specifically mention “typewriter”
refer more often than not to a person holding a clerical
position.46

Other documents do, however, place increased

emphasis on the printing of official documents as opposed
to the reliance on those accomplished by hand, thereby
signifying a shift toward preference for data recorded in
typeset.

This in turn led to individual unit purchases of

typewriters.

As the haphazard purchasing and utilization

of typewriters increased throughout the service, it became
incumbent upon War Department leaders to ensure future

Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History
of the Corps, 1775-1939 (Washington: Center of Military
History, U.S. Army, 1989), 734-735., "General Montgomery
Cunningham Meigs," Scientific American 66 (1892), 71.
45

Reports of Committees of the Senate of the United States
for the First Session of the Fiftieth Congress, 188788 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1888), 130;
Register of the War Department: January 1,
1889. (Washington: [s.n.], 1889), 139, 154, 176. Testimony
before the Joint Commission to Consider the Present
Organizations of the Signal Service, Geological Survey,
Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Hydrographic Office of
the Navy Department, with a View to Secure Greater
Efficiency and Econommy (sic) of Administration of the
Public Service in Said Bureaus, (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1886), 316; Business Methods in the War
Department: Report of the Board Appointed in Compliance
with the Request of the Senate Select Committee to
Investigate the Methods of Business in the Executive
Departments. (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1889).
46
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equipment use fell within an Army operational standard.
Therefore, the Army began issue regulations.47
The Army’s initial attempt to regulate and record
typewriter usage appears in various War Department
directives published in the latter half of the 1880s.48
Over the next several decades, thousands of typewriters
from a myriad manufacturers were unsystematically acquired
by headquarters and field units depending on their needs
and resources at the time.

Between 1892 and 1920, Army

reports and directives show a steady increase in typewriter
usage, especially in administratively heavy organizations
such as the Quartermaster Department, Office of the Surgeon
General, Adjutant General, Corps of Engineers, and Signal
Corps.

Moreover, throughout this period, calls for

typewriters, typewriter stands, paper (both letterhead and

This information derives from Annual Reports of the War
Department (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1885),
422; Business Methods in the War Department: Report of the
Board Appointed in Compliance with the Request of the
Senate Select Committee to Investigate the Methods of
Business in the Executive Departments. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1889), 19; Francis Marlon
Cockrell, Report [of] the Select Committee of the United
States Senate: Appointed under Senate Resolution of March
3, 1887, to Inquire into and Examine the Methods of
Business and Work in the Executive Departments, Etc., and
the Causes of Delays in Transacting the Public Business,
Etc.(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1888), 31-92.
47

48
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plain), ribbons, machine oil, brushes, and cases are
scattered throughout the requirements of field units.49
Since administrative machine usage remained predominately
unit-based, shifting from handwritten records to a more
formal, typewritten form of documentation varied from unit
to unit.

When to change across the board, as well as how

and why, would all become questions for a War Department
consistently in transition.
Prior to World War I, perhaps the clearest indication
of the typewriter’s acceptance in the Army is found in the
regulatory vernacular itself.

Towards the end of the

nineteenth century, administrative doctrine utilized the
term “writing” in an all-encompassing fashion, implicitly
refusing to a draw distinction between handwritten and
mechanized print-based correspondence.

While it was

implied that Army clerks should have access to typewriters

For a sample of this guidance, see Property and General
Regulations of the Signal Corps, U.S. Army. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1898); Manual for the
Quartermaster Corps, United States Army, 1916. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1917); General, Property, and
Disbursing Regulations, Signal Corps, United States
Army. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915);
Manual for the Medical Department (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1896); Annual Report of the Chief of
Engineers to the Secretary of War [upon the] Improvement of
Cumberland River, Tennessee and Kentucky, and of Obion and
Forked Deer Rivers, Tennessee. (Washington: s.n., 1896).
49
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by the early twentieth century, there was no standing
requirement for most paperwork to be typed.50

As late as

1916, the Manual for the Quartermaster Corps directs
soldiers to complete supply forms and correspondence by
dictating they “so state in writing,” “write upon the
discharge” and “write the words,” with no mention of which
writing method – handwritten or typewritten – to utilize.51
Meanwhile, regulations further stated that blank forms
contain spaces “of such size as to permit [information]
being typewritten on an ordinary machine,” yet said nothing
explicitly about these spaces being filled with typed
information.52

Thus, although the Army grew more accustomed

to machine-written documentation, typewriter use remained a
matter of individual preference influenced by industrial
standards and marketing campaigns.
On occasion, it did become necessary for operational
Army regulations to mention the typewriter by name.
Although infrequent in the context of the voluminous amount
of directives issued during this period, these certain

James Alfred Moss, Army Paperwork: A Practical Working
Guide in Army Administration (Menasha, WI: G. Banta, 1917),
214.
50

Manual for the Quartermaster Corps, United States Army,
1916, 234, 311-324.
51

52

Ibid, 58.
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regulations aimed to provide guidance concerning typewriter
use within Army organizations.

For instance, Army courts

martial instructions specify that if a typewriter is used
that the court must utilize a “copyable ribbon” when
practicable to save time and labor when making copies.53
Other regulations, meanwhile, set strict limits on
typewriter use.

By direction of the Secretary of War,

typewriter use was prohibited among payroll disbursing
officers when filling out checks due to the belief that
typewriter ink could be erased and/or changed more easily
than ink on handwritten checks.54

In another case, the

Quartermaster General ruled in 1912 that certain expense
accounts “must be made out in ink” and would not be
accepted if typewritten.55
In fact, at the start of the twentieth century, the
verb “type” had not yet entered the Army’s administrative
lexicon.

Instead, the service still used the verb “to

write” in its regulations to signify the act of typing as

53

Ibid, 1916.

Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes
No. 8, 343.
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General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations, Signal
Corps., United States Army. (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1915), 24.
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well as handwriting, along with the more specific phrase
“written on the typewriter.”56
Before America’s entry into World War I in 1917, the
Army refrained from any service-wide programmatic
acquisitions of typewriters.57 Although thousands of
typewriters were bought in bulk by various units inside the
War Department as the Army prepared for war, there was no
centralized buying program or single headquarters
oversight.

Thus, there was no unilateral allegiance to a

specific machine or manufacturer.

Nonetheless, individual

unit bulk purchases became significant for the typewriter
companies.58

In fact, many manufacturers eagerly used their

service contracts as marketing tools in their advertising
campaigns.

Periodicals from this period show contract

flaunting was not only a matter of pride but also the
result of extensive market competition.

Oftentimes, it was

Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes
No. 8, 386, and Army Circular No. 29, Headquarters of the
Army, Adjutant-General's Office (August 22,
1900) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900).
56

Email correspondence with Paul Morando (Director of the
Army Quartermaster Museum), Leo Hirrel (Historian of the
Army’s Quartermaster School), Luther Hanson (Curator for
the Army’s Quartermaster Museum), and Darcie Fouste
(Director of the Adjutant General Museum), between 11/19/12
and 12/31/12.
57

58

Ibid.
44

not enough to merely boast about contract possession; it
was equally important to explain why a product was chosen
over its competitors.

As a result, typewriter contracts

made both the news and the advertising pages of periodicals
and magazines of the day.
Examples of such flaunting ranged from prideful
expressions of technological superiority to outright
bragging over the impact of one’s product.

As an example,

a Smith Premier Typewriter Company’s advertisement boasted
in 1892 about receiving an order from the War Department
for 150 machines.

Claiming that "improvement is the order

of the age," Smith Premier asserted that this order was the
largest typewriter contract signed by any government or
corporation to date and was based upon the company’s “many
improvements and superior mechanical excellence…over all
other typewriters.”59

Just a year later, a Densmore

Typewriter Company ad explained how War Department units
had also adopted its product into daily operations,
approving of their performance to the point that they
renewed the contract two years later.60

By World War I,

Darcie Fouste, Smith Premiere Typewriter Advertisement,
Adjutant General Collection, United States Army Adjutant
General Museum, Fort Jackson, SC.
59
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industry leaders such as the Corona Typewriter Company had
published advertisements boasting of their involvement in
the nation’s war effort.

The company claimed that

"countless Coronas are in daily use in many sectors of the
great battle-fields…their ready portability, made possible
by their light weight and compactness, appeals [to] the
officer whose orders must be legible.”61

Although the Army

left few details about typewriter use before the war, the
typewriter classifieds of the day were rife with
application examples.

For those outside the service, these

advertisements were perhaps the only written notice of the
Army’s adoption of the typewriter into daily information
operations.
Congress, however, once World War I was over, grew
increasingly concerned over how many typewriters the Army
had actually purchased . . . and why.

In an address to the

Congressional House Subcommittee on Appropriations in
February, 1920, Army Major Charles Arrighi of the
Quartermaster Corps reported that as of June 30, 1919, the

Darcie Fouste, Densmore Typewriter Advertisement,
Adjutant General Collection, United States Army Adjutant
General Museum, Fort Jackson, SC.
60

Darcie Fouste, Corona Typewriter Advertisement, Adjutant
General Collection, United States Army Adjutant General
Museum, Fort Jackson, SC.
61
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War Department maintained 47,748 typewriters in their
administrative arsenal – 35,024 in use and another 12,724
in stock or storage.62

With an Army projected as needing

nearly 275,000 men following additional post-war
reorganizations, the Major predicted the War Department
would require approximately 28,588 typewriters for
administrative utilization in the Army of the future, or
roughly 1 for every 10 soldiers.

Moreover, he estimated

that a requirement also existed for another 20,000
typewriters for vocational training.

With an average life

span of only three years, typewriters had in fact become an
essential commodity at each Army post around the world.

It

was Major Arrighi’s job not only to account for the number
of machines in the service but also to report on their
condition, utilization, and potential reuse.

Prior to the

war, purchases of more than a hundred machines were
considered major acquisitions by Army organizations.

In

the post-war Army, however, usage and replacement
requirements meant that acquisitions now ranged in the
thousands with little slowing in sight.63

Major Arrighi was from the Quartermaster Corps’ Division
of Storage.
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What brought Arrighi to Congress was not so much the
number of typewriters in use but rather the number
apparently going to waste.

Representative William R. Wood

(R, Indiana) led the congressional appropriations inquiry
in which Arrighi, two additional Army officers and a senior
civil servant carefully justified the number of typewriters
required by the War Department in peacetime.64

At issue was

the element of machine waste with three major categories
under contention:

machines purchased during the war but

unpacked and unused; machines used and operational but no
longer in use; and machines broken and repairable but in
storage while new machines were purchased.

On February 12,

1920, Representative Wood challenged the United States Army

and Judicial Appropriation Bill for 1921. Sixty-sixth
Congress, Second Session ... (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1920).
Besides Major Charles T. Arrighi, the other three
individuals summoned to the hearing were Lieutenant H. A.
Clemetsen of the Division of Purchase, Lieutenant Colonel
L. B. Gerow of the Requirements Division, and Mr. W. D.
Koch from the Office of the Director of Sales.
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Appropriation Bill,
1921: Hearing before Subcommittee of House Committee on
Appropriations... in Charge of the Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial Appropriation Bill for 1921. Sixty-sixth
Congress, Second Session. Information on Representative
William Robert Wood found at "Wood, William Robert Biographical Information," Wood, William Robert Biographical Information, accessed April 1, 2013,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W0
00706.
64
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to articulate its official plans for the administrative use
and care of its typewriters…but the Army simply did not
have a coherent answer.

According to Arrighi, War

Department leaders initially surmised that perhaps a ratio
of one typewriter per 75 soldiers was appropriate, but that
figure was inaccurate as it failed to account for the
civilian workforce requirement.

Additionally, this ratio

was devised for an operational Army, thus additional
training and recruitment requirements would skew that
number tremendously.

Overall, it became clear to Wood and

his committee that there existed no coherent plan for
typewriters in the Army and that thousands of these
machines were going to waste, either being bought without
reason or purchased with appropriate intent but not
utilized or reutilized properly.

Despite his incredulous

and unprofessional tone, Wood had uncovered a longstanding
truth about the Army’s strategic administrative plans for
the typewriter – there were none.65
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For his part, Wood seemed bent on teaching the Major
and his associates a hard lesson in fiscal responsibility
and program management.

With an Army preparing for a

dramatic drawdown and serious economic constraints, the
inquiry was certainly well-timed.

After questioning

individuals from the Quartermaster’s Requirements Division,
Purchase and Storage Divisions, and an agent of the Office
of the Director of Sales, Wood was unable to extract a
coherent answer concerning the Army’s administrative
strategies and requirements.

Based on testimony, the Army

possessed few valid calculations determining the clerical
support required either per individual or per unit.

It

merely based its projections on previous organizational and
administrative experience.

Moreover, estimates submitted

never determined if all clerks or administrators even
required typewriters, or if there existed a more valid
ratio or correlation between such men and machines.

The

Army also grappled with the issue of whether its nonclerical personnel required typewriters at their location,
and if so, how many?

All told, the notional data presented

by the four War Department representatives never satisfied
the appropriations committee.

Instead, the testimony of

Arrighi and three other officials only proved the Army’s
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inability to discern between haphazard information
processes and valid administrative principles.66
While the Army had no coherent strategy for typewriter
use, the war did manage to become the impetus for one
strategic decision regarding the service’s office
equipment.

Of the information machinery improvements made

in and around World War I, one of the most important was
the centralization of Army purchasing.

Beginning in August

1918, the service’s Purchases Office in Washington, DC
became the clearinghouse for all office machine-related
acquisitions through the end of the war and beyond.

In

fact, between August 15 and November 11 of 1918 alone, the
Army centrally approved the purchase of 23,378 machines of
various kinds for use throughout the service.67

For the

first time since they appeared in the marketplace,
typewriters and other administrative devices could no
longer be purchased on the whim of an individual unit.
Moreover, the Army required that requesting organizations
provide appropriate justification to the Director’s office
for any administrative requirement they had.

Although the

War Department had no official service-wide procurement
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program at the time, this purchasing centralization managed
to at least unveil the Army’s unit-level administrative
necessities to its most senior echelons.

Furthermore, it

forced the financially strapped postwar service to
investigate alternative methods for fulfilling these
mission-essential requirements, most notably the use of
unused and reusable equipment.68
While reusing equipment was not new in the military,
the coordination of such a process was.

In combination

with the new centralized acquisition process, this new
approach allowed the Army to capitalize on a centralized
surplus accountability system that operated both inside the
Army and out.

Inside the Army, the Supply Section in the

office of the Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic
became the arbiter of service-wide machine management,
determining how best to redistribute excess typewriters and
other equipment stored throughout the country.

Originally,

the Army installed the office in December 1918 under
wartime authority to dispose of surplus property acquired
during the “war emergency.”69
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than contracting for new equipment straight away, the
process tightened to ensure all new equipment requests were
first reviewed by headquarters and then, after
crosschecking the Army’s surplus registers, filled with
devices held in excess.

If no machines were available, the

Army looked outside the organization to the General Supply
Committee of the Treasury.

There, the department

maintained its own ledger of government-wide surplus
machines and redistributed them as applicable.70

In both

cases, in an effort to recover money spent in the frenzy of
wartime preparation, any remaining excess machines were
sold to other government agencies, or even to industry, in
an effort to recover the costs of war.71
For the Army, the combination of equipment operations
and maintenance, future requirements management, and
service-wide distribution and redistribution of equipment
resulted in a centralized office equipment management
program designed to save money in a manner Congressman Wood
and the appropriations committee had expected.

Their

concern, however, was that the process took place too late
in the Army’s purchasing scheme.

Moreover, they were not
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convinced it worked as advertised in the first place.

With

such a high volume of typewriters purchased in such a short
amount of time, it is quite possible Army managers lost
sight of both the purchasing and destiny of this equipment,
much as the committee surmised.

Luckily, other

administrative machines purchased during the same period
were not nearly as abundant and could thus be better
tracked.

Therefore, the Army was able to more accurately

account for and regulate these machines.

Administrative

records from the post-war Army depict an organization with
a growing interest in information devices beyond the
typewriter.

As it happened, the War Department’s

complement of office equipment grew to include a plethora
of devices designed to calculate, duplicate and record
information, demonstrating a concerted effort to improve
the information capability at the headquarters- and the
unit-level alike.72
As mentioned, purchased quantities of these “other”
administrative machines were much smaller than with
typewriters of the era.

In fact, they represented less

than two percent of the total administrative machine
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stockpile in the War Department as of January 1920.73
Still, their impact on the Army’s tactical and strategic
information processes was invaluable at the time.

Despite

their small number, these machines exposed soldiers to an
even broader range of mechanization.

Instead of the usual

power production or transportation machinery soldiers had
grown accustomed to as part of the Machine Age, Army
professionals were instead considering a relatively unique
premise during this period:

the automation of manual

information processes and data tabulation.

This

information mechanization opened the aperture for a newer
way of thinking about data recording and manipulation, in
turn affecting administrative actions and organizational
decisions.
Of the nearly 800 non-typewriting administrative
devices in the Army at the end of 1919, the most prevalent
by far was the mimeograph machine.

With over 560 of these

mechanical units in place throughout the Army, the device
became a primary means of document reproduction outside of
the Government Printing Office (GPO).

Post-war mimeographs

had evolved from their first marketable versions in the
1880s, but their replication method of ink transfer
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mechanisms and stencils remained similar in most latter
models and proved to be an extremely compact and
expeditious method of duplicating.

Derivative of Thomas

Edison’s “Autographic Printing” patent in 1876, these
devices grew in popularity due in part to their benefits
over alternative methods, predominately tremendous cost
savings and a lower skill requirement for users.74

Besides

bearing the burden of unit reproduction needs, use of the
mimeograph was vital to the Army’s rejuvenated periodical
program.

By 1920, alongside more than a hundred circulars

and bulletins reproduced by either the GPO or other service
methods, the Army produced publications founded after the
war using mimeographs.

Periodical reproduction by

mimeograph spread well beyond typical users such as the
Quartermaster and the Surgeon General.

Instead,

participating branches now included chemical warfare,
infantry, recruiting, motor transport, and even a budding
new organization called the Air Service.75
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document reproduction viable and affordable for individual
unit needs, once again highlighting the capabilities of
innovative equipment.
The next largest category of these office devices
after document production tools was what congressional
leaders called “computing” equipment, most notably adding
machines, calculating machines, and comptometers.76

These

early computational mechanisms made up nearly twenty
percent of the War Department’s non-typewriting
administrative machine stockpile with adding machines being
the most prevalent.

With large volumes of calculable data

in areas like finance, supply, personnel, and ordnance,
units across the Army sought to purchase computational
device to ease the numerous arithmetic duties required of
soldiers who compiled statistical data or reported
complicated statuses.

Although adding machines were the

most common device in the Army, calculating machines and
comptometers had greater capability, often performing all
four arithmetic functions and even more depending on
sophistication and design.

In all, by the end of 1919, the

Army owned 130 of these computing machines in twelve of
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fourteen regional zones across the country.77

For the two

zones supposedly without them, the answer is simple:

the

Army only counted machines purchased by the service in
their reporting figures.

Units that leased this equipment

were another matter entirely.
While a number of Army organizations believed they
required some form of computing device, War Department
headquarters was often not convinced.

At costs ranging

from $125 up to $1,000 depending on complexity, these were
incredibly expensive items given their sometimes limited
impact on the unit.

Beyond the Army’s own skepticism,

members of Congress additionally questioned the validity of
military unit requirements, even accusing the Army of
wasting machines already purchased and creating
irresponsible requirements through which to acquire them in
the future.

In fact, Congressman Wood moaned that “every

fellow who has half a dozen figures to add up thinks he
must have a computing machine to do it.”78

For their part,

the Army’s Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Director
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of Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division closely
scrutinized these requirements following their takeover of
the program in 1918.

In fact, staff members took pride in

disapproving a significant amount of these requisitions,
with no more than a dozen machines actually being purchased
between November 1918 and February 1920.

However, this

does not account for the machines leased by individual
units.

In those circumstances, the requirement did not

require centralized approval and thus was not part of the
Army’s calculations at all.79

The end result, as reported

to Congressman Wood and his panel in 1920, is a data set
skewed by the nuances of the Army requisition system.

For

years, the Army calculated their office equipment usage
based on the purchase of such equipment.

The leasing issue

remained an unresolved War Department data point for years
to come.
In the end, what is missing from post-war records and
congressional testimony is the complete extent of the
Army’s mechanized office equipment following the World War
I.
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Traffic Division in 1919 and 1920 show that besides the
typewriter, mimeograph, and computing machine totals, the
War Department owned an additional 100 addressographs,
Dictaphones, duplicating machines, Ediphones, billing
machines, and mimeoscopes.

Added together, this figure –

approximately 49,000 individual devices in all – presumably
accounted for all of the Army’s purchased office equipment
during this period.

In fact, this was the data reported to

Congress following the war.

However, upon a more thorough

review of Major Arrighi’s figures, supplementary Army
records confirm the Army used more mechanized devices than
these initial figures indicate.

Besides these machines,

the Army also owned a separate suite of mechanical office
devices designed to enhance record keeping and other office
services.

The number and range of these devices, which

included bookkeeping machines, stamping machines, letteropening machines, sealing machines, perforators, presses,
multigraphs, electrotyping and etching machines, are
further evidence that by the end of World War I, Army units
had certainly embraced the mechanization of administrative
functions throughout the service.80
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Representative Wood’s assertion that soldiers were
overeager to obtain mechanized administrative equipment may
have been accurate, but nonetheless highlights the genesis
of a new era in military information; that is, one of
seeking more detailed information in larger quantities
through mechanical and electrical data devices.

Wood’s

accusation bears testimony to the fact that members of the
Army sought out new and purportedly better methods for
obtaining and exploiting information, whether it was
necessary or not.

This desire to harness modern

technological advances in an effort to ease an
administrative burden has its origins in the period between
the Civil War and World War I.

Very little of this was

downward-directed by Army leadership at the time.

Instead,

it was bottom-up, driven by the desire and curiosity of the
average user.

It was that desire and curiosity that helped

advance perhaps the most important innovation of the era
and one that inevitably led to the more familiar beginning
of the “information age” – the first computer.

The device,

originally named the electric enumerator, would eventually
change forever the way the Army looked at data compilation
and manipulation.

More commonly known today as a punched

United States Army (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1918), 148.
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card tabulating machine, this groundbreaking device grew to
become a catalyst for transformational information changes
throughout the military and government over the next
quarter century.

Data Mechanization Systems: the Electric Enumerator and
Data Tabulation
While Arrighi and Wood argued about the equipment
totals required for the Army of the future, one thing was
certain:

they only discussed the machines as individual

office items and never considered a larger, more
comprehensive data mechanization system.

On one hand,

ledger books and forms got soldiers thinking about how to
better record information, while typewriters and
mimeographs got them thinking about how to improve its
quality and quantity.

Even computing machines, to use the

colloquial congressional term, looked to improve the speed
and accuracy of data manipulation but always in a very
singular, individualistic way.

What escaped the

congressional testimony in 1920 was any conversation about
capturing large volumes of information, assembling and
organizing it, and then presenting it in a meaningful
fashion – all with one device.

Such a device was well

known in government circles as it had made headlines with
62

its publicized use by the Bureau of the Census beginning in
1890.

What had been missing from the appropriations

conversation was what was missing from the Army’s strategic
vision for information – a data mechanization system.

The

fact that the Army was already a pioneer in the use of such
a system apparently escaped the attention of all concerned,
soldier and civilian alike.
This effort began in earnest in 1888.

As the

challenge of managing large amounts of quantifiable data
grew in significance, industry leaders understood that
incremental additions of mechanical calculators and
enumerators were not an end solution.

What was needed was

a system capable of somehow capturing and manipulating
substantial volumes of data while reducing the amount of
human intervention involved in the process.

In 1890, one

such solution made the front cover of Scientific American
magazine, the inside text boisterously detailing the
success story of that year’s American Census and the
incredible time-saving device labeled as the world’s first
“electrical numerating system.”

This innovation was not

news to the Army Surgeon General’s office.

Two years

earlier, a senior member of the Vital Statistics Branch had
recognized this system’s capabilities and its potential
applications for health and mortality records.
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The

system’s inventor was Herman Hollerith, and his primary
product – the punched card tabulator – would lead to his
co-founding of information behemoth International Business
Machines (IBM) only a few decades later.

This machine

would almost singlehandedly set the foundation for
information collection and exploitation for the next fifty
years.81
Hollerith’s journey began years before the Army called
on his assistance.

Long before his tabulator took on both

the Surgeon General and the Census Bureau projects, the
inventor shopped his innovation across several northeastern
states shortly after applying for his first patent in 1884.
He began his quest modestly, designing his first device to
“simplify and thereby facilitate the compilation of…various
kinds of statistics.”82

Originally a paper tape-driven

system akin to the telegraph, it soon became obvious that
any long-term utilization required a more durable
documentation medium.

Thus, he rejected his earlier tape-
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based system in favor of a medium more closely resembling
that used by French weaver and inventor Joseph Marie
Jacquard and his famous loom – i.e., the punched card.83

As

the decade progressed, Hollerith looked for customers
requiring large volume statistical computation, eventually
finding several in the New York area railroad and health
industries.

Working with the health departments in

Baltimore, the state of New Jersey and New York City proved
fortuitous as the device clearly had other health-related
applications.84

Moreover, thanks to a preexisting

relationship with one of the Army’s senior officers in the
Vital Statistics Branch, news of his successes did not have
to travel far.85

As unit leaders sought to prioritize the

importance of preventive health statistics, they recognized
the potential in Hollerith’s system.

By 1888, the decision

was made to address the inventor formally.86
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Approaching Hollerith as the year drew to a close
illuminated two primary concerns harbored by the Vital
Statistics branch:

capability and cost.

First, the Army

wanted to ensure the device not only worked as advertised,
but also could handle the sizeable data fields their
records and analyses required.

To accomplish this,

Hollerith had to change the design of his punched cards to
allow aggregate combinations, thus permitting more detailed
data in greater numbers.

Then, in an effort to prove the

solution’s effectiveness, he would have to test the new
system using historical data from his New York City
application.

As time would show, both the card redesign

and testing platform worked to the Army’s satisfaction.
Still, there remained the issue of cost.

Spending money on

a relatively unproven technology was a risky proposition
for such a small branch deep inside a resource-constrained
Army.

Accordingly, the inventor applied a different albeit

common business model – an equipment lease – to allow the
Surgeon General of the Army to keep costs down while
keeping interest up.87

The Army’s total lease cost was only

$1000 per unit, plus the cost of the punched cards
themselves.
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In September 1888, the War Department agreed
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to the lease and contracted with Hollerith for the
compiling of medical and casualty statistics.

Although

this was only a small application almost completely out of
the purview of most Army leaders, it was nevertheless
incredibly significant; after all, regardless of its scope,
it was the earliest known implementation of this technology
in the military.88
For the next several months, Hollerith focused his
efforts on installing and preparing the system in the Vital
Statistics office.

In January 1889, he wrote a letter

informing the War Department that the tabulating equipment
installation was complete and ready for application.

Over

the next several months, members of the unit worked with
Hollerith to apply prior health department lessons to the
challenges faced by the Surgeon General.

By April, Captain

Fred C. Ainsworth, the officer in charge of all medical
records and statistics for the Surgeon General's office,
appeared pleased with the capabilities of the punched card
system.

In fact, although he was hesitant to endorse the
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machine for Hollerith’s entrance in 1889’s Exposition
Universelle in Paris, France, he did state the machines
thus far were operating to his satisfaction.

Despite the

general acknowledgment of success, Ainsworth still held
reservations about their overall usefulness.

Matters

worsened when a few months later, the War Department
directed the Surgeon General to consolidate all Civil War
volunteer medical records and muster rolls with all preexisting medical records in the Vital Statistics office, a
task that helped form a new and independent Record and
Pension Division.

By July, the Army had prepared over

50,000 cards for the project, although it understood that
such a large amount of data would require additional
tabulating equipment.

As Hollerith’s contract was up for

renewal, the question arose whether or not the Army would
continue with the inventor’s system or go back to manual
compilation.

In July, he received his answer: Ainsworth

endorsed his contract and the Army renewed the arrangement
until June of 1890.89
Despite the apparent success of the early punched card
system, the Army soon realized it no longer truly required
such mechanization, especially given the small number of
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troops remaining on active duty.

In the early 1890s, the

total number of military personnel on active duty dropped
to a meager 27,000, thus abating the need for a complex
tabulation system like Hollerith’s.90

Even with the

apparent capabilities of a data compiling system, the Army
felt transcribing each information incident from a report
card to a statistical ledger remained a more realistic and
cost-effective option than one requiring automation.91
While the ledger system lingered well into the First World
War, the advantages of card-based accounting continued to
be an optional and functional component in Army information
management.

Moreover, although the Vital Statistics Branch

discontinued its use at the time, the application of
punched card systems was no longer confined to a single
office.

Even though the Surgeon General of the Army was

Hollerith’s only viable and paying contract in early 1889,
his fortunes soon changed.

By the time the Tenth Census

began a year later, industry knew well of his system’s
capabilities and possibilities.

Moreover, the exposure

from the Scientific American article, not to mention the
magazine’s cover dedicated to Hollerith’s innovation, gave
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the inventor a running start into this new and budding
industry.92

The Army may have temporarily halted its

punched card operations, but the world did not.

It would

take more than a quarter-century for the service to catch
back up to the industrial standard.
The Army’s history of punched card systems between the
end of the Vital Statistics project and the beginning of
the World War I is one of extraordinarily limited use and
sparsely documented implementation.

Without a directive

from the War Department, individual attempts at applying
this burgeoning technology proved relatively insignificant,
which was ironic given the success of tabulators in
industry during the same period.

Army historians maintain

that until 1917, the implementation of tabulating machines
was minimal at best.93

As war loomed on the horizon,

applications in place remained nearly absent.

Official

histories recount only one small tabulator installation in
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the Surgeon General's Personnel Division used for locating
specially trained officers and another in the Ordnance
Department used for data compilation at its depots.94
Meanwhile, veterans of Hollerith’s original implementation
in 1889 were anything but pleased with the potential return
of tabulators to the Army, even cautioning their superiors
against further use.

They warned about card preparation

issues, insufficient and ineffective data calculations, and
an overall sense of time wasted in integrating a system
that more often worked better by hand.95

Despite their

reservations, the Division leaders understood something had
to be done.

With Congress declaring war against Germany on

April 6, 1917, the requirements of mobilization
necessitated a better way to manage the flood of
information set to pour into the Army.96
This deluge of information, of course, was originally
precipitated by the mass of individuals mobilized to
support the war effort.

When Congress enacted the

Selective Service Act into law on May 17, 1917, the volume
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of Army personnel data expanded like never before.

Over

the next four months, nearly 10 million males between the
ages of 21 and 30 completed their registration for military
service.

Within the next year, another 14 million

registered after the entry age widened to include men up to
45.97

The job of tracking the medical condition of recruits

fell, as expected, to the Army Surgeon General’s office.
Unbeknownst to many in the organization at the time, this
mission was about to transform into a landmark endeavor
that included “the largest studies of men done so far by
data mechanization equipment.”98

Of all the data tabulator

applications in this wartime era, few are more indicative
of an information sea change than the systems put in place
to handle the Army medical establishment’s information
crises at the start of the war.
In October 1917, the Medical Records section of the
Surgeon General’s Sanitation Division was charged with the
mammoth responsibility of processing, maintaining and
distributing all Army sick and injured records of both
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current soldiers and new recruits.99

The section bore the

additional responsibility of preparing, compiling, and
analyzing all Army medical statistical data for the
numerous Surgeon General reports and analyses provided
regularly to the War Department.100

That year, Major

General William Gorgas, the Army Surgeon General,
recognized that not only was the current method of hand
data compilation inadequate, but that future uses of the
Medical Records section required a more robust and capable
mechanically-based information apparatus.101

With no time

to waste, a “punch-card system” was installed with the
requisite tabulating and sorting machines in tandem.

The

capabilities of the Hollerith devices completely opened the
aperture for what statistical data the Medical Records
Section could provide the Army.

For the second time, the

Surgeon General’s office was attempting to utilize
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Hollerith’s data tabulation system for medical record
administration.

This time, the volume of personnel data

generated made this application a far more useful effort.102
With millions of recruits undergoing physical and
psychological examination, the responsibility for compiling
and analyzing this data fell to records personnel in the
Surgeon General’s office.

Taking full advantage of the

compiled data, the organization not only reviewed and
evaluated the physical and mental limitations annotated in
patient records, but also employed the information for
manpower utilization and anthropological analysis.103

In

fact, in some cases, the analyses went so far as to include
a measurements study of soldiers’ physical characteristics
as a precursor to standardizing and ordering uniforms.104
At one time, the volume of material nearly reached two
million records of those selective servicemen sent to
military encampments.

As anticipated, data tabulators

could more efficiently break down demographic and
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physiological information in a manner almost unthinkable
without mechanization.

In fact, such information became so

detailed that the Army created reports that included
“Defects Found in Drafted Men,” which broke down military
rejection statistics by state, urban and rural
environments, and another 156 population sections grouped
into series of occupational, physiographic, and racial
statistics.105

After thirty years, Army leaders had finally

found an effective use for Hollerith’s data tabulators.
Between America’s entry into the war and the Armistice
in November 1918, the availability and application of data
tabulators increased significantly throughout the
government, including the military.

Demand was so great,

in fact, that federal officials required tabulators be
diverted from commercial customers to federal agencies
throughout the war emergency period.106

Behind this edict,

of course, was the War Industries Board, the controlling
agency for nearly all war supply activities.

The Board

presided over the country’s purchases, industrial
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production, raw material allocation, transportation and
communication during the war.

To account for it all, they

acquired and applied a host of data tabulators, the
backbone of the organization’s statistical support.107

In

fact, punched cards and tabulating equipment became so
prevalent that, as Hollerith’s biographer wrote, “the
punched card [became] a daily fact of life for thousands of
clerks marshalling the nation’s food supply and other
resources.”108

Authors Frederick Bohme and J. Paul Wyatt

echoed this assertion in their book 100 Years of Data
Processing: The Punchcard Century by claiming that “the
nation implemented hundreds of these machines throughout
its military, federal departments and public bureaus.”109
Clearly, these devices were no longer a clerical oddity in
American government organizations.

Instead, they were an

Frederick G. Bohme and J. Paul. Wyatt, 100 Years of Data
Processing: The Punchcard Century (Washington: U.S. Dept.
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World War I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
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integral component of numerous information processes across
the nation’s administrative landscape.
However, the statements above pertain to the
government as a whole and not the military specifically.
This distinction is important, for although the
government’s data tabulator application rate did increase
significantly, and that figure does include the military,
the portion of that increase relative to the armed services
is markedly small.

Thus, it is critical that historians be

cautious in referencing the punched card tabulator’s
significance during this period.

Despite a number of

generalizations to the contrary, the military was not part
of the industrial leading edge of this phenomenon, nor was
it even a primary user during the Great War.

That

distinction belongs instead to the insurance and railroad
industries which almost singlehandedly kept Hollerith in
business during this period.

Claims of ubiquitous data

mechanization throughout the War Department’s information
processes at this time are erroneous as well.

While there

are indeed several cornerstone cases, including those in
the Surgeon General’s office, the Army did not fully
appreciate the capability and potential of data tabulators
in this period.

The aforementioned uses of data tabulators

are oftentimes referenced by authors attempting to closely
77

correlate the military and punched card usage during World
War I.

Unfortunately, this small number of cases pales in

comparison to the massive use of manual card-based data
processes used throughout the Army leading into 1919.

In

short, while the military remained involved with data
tabulators during this period, to claim the existence of
any widespread usage or monumental program is to distort
the historical facts of the period.
Although the War Department was obviously not the data
mechanization catalyst prior to the end of the war, the
Army and its government and industrial colleagues did
manage to lay fertile ground for its future information
processes.

Thus, for Herman Hollerith and other tabulator

companies, the time for widespread mechanized data
compilation was clearly within sight.

With organizations

across the public and private sectors jumping at the chance
to implement these information mechanization devices,
tabulator earnings tripled by the height of the war.110
Hollerith, who decades before was trying to solve a simple
problem in the Census Bureau, had almost single-handedly
launched arguably the greatest information improvement
device of the era.
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seemingly insatiable appetite of government and industry
leaders for more elaborate statistical analyses and more
comprehensive data manipulation meant that the age of
information had finally, and unequivocally, arrived.
Data Transfer and Communications Systems of the Period
Beyond the processes and machines that dictated what
information the Army thought was important as well as how
they compiled and exploited it, a final factor worth
examining was how the Army transferred its information from
one participant to another.

As previously mentioned, the

Civil War was a catalyst for numerous advances in
battlefield communication, such as the wig-wag signaling
system, field telegraph machines, and horse-drawn “flying”
telegraph lines.

Following the war, the federal government

disbanded the Military Telegraph Corps and gave the reins
of the War Department’s communication system over to the
Army Signal Corps.

In doing so, the application of the

telegraph and its operational uses became more than just a
Signal Corps concern; it became an Army information
problem.

Now that the war was over, it was up to the Army

to discern how to best utilize the telegraph, and why.111
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Prior to 1880, the military did not heavily regulate
telegraph usage, regardless of whether it was through
military or commercial channels.

By and large, telegraph

applications were often sporadic and became a function of
necessity, proximity, and cost, especially for those units
based in the West.

In 1881, with the publishing of

Regulations of the Army of the United States, the Army
finally brought all telegraph procedures into one document
and created strict guidelines for their application.

For

example, the Army officially announced in Regulations that
the telegraph was not intended to be a primary means of
communication; that was saved for mail or messenger
service.

Instead, under the charge of the Chief Signal

Officer of the Army, soldiers were only to use the
telegraph in “cases of urgent and imperative necessity,
where the delay of the mail would be prejudicial to the
public interest.”112

By these directives, the Army

practically prohibited telegraph use, especially for nonemergency reporting and information requests from higher
echelons.

To the Army in peacetime, telegraph messaging

remained reserved for official and immediate communication

See Annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer to the
Secretary of War for the Year 1872, 158. For all other
information, see Regulations of the Army of the United
States, 68, 272.
112
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purposes only.

Over time, however, growing Army

requirements necessitated more expedient information
transfer.

By the end of the decade, the rules and

regulations put in place in 1881 were under scrutiny by
both the Signal Corps and their telegraph clientele.
Over the next several years, the telegraph emerged
from its emergency-only status to become an integral part
of primary service communications.

In both 1892 and 1899,

the Chief Signal Officer confirmed this notion in the
Corps’ own set of regulations that controlled what was
acceptable in modern Army telegraphy.113

For example, in

the 1899 version, the directives stated that the realm of
legal telegraphic operations included “[a]ll business of
the War Department, its officers and agents, and telegrams
authorized by competent authority, and all ‘official
messages’ of the several departments of the Government.”114
The Army tested this notion in their 1895 regulatory

Regulations for the Operation and Maintenance of United
States Military Telegraph Lines: And General Regulations of
the Signal Corps, United States Army. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1899), 1-8; Regulations for
Operation and Maintenance of U.S. Military Telegraph Lines
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1892).
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anthology (printed in 1899) by directing that commanders
notify the Adjutant General by telegraph of specific
personnel actions ranging from positional appointments to
escorting a legally insane soldier.115

Further examples

extended primarily to the post quartermasters, especially
in cases where the speed of information delivery was time
dependent.

By the end of the century, the telegraph was no

longer an administrative rarity for Army field units.
Instead, as expounded upon in Signal Corps regulations, it
was an integral part of the information landscape.116
Meanwhile, back in the 1880s, a new communications
device – the telephone – began to interest soldiers on
staff and in the field alike.

With thousands of telephones

in public service by 1887, Chief Signal Officer General
Adolphus Greely recognized the importance of the device to
future service operations.

In doing so, he formally

acknowledged the telephone’s military possibilities in 1889
by including the technology in his annual report to the
Secretary of War.

There Greely reported that the

telephone, along with the telegraph, heliograph, and the

Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1895,
with Appendix Separately Indexed Showing Changes to January
1, 1899, 34, 61.
115
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electric flashlight, were all “potent factors in civilized
warfare” and condemned the Army for not applying more money
into the research, development, and practice of these
various devices.117

By 1893, years of politicking paid off

as Congress issued General Order 20 approving and
appropriating resources to the Signal Corps to purchase and
maintain telephone equipment.

Although its application was

still not widespread in the service, the potential uses of
the telephone were characteristically undeniable to those
who witnessed its capabilities.118
Five years later, the Army’s role in the SpanishAmerican War proved critical to granting field credibility
to the telephone.

In magazines dedicated to this new

technology, telephone enthusiasts of the day bragged about
a new service practice:
[t]he often hinted at, frequently
discussed, but never before realized
field telephone in actual warfare has
come and is come to say. For the first
Annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army to
the Secretary of War for the Year 1889 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1890), 5.
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time in the history of the United
States army, a long-distance telephone
has been used for the purpose of
handling troops in time of war.119
In garrison, peacetime telephone usage helped transfer
information among geographically separated staff offices.
In one example at Camp Black in New York, adjutants, chiefs
of staff, and field hospital commanders all had access to a
newly-installed telephone system.

After testing its

usefulness, the telephone proved extremely helpful in
reporting operational and patient information, as well as
providing “moral influence” over those not geographically
stationed at the same location.

According to one source,

in almost every branch of government, telephone service
increased between 1898 and 1899.120

Even as telegraph usage

continued to increase throughout the service, the telephone
endured as an operational alternative throughout the era.
Finally, as the Aeronautical Division was coming into
existence, another communications innovation became the
talk of both the operational and administrative communities

Edward E. Clement, "This Years Progress in Telephony and
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in the Army – the radio.

Originally known as “wireless

telegraphy,” it appeared to service leaders that radio
communication provided the answer to the myriad wire
constraint issues suffered in telegraph and telephone
operations.
expectation.

At least, that was the original leadership
Although it would take years for wireless

telegraphy and spark-gap technology to play an integral
part in Army operations, the potential of radio technology
kept departmental leaders interested and engaged in
wireless telegraphy projects.

With maritime communication

and safety a major potential application for this
technology, the Navy took the lead role in radio
communication endeavors.

As it was, despite initial

interest, the Army was still developing current
communications applications via telegraphs and telephones.
Realistically, how interested servicemen were in radio was
a factor completely dependent on unit leadership.121
As it turned out, that leadership – predominately in
the Army’s Signal Corps – remained engaged throughout the
initial technology indoctrination process.

For instance,

at the first international wireless telegraphy conference
in Berlin in 1903, Chief Signal Officer Greely was part of
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the select group that helped produce international
protocols for future civilian and military applications.
Three years later during a second conference in Berlin,
Greely’s successor and air arm-founder Chief Signal Officer
James Allen attended.

While new to the position, Allen

impressively contributed to the conversation by helping
create radio operations policy.

Even further, Allen helped

define the radio’s military usefulness to the point that it
found its way into Cuban operations in 1906 and Philippine
operations in 1907.

Although clearly in its infancy, the

Army did not squander its opportunity to begin integrating
radio into the operational elements of the service.122
Over the half-century that separated the Civil War and
World War I, the means by which the Army transmitted its
information changed dramatically.

As the years passed, the

ability to move data more rapidly grew at nearly the same
speed as the requirements to do so.

In the beginning, the

Civil War proved that visual signaling and telegraph
requirements could be more effective information
transmission methods (at times) than mail, messenger, or
carrier pigeon.

By the end of the era, the Army possessed

a wide variety of transmission methods that ran the

122
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spectrum of technological capability.

Operationally, as

shown by its regulation in Army documents, the
functionality and importance of each transmission method
most often depended on the speed and cost of those methods
that superseded them.

Still, two things appeared

abundantly clear to military leaders at the beginning of
World War I:

first, that technological advances in

information transmission would continue into the future,
and second, that they would be driven by the incessant
desire to improve on the communications status quo.
Conclusion
In 1864, Captain August Kautz of the Sixth U.S.
Calvary wrote an official compendium detailing the proper
methods for managing the books, records, and accounts
required of an Army unit administrator.
Company Clerk:

Entitled The

How and When To Make Out All The Returns,

Reports, and Other Papers, and What To Do With Them,
Kautz’s compendium stressed the importance of the
administration business, noting that current regulations
failed to properly guide clerks and other data keepers on
the proper methods of recording and reporting the unit’s
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vital information.123

What the Army needed, the captain

wrote, was a handbook that explained not only what data –
or as he termed, “administrative matters” – was required,
but also how to process it.124
Army Colonel James Moss’ 1917 attempt at a similar
compilation echoed several of the key themes Kautz had
developed over a half-century earlier.

In Army Paperwork,

A Practical Working Guide in Army Administration, Moss
emphasized the indispensable nature of paperwork in Army
operations, signifying that without ensuring its accuracy
and completeness, the information dispensed across the
service would be all but useless, wasting time, resources,
and energy.

To the Colonel, the documentation,

exploitation, and transfer of information was as essential
to the military profession as any other function inside the
Army.

Thus, “the man behind the desk” who was denied the

glamor of battle or popular favor of the war hero could
live with the solace of knowing that without the
information he maintained and provided, the “man behind the
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gun” would fail.125

As Moss concluded, Army paperwork and

the information contained within it was “less spectacular
though no less important” than any other detail in military
operations.126
By themselves, these two documents illustrate a pair
of important truths:

one, information requirements

remained a consistent and often disjointed Army issue in
the 53 years that separated them; and two, the absence of
direction from the Army’s senior leadership that allowed
two comparatively junior officers to act independently
shows that information and administrative operations had
not earned the former’s full attention.

Throughout this

chapter, example after example of information environment
modifications – from registers and typewriters to punched
card tabulators and telegraphs – demonstrate how the Army’s
most senior leadership neglected to proactively centralize
or coordinate a data management strategy for the service.
Instead, branch leaders like those from the Quartermaster,
the Signal Corps, the Surgeon General and the Adjutant
General culled together processes and procedures as best

James Alfred Moss, Army Paperwork: A Practical Working
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they could, often clamoring for additional resources to
accomplish their mission.

The Army during this period

functioned, but certainly not cohesively.
These often independently driven changes and decisions
at the branch- or unit-level became problematic for the
service.

For example, haphazard unit typewriter purchases

throughout the late 1800s meant a lack of unit
standardization.

This difference in standards caused a

number of concerns across the Army, most especially those
resulting in administrative training issues where unit
transfers potentially meant completely relearning
information-related duties.

Another example occurred in

1899, by which time telegraph usage standards varied by
unit, branch, and staff.

Not only had the Adjutant General

and Signal Corps published competing regulations, but also
inside regulatory anthologies like Regulations of the Army
of the United States were various directives that
contradicted one another.127

In one final example, the

Surgeon General’s relative failure to fully incorporate
Hollerith’s card tabulating system into hospital
information operations denoted a near failure of the data

As referenced in Regulations for the Operation and
Maintenance of United States Military Telegraph Lines and
General Regulations of the Signal Corps, United States
Army, 169.
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mechanization concept itself.

This resulted in ill-will

among the medical statistics community that permeated the
mechanization discussion a quarter-century after this
initial project.

The Army had issues that needed solving,

but attempting to resolve them at lower unit- and branchlevels only caused more challenges for the service later
on.
Fortunately, however, some of the outcomes that
derived from these uncoordinated and provincial activities
still managed to benefit the service.

First, during the

many conflicts and campaigns that arose between the
Spanish-American War and World War I, wartime operations
were significantly benefited by the compilation of Army
regulations and the standardization of information
processes.

Likewise, although the volume of data

traversing the service was massive, especially given the
reporting needs codified in the late 1800s, such
information in the right hands allowed Army leaders to make
more intelligent decisions than ever before…or at least,
more informed ones.

This was especially true for the

Quartermaster, who between 1865 and 1898 managed to develop
a staggering array of supply and clerical forms that
captured a tremendous amount of data for the Corps.

From

that data, the operational, logistical, and administrative
91

decisions made both by Quartermaster and other branch
leaders were based on facts as far as possible.

Last, such

intensive data collection was helpful to officers and
civilians who fought for resources and defended programs in
front of an assortment of congressional committees.

As

noted earlier in the chapter, the case of Major Arrighi and
post-war typewriter purchases highlights that data
collection and exploitation measures proved quite helpful.
Looking back, there clearly was no Army information
strategy during this period, even though there were clear
attempts to act as if one existed.

Army branch and staff

organizations, each with its own purpose and directives,
often followed their own path to gathering, exploiting, and
transferring information within a set of relatively
innocuous macro-level constraints.

This lack of strategic

forethought or regulatory vetting process on the part of
the Army senior leadership speaks to the general lack of
cohesiveness in the service following the Civil War, much
as General Sherman pointed out.

Given the amount of debate

in Congress over what the Army did, its size, or its very
existence, this disorganization is not surprising.
Moreover, for those who have overgeneralized the Army’s
lines of responsibility or misinterpreted the connections
between organizations, this chapter challenges this false
92

sense of a singular, unified Army and replaces it with the
notion that each unit – oftentimes by whatever means
available – did what it could to improve its operational
and administrative information status.

Using their data as

a critical resource, these organizations overcame disorder,
inadequate leadership, and inept guidance to eventually
become a deciding military factor during the World War I.128
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Chapter 2
Information Standardization, Data Mechanization,
and Statistical Control, 1907-1947
To properly understand the early history of the United
States Air Force, it is important to explore the advances
and decisions made using information management and
technology as these were integral to the service’s
development and operation.

In service narratives that tend

to highlight successive aviation achievements, data
management and mechanization often fail to emerge as
significant themes.

However, these fields underpinned a

great deal of the operational and organizational change
that supported military aviation in its early decades.
Examining the history of service data management and
mechanization is therefore important to a comprehensive
understanding of how the organization used its information
for its operational and administrative needs and how in
turn this affected the organization’s development as a
service over these four critical decades.
The early U.S. military aviation component developed
within a growing culture of information standardization
that carried over from its Signal Corps origins.
94

Like

other Army components, the burgeoning air arm repeatedly
sought to identify what information it required and then
determined how best to generate it, albeit arguably not
always in the most effective or efficient manner.

A large

part of the resulting information generation involved the
application of business machines and data management
systems we construe today as information technology.

These

advancements and improvements were pivotal factors in the
development of new operational capabilities, organizations,
and processes at both the unit and service level.
However, these were not the only factors affecting the
air service’s growing information requirements.129

Although

information technology did progress significantly during
this period, some service processes remained married to
manual systems and regulatory control in operational
management.

Throughout this period, airmen relied upon the

application of paper-based information forms and
procedures, manual accountability systems, and handcalculated data/statistical analysis in order to meet their

The term “requirements” is a frequently used military
term signifying a perceived need or desire – real or
imagined – on the part of the requester. It is not meant
to signify an absolute need without question. In fact, far
from it. However, a great deal of military programming and
budget planning is based upon requirements-based decision
making and such an item should not be left out of the
conversation.
129
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information needs.

By the end of World War II, information

management using both technological and manual systems was
a fundamental component of Army aviation operations and
administration.
This chapter demonstrates how, from 1907 to 1947, the
management and application of information in the Army’s air
arm played an essential role in the service’s development
and operation. From aviation specific forms and procedures,
to manual and punched-card inventory and reporting systems,
to a service-wide statistical control and analysis system,
the Army’s aviation service developed its information
capabilities to help train, equip, and employ its forces
both in-garrison and at war. As the air arm grew from a
three-man office to more than a two-million-airmen
organization, more timely and expansive information
generation and processing for logistical, administrative
and other purposes evolved.

Explaining how and suggesting

possible reasons why this evolution occurred will
demonstrate both the way information was pivotal the growth
of the Air Force and the extent to which technological
development in the arm was not simply a matter of
progressively more powerful and complex aero engines and
airframes as standard service histories imply.
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Information and Mechanization in the Air Service
World War I afforded the War Department a tremendous
opportunity.

No longer manpower or fiscally constrained as

in years past, the Army was able to use wartime authority
to rebuild its organization, revamp its procedures and
retool its operations and supporting equipment for the
first time in decades.

Administratively, several branches

used the opportunity to assign and improve information
gathering, dissemination, and archival methods, given that
pre-war requirements were but a fraction of wartime
responsibilities.

As business machines and data

mechanization became more prevalent in corporate and other
circles, some branches already accustomed to organizing and
manipulating large volumes of data did not hesitate in
adopting these advancing technologies.

Although the

military was certainly not keeping pace with its industrial
and government counterparts, the parity achieved both
during and after the war proved it was not blind to
opportunity.130
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Between 1907 and 1918, the history of early military
aviation information processing is quite similar to that of
the United States Army as a whole during the same period.
From its origins in August 1907 until it reorganized as the
Aviation Section of the Signal Corps in July 1914, few
information processes of the air arm differed from standard
War Department procedures.131

This pattern changed only

slightly in the years leading up to America’s entry into
World War I despite explicit efforts to single out
aviation-specific issues.132

At the time, there appeared

little need to forsake most regular Army information
procedures, especially given the seemingly ancillary nature
of air applications in either a wartime or peacetime

Burroughs, and Remington Rand and the Industry They
Created, 1865-1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1993), 11-14.
Evidence in this paragraph is derived from conversations
with members of the Adjutant General, Quartermaster and
Signal Corps historians of the U.S. Army between November
2012 and February 2013. Specifically, until the Army
Reorganization Act in 1912, few administrative processes
like these were accomplished Army-wide.
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environment.

After all, as the country entered the First

World War in 1917, the American military ranked fourteenth
among nations with an aerial military component and could
boast little more than few dozen airmen fully capable of
flying.

Thus, improving information efficiency and data

gathering was hardly a dominant goal in the air arm leading
up to the war.

In some respects, early airmen considered

themselves fortunate just to have the equipment and
procedures they had.133
This is not to say there was no effort on the part of
airmen to establish their own information environment.

All

things considered, air officers appeared to understand from
the start that there existed a need for certain levels of
documentation and information control, mechanized office
equipment, and effective administrative processes specific
to military aviation.

Chief Signal Officer John Allen’s

There is no evidence to suggest the air arm dedicated
any large-scale, extraneous effort trying to improve its
data management procedures during this time, although steps
were clearly taken to ensure aero-specific requirements
were not neglected. The primary focus on the unit,
especially during such austere years as between 1908 and
1913, was establishing the unit as a viable function of the
Army. See Martha Byrd, Chennault: Giving Wings to the
Tiger (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 1820; and Arthur Sweetser, The American Air Service; a Record
of Its Problems, Its Difficulties, Its Failures, and Its
Final Achievements, (New York: D. Appleton and, 1919), 1517.
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first memorandum creating the Aeronautical Division
suggested as much in ordering that all “data on hand will
be carefully classified and plans perfected for future
tests and experiments…and no information will be given out
by any party except through the Chief Signal Officer of the
Army or his authorized representative.”134

As the service

developed over the next decade, its information needs
swelled even as the organization’s future remained under
consistent scrutiny from various War Department and
Congressional committees.

Flight and accident reports,

maintenance schedules, aircraft data, stock tables, and
other administrative records all became essential
information sources as the air arm defended itself, its
requirements, and its expenditures time and again.

With so

much at stake, the equipment, processes, and personnel
responsible for recording and disseminating data tested the
air arm’s information capabilities.135

This quote comes from the “Memorandum #6” in Hennessy’s
book detailing the origins of an air arm in the Army.
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1861 to April 1917 (Washington: Office of Air Force
History, U.S. Air Force, 1985), Appendix 1.
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Specific information regarding flight records can be
found in Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm April
1861 to April 1917, 28-89. Although there is widespread
discussion of these records throughout the manuscript,
pages 28, 33, 34, 40, 54, 57-61, and 84 mention these
records specifically. Additionally, evidence regarding
135
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Beginning in 1912, Signal Corps reports and
regulations contained sporadic hints of administrative
measures adopted for aviation purposes specifically.

In

that year’s General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations
of the Signal Corps, mention of fixed-wing aeronautics and
its materials is slight at best.

Compared to balloons and

dirigibles, the regulation barely mentions heavier-than-air
flying machines and associated equipment despite four years
of military operation.

Nevertheless, the single reference

to a new standard form – Army Form 277:

Record of

Aeroplane Flights – speaks volumes, clearly denoting a
conscious effort on the division’s part to create a unique
data recording process codified by headquarters.136
Meanwhile, aviation administration mirrored that of Signal
Corps field companies with equipment allowances for such

typewritten documents as well as use of the telephone and
telegraph in incident reporting and service documentation
are also a part of this document.
Balloons and dirigibles receive far more mention in this
regulation than do the aeroplane, which as mentioned is
known as "machine, heavier-than-air." There is mention of
handmade aeroplane tents, but otherwise little else is
afforded the aircraft. Page 161 contains the entire list
of blank forms available for the Signal Corps specifically,
of which Form 277 is listed under "Miscellaneous." Property
and Disbursing Regulations, including Miscellaneous General
Regulations, (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1912), 102-103, 158-161.
136
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items as typewriters, field books, letter boards, message
envelopes, and pencils.

Meanwhile, for data processing and

accountability, Corps ledgers and standard bookkeeping
began giving way to a new method of data recording:

manual

data card accountability systems.137
Intermittent use of card reporting and archiving was
common across the Army before the war.

A manual derivation

of the punched card tabulating system developed by
Hollerith in the late nineteenth century, card records grew
incredibly popular in many military fields, especially in
the personnel, medical, and logistics branches.

The use of

standard-sized cards with specific codes and recording
standards allowed units to organize and manage their
information, not to mention their associated resources,
with considerably greater precision than the ledger-based
accounting systems previously in operation.

For example,

following the abandonment of Hollerith’s patient card

The equipment listing for Signal Corps field companies
is standard, only deviating with organizations specifically
assigned telegraph duty. As for the manual data card
accountability systems, a number of different uses are
recorded in this document. Specifically, the use of
descriptive and assignment cards for personnel use, the
civilian employee cable accountability record, and the
daily report cards used in reporting issues and receipts of
Signal Corps property. See Property and Disbursing
Regulations, including Miscellaneous General
Regulations, 10, 30, 60-64, 76-82, 101-3, 31.
137
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system in the 1890s, the Surgeon General of the Army began
using manual 3½ x 8 inch “sick and wounded report cards”
near the turn of the century to replace the decades-old
Report of Sick and Wounded.

By 1904, the unit had nearly

eliminated ledgers altogether and instead reported a
soldier’s condition and treatment on cards maintained for
hospital accounting.

Moreover, as patients transferred to

other medical facilities, hospitals created “transfer”
cards to ensure the data passed to the receiving facility
without losing the information at origin. Finally, on a
monthly basis, the Surgeon General’s office pulled the data
from all hospital cards to report a complete picture of
Army medical status and demographic information to its
higher echelons.

While not an automated system like

Hollerith’s, data systems like this set a benchmark for
future information management processes throughout the War
Department.138
For their part, between 1912 and 1914, the Signal
Corps and its aviation units used card recording procedures

This report encompassed data ranging from illness and
wounded figures to a census of the military population by
rank, race, and color. The bulk of the information in this
paragraph derives from the following website:
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/misc/tabulatingequi
pandarmymedstats/ chapter2.htm
138
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that generally revolved around either personnel data or the
Quartermaster duties of supply requisition and inventory
control.

At the time, these systems were often a function

of Army General Order 92, a 1909 regulation requiring units
to use a card record system to document all military
correspondence.139

Although muster rolls and manpower

registers remained personnel requirements at each post,
this information still derived from descriptive and
assignment cards originally maintained either on station or
higher headquarters.140

At the same time, Quartermaster

requirements for property accountability and responsibility
dictated that Signal Corps Depots and Posts use a card
record system to maintain order and discipline throughout
their supply system.

By using daily report cards, depot

stock cards, and storekeeper record cards, units maintained
a record of all property available for issue.
Additionally, by order of the Chief Signal Officer, depots
used these cards to report the daily status of all property
received and issued as well as the balance of items

James A. Moss, Army Paperwork, a Practical Working Guide
in Army Administration... (Printed March, 1917). (Menasha,
WI: George Banta Pub., 1917), 57.
139

General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations, Signal
Corps, United States Army. (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1912), 10; and Moss, Army Paperwork, a Practical
Working Guide in Army Administration.
140
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remaining on hand.

So enthused was the Army’s top

signalman that he even bragged to the Secretary of War that
the processes were “working with complete success and to
the entire satisfaction of all concerned.”141

As a service

to the units, this information additionally allowed the
crosschecking of data between property records and daily
reports while further ensuring stock accountability with
detail as minute as the disbursing officer's order number
and the item requisition number.142
With such stringent and task-intensive administrative
requirements placed on Army units, the men of the
Aeronautical Division and their Signal Corps superiors
began to question the responsibilities of aviation officers
and enlisted men.

In standard Army units, the

responsibility for administrative duties such as personnel,
finance, and Quartermaster often became either an officer’s
additional duty or their full-time duty.

However, a long

aviation training timeline and intensive operational
duties, coupled with the harrowing possibility of death in
both peacetime and war, made the administrative duty

Report of the Chief Signal Officer, United States Army,
to the Secretary of War (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1914), 17.
141

General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations, Signal
Corps, United States Army, 10, 60-62, 76-83, 99, 168.
142
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requirement for pilots seem unacceptably burdensome.

Army

Chief Signal Officer Brigadier General George P. Scriven
testified to this issue to the Secretary of War in 1913:
In the assignment of officers to the companies it
is assumed that [the aviators] are acting either
as instructors or pupils, and it is highly
desirable that they should not be included in any
of the administrative or property work of the
organization. In other words, the company should
be regarded somewhat as a school organization. To
each company, whether on a peace or war footing,
it is most desirable to assign an officer as
executive and property officer who will not be an
aviator and not subjected to the unusual risk
which such service involves.143
Administrative duties were not necessarily seen as being
beneath Signal Corps aviators, although over time some
would draw such a conclusion.

Instead, to General Scriven

and others in Army leadership positions, their job was far
too intensive and perilous to burden further with unit
clerical duties.

Instead, the General suggested one

officer be assigned as an adjutant in each aero company or
squadron in order to handle the unit’s requisite paperwork.
Furthermore, a part-time clerk serving as a first sergeant,
or perhaps even a supply or mess sergeant would also serve
a similar purpose.144

Despite its growing importance in

Annual Report of the Secretary of War 1913 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1914), 809.
143

144

Annual Report of the Secretary of War 1913, 809.
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aeronautical operations, information, data collection and
the routine paperwork that accompanied it appeared to some
as too bothersome to be handled by Corps aviators.
By 1914, the advance of military aeronautics had
brought with it a corollary organizational milestone:
Congress’ passing of Public Law 143.

The law, also known

as the Act of July 18, 1914, effectively eliminated the
Aeronautical Division in favor of an Aviation Section, a
more discrete and autonomous organization complete with
more manpower, resources, and its own special applications
and necessities.

Over the next four years, Section leaders

attempted to operate more independently even as
congressional overseers showed little interest in funding
their progress.

In fact, only months after PL-143’s

passing, General Scriven’s request for an increased budget
was met with so little interest that his original
appropriation was instead reduced by more than fifteen
percent.

Despite capturing the public’s interest and

imagination, military aviation was stagnating.

The Army,

having only purchased two dozen aircraft in the five years
since the Wrights’ first delivery, operational aircraft
were scarce as many became unserviceable due to accident
and maintenance issues.

As Army aviation author Arthur

Sweetser detailed shortly after the war, these issues were
107

the perfect indication of just “how purely experimental and
negligible the service was considered at that time.”145

The

challenge for aviation and Signal Corps officers was more
than just survival; it was overcoming indifference in an
effort to prove aviation’s capabilities and worth once and
for all.
This indifference by Congress was neither based on
ignorance nor factual misrepresentation; congressional
leaders had more than enough information on the status of
American aviation to comprehend what these budget decisions
meant to the service.

Such facts were integral to the

Army’s case and had been previously submitted to Congress
in the Annual Book of Estimates published that same year.
These volumes contained facts and figures from a host of
services and programs on both the federal and state level
and were indicative of the amount of data collection and
exploitation achieved at the time.

The statistics were

straightforward and abundantly clear:

the aviation

expenditures of several other countries far exceeded those
of the United States including five that equaled or
surpassed the one million dollars Scriven had originally

Arthur Sweetser, The American Air Service; a Record of
Its Problems, Its Difficulties, Its Failures, and Its Final
Achievements, (New York: D. Appleton and, 1919), 17-19.
145
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requested and three that exceeded his congressionallyapproved budget by more than a factor of twenty.
Additionally, the information clearly showed that the Army
also lagged behind in combined appropriations (a five-year
total), numbers of aircraft and numbers of pilots.
Overall, the Army clearly had done its job collecting and
assembling the requisite information to make its case.
Unfortunately, despite such evidence, Congress still chose
to reduce the budget.

Although this effort did not deter

the Army from compiling such data in the future, it was
clear that even the best and seemingly most convincing
information did not infallibly justify requirements in
congressional eyes.146
Eighteen months after its creation, the Signal Corps
took a major step in aiding its Aviation Section’s bid for
organizational legitimacy.

This step involved the Chief

Signal Officer’s approval of Equipment for Aero Units of
the Aviation Section, a new service publication formally
recognizing the unique equipment requirements of
aeronautical units, including administrative items.
notion was simple:

The

detail the requirements of forward

See Sweetser, The American Air Service, 15-18, and
Congressional Serial Set, 64th Congress, 2d Session,
December 4, 1916-March 4, 1917: House Documents, vol. 117
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), 55-56.
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deploying aviation units by identifying an approved,
standardized set of equipment items.

What developed in

this documentation, besides the obvious aero-centric
necessities, were the distinct information needs of the
unit.

As expected, many requisite items fell directly in

line with the standard Army forms, folders, filing
cabinets, and office utensils found across the service.
What differed, however, provides evidence that unit leaders
understood the organization’s advancing information needs
and offers insight into the air arm’s attempts to manage
its organization and document its progress.

These

differences fall into two categories: equipment and
processes.
Overall, the vast majority of information equipment
required by the Aviation Section was hardly different from
that of regular Army units and its parent Signal Corps.
Through Equipment for Aero Units, the Chief Signal Officer
set out to ensure the Aviation Section not only specified
what different information equipment it needed, but also
why.

The publication dictated that aviation units acquire

special filing cabinets with hundreds of cards in order to
file and preserve aircraft records.

Additionally, beyond a

call for five miscellaneous-duty typewriters, it required
$500 in blank forms, binders, and other assorted material
110

earmarked for keeping additional aeroplane documentation.
The sophistication of maintenance administration grew to
the point that even the Engineering branch required its own
typewriter, presumably for both aircraft data recording and
supply requisitioning.

While the aviation requirements as

a whole did not massively differ from standard Army needs,
the few equipment requirements that did diverge from the
norm clearly established the exceptional nature of an
organization determined to document essential data.147
The second area of difference came by way of
information processes.

The service had increased the use

and number of aviation-specific forms significantly since
their first iteration in 1912.

Four years after the

introduction of the Record of Aeroplane Flight form, the
Army now had seven aeronautical-specific forms with four
directly related to flight records and aircraft
maintenance.

Meanwhile, it was the increase in aviation

information recording that required specific attention in
the publication.

Developed in aeronautical field units,

these enhanced recording procedures ensured the Aviation
Section documented the progress of flight at every turn.

Equipment for Aero Units of the Aviation Section (Signal
Corps), Tentative, 1916. (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1916), 30-31, 49-51.
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The procedures required every officer to keep an official
diary to document each flight, designed to include
comprehensive aeroplane and motor data for inclusion in
section records.

Additionally, aircraft-responsible

sections kept daily records of their own aeroplane and
motor data, including descriptive lists for up-channeling
squadron information.

Finally, unit expenditures and

transportation vehicle data were also required, as were
weekly and monthly reports that complemented those
submitted on a daily basis.

In the end, each unit section

kept a small record chest to hold the voluminous amount of
spare forms and records required.

In this way, information

recording became more than a necessity inside the Aviation
Section; it was fast becoming a way of life.

In fact, few

Army branches appeared as committed to such high levels of
pre-war data documentation as did those in the aeronautics
field.148
In 1917, the significance of articulating distinct
aeronautical requirements went a step further.

This time,

rather than directing a separate equipment publication from
the Signal Corps, the Army’s Adjutant General published the
document under the ultimate approval of the Secretary of

Equipment for Aero Units of the Aviation Section (Signal
Corps), Tentative, 1916, 30-31, 49-51.
148
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War – a sizeable leap forward in administrative oversight.
While there are significant similarities between the two
documents, the more recent publication abandoned building
itemized allowances for organizational subsections.
Instead, the Adjutant General centralized the Aviation
Section’s administrative requirements under a special
“Office Supplies” section, thus abating the need for
individual units to account for their own exclusive
requirements.

Like the previous Signal Corps version, the

justification for an extensive card recording system (and
requisite materials) remained firmly in place.

However,

the Army tripled the requirement for mechanized writing
instruments.

In this iteration, the service approved a

complement of 17 typewriters as part of the standard
aviation contingent, of which a dozen were portable
machines built specifically by the Corona Typewriter
Company.

This incremental improvement coupled with

increased organizational oversight highlights the emerging
importance of the organization inside the War Department
and the persistent requirement to document its progress.149

Unit Equipment Manual for the Aviation Section, Signal
Corps. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), 117.
149
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As indicated by an ever-increasing amount of
regulatory guidance, Army leaders clearly spent a great
deal of time before the war codifying the purpose,
materials and procedures associated with War Department
information processing.

As Army Colonel James A. Moss

stresses in his administrative compendium Army Paperwork, A
Practical Working Guide in Army Administration, paperwork
was an essential albeit “irksome” requirement in the modern
Army.

It was its primary means of recording, exploiting,

transferring and archiving its information and now had
become an indispensable characteristic of life in the
military.150

Leaders understood that modern Army

information processes were not only a factor in military
and legislative requirements, but were also part of the
“complexity of our present form of civilization.”151

As the

ability to record data both increased and grew more
efficient, so too did the requirement to exploit it.

For

the Aviation Section and those seeking a more prominent
role for military aeronautics, there existed an
understanding that aero-specific documentation and
reporting would remain vital to their struggle for greater

Moss, Army Paperwork, a Practical Working Guide in Army
Administration…, 29.
150

151

Ibid.
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organizational legitimacy.

With the War Department leading

all government agencies in adding new clerical positions in
the intrawar period (over 5,000 new administrators in
Washington alone), the institutional desire for information
skyrocketed alongside increases in personnel and
materiel.152

It became clear that the Army was becoming

enamored with information and its corresponding technology
and that information was becoming an integral part of its
operations.
The scope and size of aviation’s information
requirements remained reasonably small as before America
entered the war.

As an organization insignificant in

comparison to its great power counterparts, the Army’s air
arm had little reason to invest copious amounts of
resources toward improving or expanding its data processes.
With few pilots and aircraft, there was little need to
track pilot training or aircraft maintenance statistics, or
separately improve aircraft materiel requisitioning or
personnel employment records.

The meager budget

allocations did not help matters either.

Overall, the

Aviation Section was in a survival mode, just another

"The Growth of the Capital in War Time," Air Service
Journal, Vol I, November 29, 1917, 666.
152
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subordinate Army unit jockeying for scarce resources and
operational respect.

Until the war, however, they received

little of either.153
By the summer of 1917, however, that paradigm had
changed completely.

America’s entry into the war afforded

the Army and its air component the opportunity to pursue
new technologies and methodologies without the intense
fiscal pressure of peacetime.

In short order, the Aviation

Section’s pre-war budget constraints began to vanish,
usurped by the influence of wartime authority and public
opinion.

Principal among these changes was President

Wilson’s approval of the July 1917 Aviation Act.

Two

months earlier, French Premier Alexandre-Félix-Joseph Ribot
sent a cablegram to Washington briefly describing how
aviation assistance from America “…would allow the Allies
to win the supremacy of the air.”

To meet his challenge

required unprecedented changes in both military and
civilian aeronautics, with the Aviation Act providing the
catalyst a mere fifteen weeks after America’s declaration
of war.

For the first time since its inception, Army

aviation leaders could finally begin building an air

Sweetser, The American Air Service; a Record of Its
Problems…, 66-104.
153
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service without the oppressive restrictions placed on them
by an uncooperative Congress.154
The response to the Aviation Act’s was massive.
Ribot’s 150-word cable requested aircraft and aviator
acquisitions requiring over 640 million dollars in new
funding, a seemingly absurd amount for an aviation program
that had received less than a quarter of that sum over the
past ten years combined.

With less than 300 planes in the

government’s inventory at the time, the Act called for the
production of more than 20,000 new aircraft, nearly half of
types never before witnessed on American soil.

It required

placing a thousand qualified men in training a month, 24
new aviation training fields, as well as air parks, supply
depots, and maintenance centers to keep the entire
organization operational.

American aircraft manufacturers

were tasked to produce two thousand planes a month in order
to maintain the rigorous demand schedule, not to mention
producing twice that many engines for aircraft and spares.
Within the first six months alone, France specified that
victory for the Allies required a flying corps of
approximately 4,500 aircraft, complete with 5,000 new
American aviators and nearly ten times that amount in

154

Ibid.
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maintenance technicians.

Ultimately, such sweeping changes

challenged the organization and operation of the air arm in
the war.

It also challenged how airmen handled their

corresponding information requirements.155
Aviation leaders such as Generals George Squier and
Benjamin Foulois were seasoned officers with experience in
difficult situations.

However, the problem of handling the

windfall of new aircraft, the selection and training of
thousands of new aviators, and the operations of an
organization ballooning to nearly ten times its former size
was more than just a leadership issue.

This mammoth

escalation in personnel and equipment created a host of new
challenges for the air arm, not the least of which was an
escalating amount of organizational information.

Until

that point, the management of military aviation information
was primarily an issue for higher Army echelon staff
organizations.156

As the air service grew, however, its

expansion necessitated the development of distinct
administrative procedures ranging from aero-centric forms,

155

Ibid.

In these specific cases, I am referring to the Adjutant
General staff for personnel documentation, the
Quartermaster department for logistical and maintenance
concerns, the Surgeon General for medical and psychological
documentation.
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files and reporting procedures to a card-based personnel
system that dovetailed into the larger Army system.
Following the Aviation Act, Army leaders looked to new
information and administrative procedures that were not
based on a previous Army construction.157

For their part,

air officers and their supporting cast began experimenting
with data processes better suited to harness voluminous
amounts of data, most often in the form of newer
derivations of manual card-based data management systems.
Despite the continuing use of ledgers and registers,
migrating to manual card systems became a universal
tendency for major Army information processes during the
war.

For aviation personnel specialists specifically,

managing the growing horde of pilots and supporting airmen

See The Personnel System of the United States
Army. (Washington: National Publication-U.S. Army AdjutantGeneral’s Office, 1919).
Throughout this document, the
Army discusses how the onset of the war forced a number of
administrative changes for the individual Army branches and
makes a number of specific references to the Air Service.
There is an entire section beginning on page 56 that
details how Secretary Baker and General McCain oversaw “The
Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army,”
which had a great deal to do with the administrative
details of recruiting, training, and administering to
massive influx of incoming airmen. In addition, Chapter
47, page 604 is entitled “Cooperation with the Aviation
Section, Signal Corps and Department of Military
Aeronautics” and deals directly with the selection and
classification of air officers. Also see Sweetser, The
American Air Service…, 84-145.
157
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was an alarming task.

In the first year of America’s war,

the total air arm population grew from 65 officers and
1,100 enlisted men to more than 12,000 officers and over
130,000 enlisted men.

By mid-1918, the newly created Air

Service had expanded to a size almost equal to that of the
entire pre-war Army.158

With so many additional personnel,

each with his own individual characteristics and background
data, using a Hollerith tabulation system seemed a viable
option for managing this information.

However, after

nearly three decades of sporadic military use, some felt
punched card systems were suited for little else other than
figure calculations and were not a fundamental or necessary
capability for large-scale data management.

Thus, instead

of fielding its own data tabulation systems, the Aviation
Section would instead borrow from the larger War Department
effort of creating a single, manual personnel data system
designed to handle the colossal amount of manpower pouring
into the Army during the war.159
The rapid influx of troops put the Army and its
aviation arm in a difficult position.
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Recognizing the

Sweetser, The American Air Service…, 225.

The Personnel System of the United States
Army. (Washington: National Publication-U.S. Army AdjutantGeneral’s Office, 1919), 143-150.
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issue early on, Secretary of War Newton Baker established a
special committee to oversee the service’s growing
matriculation and assignment concerns.

This group of

highly-regarded civilians became known as the Committee on
Classification of Personnel in the Army, responsible for
tackling the Army’s manpower expansion challenges
throughout the war.

Most notably, the committee

recommended in September 1917 that the Army establish a
manual card-based data management system built on
identically-sized “Soldier Qualification Cards” to be
universally applied across all branches. Replete with space
for a soldier’s background information, education,
occupational experience, assignment desires, and other
pertinent data, the service strove to get all qualification
cards completed within hours of a soldier’s arrival on
station.

Moreover, cards were specially marked with

orange-, black- or green-colored celluloid tabs to denote a
soldier’s skill level in his given trade as well as his
usefulness to the service. In June 1918, project managers
refined the card system with simplicity and universality in
mind.

Instead of an overbearing and complicated program,

the committee members sought out a system that was easily
cross-indexed, sortable between skill levels and trade
sets, and would inevitably fit into a standard Army filing
121

cabinet.160

With qualification cards in use throughout all

Army branches, air units specifically used them to
integrate new personnel into the organization as a means of
ensuring aviation procedures aligned with its higher
echelon counterparts.
One area where the Aviation Section did require
deviation, however, was in the selection of many of its
enlisted airmen, especially ones designated for aircraft
maintenance positions.

From its inception, members of the

Classification Committee used their expertise to design
tests for incoming soldiers that assessed mechanical
capability and potential.

Nevertheless, air officials

believed these examinations only validated general
mechanical aptitude and did not discern between these
individuals and those more qualified (or with the
potential) for more challenging positions in aeronautical
maintenance.

The Aviation Section convinced the committee

in 1918 to design special tests to select soldiers for this
specialized field.

The results were immediate, and the

quantity and quality of airmen entering the air arm

The Personnel System of the United States Army, 143-163;
Mark R. Grandstaff, Foundation of the Force: Air Force
Enlisted Personnel Policy, 1907-1956 (Washington: Air Force
History and Museums Program, 1997), 15-16; and Edwin
Garrigues Boring, Psychology for the Armed
Services. (Washington: Infantry Journal, 1945), 13-14.
160
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profoundly improved.

Moreover, the mechanical capacity of

incoming soldiers coupled with the diversification of the
profession allowed enlisted aviation positions to
proliferate into numerous subspecialties.

Whereas only the

position of “Air Mechanician” existed before 1917, World
War I saw aviation specializations develop in aircraft
engines and wing fabric, in propeller making and testing,
and in general aircraft maintenance.161

For those in the

aviation organization not directly involved in flight
operations, careers expanded in similar fashion to those in
the Signal Corps itself, with positions in communications,
engineering, photography, and weather.162
A similar evaluation and selection overhaul awaited
the Aviation Section’s massively reinvigorated pilot
selection program.

In general, the selection of new

aviators both before and during World War I presented some

It is worth noting that the term used was not mechanic
but mechanician, although reasons why are unknown.
161

Grandstaff, Foundation of the Force: Air Force Enlisted
Personnel Policy, 1907-1956, 15-16; Walter Van Dyke
Bingham, Army Personnel Work, Vol II (Washington: American
Psychological Association, 1919), 1-12; Harry David
Kroll, Kelly Field in the Great World War (San Antonio:
Press of San Antonio Print., 1919), 53; and Robert Mearns
Yerkes, Report of the Psychology Committee of the National
Research Council, 2nd ed., vol. 26, The Psychological
Review (Washington: National Research Council, 1919), 83149.
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of the most significant data compilation challenges the air
arm had ever seen.

Although exact figures vary, by the

start of the war the total number of fully-qualified
“flyers” in army aviation only amounted to approximately 50
officers, although some estimates project that even a third
of those were not considered completely competent in the
air.163

From July 1914 to June 1918, the Army’s

aeronautical unit processed 38,770 men seeking admission as
Air Service pilots.

In some periods, as in December 1917,

the application load grew incredibly intense with nearly
3,000 candidates volunteering for examination in one month
alone.

The administrative process became so selective that

only 18,004 individuals made it past their initial
screening, cutting the selection pool nearly in half.

By

the time the Armistice was signed in November 1918, the
U.S. Army Air Service had examined and trained upwards of

Records and accounts on the exact figure of “qualified”
pilots vary considerably, although one could argue that
numbers as miniscule as 26 to 54 are insignificant
considering the figure rose to over 16,000 just a short
time later. Data for these early numbers derive from
Martha Byrd, Chennault: Giving Wings to the
Tiger (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 19;
Diane L. Damos, Foundations of Military Pilot Selection
Systems: World War I (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2007), 2;
and V. A. C. Henmon, "Air Service Tests of Aptitude for
Flying," Journal of Applied Psychology 3, no. 2 (1919):
103-109.
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16,000 air cadets in their program.

No administrative task

of this magnitude had ever been attempted.

Like the

overall Army personnel system, the pilot selection process
gave air leaders the opportunities to manage and exploit
information in volumes the likes of which were foreign to
the service’s short history.

And, once again, the method

of data management became nearly as important a lesson as
the information derived from the data.164
Although the air arm’s data recording methods were
similar for enlisted and officer enrollment, the recruiting
and subsequent information gathering processes for aviator
selection were altogether different.

In the first place,

the standards for aviation officers were incredibly high,
calling for “men of the highest character” who were both
“well-educated” and of “good physique.”165

Luckily, with

aeronautical interest remaining strong throughout the
country during the war, the number of applicants was
staggering.

Thus, Signal Corps leaders understood they

could afford to be particular when selecting pilots, even

Along with the aforementioned records and accounts of
Byrd, Damos, and Henmon, another valuable reference in this
discussion is Sweetser, The American Air Service…, p. 96102.
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in the face of the massive requirements levied by the
Aviation Act.

Ensuring a thorough vetting process meant

more than choosing those applicants who survived a
stereotypical military training scenario.

Potential future

aviators required a combination of qualification programs
each designed to ensure only the most fit would eventually
take to the air.

In fact, even the Adjutant General of the

Army warned that neither schools nor competency boards
should be the overall arbiter for pilot qualification as
neither could perfectly determine who was truly airworthy.
The final result was to be not only a test of the potential
pilot’s aptitude and attitude, but also an extensive
assessment of the service’s ability to manage the millions
of corresponding data points that defined the process.
Pilot selection was to be the largest information
management program in aviation history until the Second
World War.166
The amount of information collected on candidates
journeying through the pilot selection process was
staggering.

Each potential aviator provided substantial

personal and professional information on his application
forms in addition to the standardized data set required on
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his Army qualification card.

This allowed examination

boards to review an abundance of information determining
everything from a candidate’s academic compatibility to his
potential for courage and “zeal for risk.”167

The primary

selection paperwork instrument during this process was
known as a “Form 609,” a document that originated as a prewar medical evaluation form only to grow into a
professional and mental examination document that included
elements administered by Aviation Examining Boards.
Through these forms, candidates provided answers to
questions on family, education, business experience,
athleticism, previous responsibility, and other forms of
military or professional training.

Included in the Form

609 package were no less than three letters of
recommendation and the results of an oral examination
conducted before yet another aviation board.

For each

pilot candidate, the total amount of information required
and compiled became a very daunting and invasive process
that matured considerably throughout the war.168
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Aptitude data was continuously added and updated as
prospective aviators navigated a gauntlet of intense
educational and training experiences.

Beginning with a

rigorous ground school, trainers tested and documented
everything from aeronautical talent, to ceremonial drill,
to wireless telegraphy knowledge.

By the time students

made it through flying school, their cadet records
reflected competency levels in flight theory, engine
operation, aircraft rigging, navigational aids,
reconnaissance and artillery theory, and a variety of other
topics from bomb characteristics to general military
paperwork.

Ultimately, despite being dispersed across

forms, cards, and other assorted paperwork, enough diverse
and detailed information existed on each cadet to determine
his airworthiness.

Moreover, with so much concerted effort

poured into each recruit’s evaluation, final graduation
authority was not left to low-ranking officers but instead
rested with the school’s commandant and the Chief Signal
Officer himself.169
While air leaders designed the decision process to be
both incredibly strenuous and selective, the task of

“How Army Aviators are Trained,” 370; The Personnel
System of the United States Army, 617; and Sweetser, The
American Air Service…, 119-168.
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organizing, accounting and distributing all this
information was still a chore in and of itself.

Therefore,

to make this happen required managing this information
throughout each process element.

For those military and

civilian administrators who participated in this endeavor,
pilot selection grew to become an exceptionally arduous
procedure to adjudicate and was made worse by the vast
amounts of paperwork required for process completion.
Moreover, without any form of data mechanization or
unlimited clerical assistance, the scale and scope of this
effort was at times overwhelming.

After reviewing the

pilot selection process in detail, one might question why
the Aviation Section (and after 1918, the Army Air
Service), the Signal Corps, or the Army did not introduce
any form of data mechanization into this procedure to
alleviate such a cumbersome administrative burden.

The

fact is that punched card tabulators were, in fact, used in
this process but not in the procedures previously
discussed.

Instead, punched cards were used by another

medical group in this process . . . one that was outside of
the traditional military purview at the time.170
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As mentioned in the first chapter, the Surgeon General
of the Army used the rapid escalation in the number of
recruits as an opportunity to exploit the personnel data of
soldiers.

Encased in this effort was the Army’s

psychological testing, of which aviation became an integral
part given the newness and inherent danger of aircraft.
The day after the United States declared war on Germany, a
group of psychologists eager to contribute to the war
effort formed a committee to address potential
psychological problems in Army recruits.

At the request of

the National Research Council, this “Psychology Committee”
aligned with the Council of the American Psychological
Association and examined ways to best utilize the expertise
of the nation’s top psychologists.

Under the original

direction of Dr. (and later, U.S. Army Major) R. M. Yerkes
of Harvard, the group established a subcommittee
specifically to examine the unique military problems
related to aeronautical personnel.

Formally designated

“the Committee on Psychological Problems of Aviation,”
Yerkes selected this panel of experts as one of the twelve
breakout groups to assist the war effort.

Shortly

thereafter, they began work on selecting specific testing
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methods and certifying the mental and psychological
information captured on the Form 609.171
A year later, shortly after the Air Service came into
existence, the aviation psychological committee continued
to make substantial progress in its aero-centered
investigations.

By closely studying the examining board

and intelligence test data, committee members were able to
discern valuable information on progressing aviation cadets
as well as devise additional assessments to further hone
their findings.

After a study of over two thousand

records, committee chairman Dr. Edward L. Thorndike
determined critical relationships existed between pilot
success and a candidate’s age, social status, intellect,
professional achievement, and athleticism.

From that data,

the committee designed a testing and ratings plan for the

See Damos, Foundations of Military Pilot Selection
Systems World War I, 1-23; Yerkes, Report of the Psychology
Committee of the National Research Council, 83-99; Diane L.
Damos, A Summary of the Technical Pilot Selection
Literature(Randolph AFB, TX: Air Force Personnel Center
Strategic Research and Assessment, 2011), 1-13. It should
be noted that the psychological testing of recruits is one
of the most misinterpreted Army processes of the war. This
testing, which began only days after Congress’ declaration
of war, is often referenced in historical literature as the
first large-scale use of data mechanization in the Army.
It is often assumed that the air arm had some experience
with these Hollerith systems and thus likewise participated
in this form of information processing. However, evidence
clearly shows that both the Army’s and the Air Service’s
involvement are exaggerated.
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Air Service’s Personnel Procurement Branch to adopt in
order to meet the Aviation Act’s goal of one thousand
aviation cadets per month.

Still, even with such an

advanced level of analysis, the processing methods remained
a manual endeavor.

Although numerous accounts of the

Psychology Committee recall the use of Hollerith tabulators
during the war period.

Hundreds of clerks worked for days

on end to compile, sort, and distribute the committee’s
data throughout the remainder of the war.

It was not the

finest hour for air arm information processing.
Eventually, however, the toil spent during this period
would become an exemplar for future systems generated
during the next World War.
In the meantime, the larger Psychology Committee did
manage to capitalize on its opportunity.

After culling

approximately 200,000 records from a pool of over 1.5
million, Major Yerkes and his committee of experts applied
a Hollerith punched card system to statistically examine
the progress of this subsection of Army troops.

The board

compiled as much data into one card as they could feasibly
imagine:

camp assignment, state drafted from, age, rank,

military specialty, nativity, time in country (for foreign
born soldiers), schooling, test scores, and most important
of all – race, specifically White or Negro.
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While

interesting and informative, the end result was a series of
statistical studies that were not as groundbreaking or as
helpful to the war effort as perhaps some committee members
initially expected.

While the compiled material certainly

provided a host of surveys and reports useful to higher
echelons, the data remained predominately useful for
selection and training procedures.172
Thus, by war’s end, data mechanization clearly existed
as part of the Army’s information processing programs, but
only on a limited basis.

Meanwhile, for the newly-minted

Army Air Service, tabulation systems for inventory and
personnel control were of even less importance in its
overall information processes.

The qualification card, the

Form 609, and the abundant amount of aero-specific tests
and evaluations performed on recruits (especially pilots)
remained the most enduring information control lessons
learned from the First World War.

It would take several

more decades, as well as a continuing fascination with
statistics and data analysis, to entrench the use of
punched card tabulators in the military’s air organization

Robert Mearns Yerkes, Psychological Examining in the
United States Army.(Washington: Government Printing Office,
1921), 565-570, 659-869; Reprint and Circular Series of the
National Research Council. (Washington: National Research
Council, 1919), 8-10.
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as well as produce the need for information technologies
more powerful than Hollerith ever imagined.
Supply, Statistics, and Data Tabulation
The newly christened Air Service came out of World War
I with renewed focus.

No longer driven by the operations,

logistics, and support missions of the war, the service
could now concentrate on standardizing and improving its
processes and procedures in order to sustain itself as an
independent Army branch.

Part of this improvement process

meant taking a close look at how the organization managed
and exploited its information.

In the post-war Air

Service, few endeavors exemplified this effort as much as
those undertaken by the service’s Supply Division.
In the winter connecting 1919 and 1920, Supply
Division Lieutenant Edwin R. Page engaged in what one
historian described as “undoubtedly one of the most
important steps taken by the Air Service after World War
I.”173

His junior rank notwithstanding, Page developed a

new property classification information system that would
become the backbone for aviation logistics processing for

Lois E. Walker and Shelby E. Wickam, From Huffman
Prairie to the Moon: The History of Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base (Washington: Air Force Logistics Command, 1986),
349-350.
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the next thirty years.

By dividing all equipment and

supplies into 29 different classes, this new program
allowed logisticians to navigate a manual supply system
that identified, stored, and issued supply items with
relative ease.

Given the intricacies and disconnectedness

of the existing system developed both before and during the
war, Page’s methods were welcomed in the Air Service.
Moreover, the fateful presence of then-Major Augustine
Warner Robins in the same office truly brought the program
to light.

Robins, now known as the father of Air Force

Logistics and the namesake of one of today’s largest
logistical bases in the world, helped take the system
public, believing in it so strongly that some writers
mistakenly give him credit for developing the program
himself.

Interestingly, when Robins transferred to take

command of a transitional air depot in the plains of Ohio,
Page went with him.

It was there that the importance of

information control was tested in the post-war Air Service
through the service’s first true operational applications
of data tabulators.174
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In 1919, small airfields, depots, and other servicerelated installations peppered the countryside of many
American states, and western Ohio was no exception.

Just

outside of Dayton in Fairborn, Fairfield Air Depot served
as the service’s supply clearinghouse, especially for the
trainloads of excess airplanes, engines, and various
unsorted aeronautical equipment shipped there after the
war.

Only miles away, McCook Field was an up and coming

experimental laboratory that housed, among a number of
other organizations, the Airplane Engineering Division
tasked with designing and redesigning aeronautical
components ranging from engines to armament.

In the two

locations, the Air Service developed some of the basic
logistical functions required of an air arm, specifically
the acquisition, supply, and experimental research systems
of the organization.

To do so required the establishment

and formalization of key information processes designed to
ensure the most effective operation possible, especially
given the financial constraints of the post-war Army.
information the organization tracked, and how, became a
principle factor in the behavior of the post-war
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organization . . . a fact not lost on other service
officers besides Robins and Page.175
In line with its wartime procedures, the Air Service
put aside thoughts of mechanizing their data processes in
favor of the tried-and-true manual card-based systems
applied over the past decade.

At McCook Field, known

throughout the service as an “information clearinghouse”
for producing aviation-specific reports and bulletins, this
meant that the statistical analysis and information
processing required for these publications would remain a
manually-processed endeavor.

For its airmen, this amounted

to using tens of thousands of cards each month to
operationally control information.

In July 1919 alone, the

Engineering Branch at McCook used over 33,000 three-by-five
inch cards just to monitor the phases of aircraft
development programs.

Steeped in information

documentation, a number of functional units under the much
larger Engineering Division used this card system in
coordination with other data “machines” and methods.

Using

recording processes that involved blueprints, blank forms,

Walker, From Huffman Prairie to the Moon, 349-352; Mary
Ann. Johnson, McCook Field, 1917-1927: The Force behind
America's Golden Age of Flight (Dayton, OH: Landfall Press,
2002), 296-299; "Engineering Branch of Shop Engineering
Section," Slipstream I, no. 3 (September 15, 1919): 1, 32;
Head, Every Inch a Soldier, 84.
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stationary stock, mimeographs, multigraphs, photographs,
and a plethora of other documentation and also office
machines, McCook airmen were able to publish the reports,
bulletins and special orders required by the unit’s
experimentation and engineering work.176
A few years later, Fairfield Air Depot contained more
than 250 million dollars’ worth of government property
registered on 120,000 stock record cards, each requiring
continuous updating to ensure accuracy.

With Robins in

command and Page on staff, the Fairfield depot became a
supply repository for post-war aeronautical surplus, not
only from inactivated airfields throughout the states, but
also from the host of overseas depots established during
the war.

Because so many war surplus items (both

serviceable and obsolete) made their way to the depot, the
amount of excess supplies requiring sorting,
classification, and storage created “serious record-keeping
problems.”177

In fact, it took well over two years for the

operation to become fully functional.

The painstaking

accountability process involved identifying, designating,
cataloging, and indexing entries for hundreds of thousands
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of technical supplies.

In all, it took a team of 350

civilian employees nearly four years to annotate the entire
system.

If reviewing the programs at McCook and Fairfield

reveals anything about the Air Service during this period,
it is that these installations relied heavily on manual
card information processes.

Even more so, it highlights

the importance of the information they generated and the
service’s persistence in obtaining it regardless of cost.178
The effective maintenance of supply information after
World War I shows just how important accurate and timely
information was to the air arm.

However, methods employed

also demonstrate a reluctance to make massive, wholesale
changes to information systems.

As time went on, the

reliance on manual card-based systems stood in even greater
contrast to the mechanized data machines in use across
similar logistical and administrative networks outside the
military.

War Department personnel understood that

eventually programs would include an either partial or
completely mechanized information system.
question was when.

The only

With companies adapting to modern
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administrative technologies at a faster pace, the gap
between the military and industry grew more noticeable with
each passing year.179
In the decade following World War I, the commercial
market for data tabulators and business machines in general
grew even larger as new and improved variants enticed a
growing pool of potential users.

Additionally, new market

competitors pushed the prevailing technological boundaries
as each sought their own niche in the fast growing office
machine industry.

The American public was swept up in the

phenomenon, with more school aged children signing up for
typewriting classes each year and an increase in office
machine and furniture sales for industry and in the home.
In these early business machine years, companies such as
Remington Typewriter, Dalton Adding Machine, and Powers
Accounting Machine all competed for market share against

Information of industrial advances in these areas is far
better documented than those of the military. For example,
Technological Innovation in Retail Finance includes the use
of punched card machines in the banking industry [see
Bernardo Batiz-Lazo, Carles Maixe-Altes, and Paul Thomes,
eds.,Technological Innovation in Retail Finance:
International Historical (New York: Routledge, 2012), 278.]
following World War I, while Punched-Card Systems and the
Early Information Explosion expounds upon tire producers
like Michelin and Renault who used these machines to
process operational statistics in the same post-war period
[see Heide, Punched-Card Systems and the Early Information
Explosion: 1880-1945, 158.]
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original standouts like Herman Hollerith’s Tabulating
Machine Company.

Even the Census Bureau, which only years

earlier had relied on Hollerith’s innovation for their allimportant decennial event, turned inward and created its
own machine shop to build the equipment for its data
collection and statistical needs.

In short, there were

enough machines, with enough capability, with enough proven
performance to satisfy many of the statistical and
informational requirements of the military in the mid1920s.

The question of when the air arm would abandon

manual systems and begin employing modern business machines
was anyone’s guess.180

The history of these business machines is found in
numerous narratives written about the age. Heide does a
worthwhile job of highlighting Herman Hollerith’s journey
from inventor to businessman, all the while identifying key
market trends and users along the way [see Lars
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2004)]. An IBM pamphlet is also helpful in tracing the
story of that company’s involvement during this period [see
IBM Highlights: 1869-1969 (Washington: International
Business Machines (IBM), 2011)]. Finally, Cortada
discusses at length the role of data mechanization,
information control, and business machines in the interwar
years [see James W. Cortada, Before the Computer: IBM, NCR,
Burroughs, and Remington Rand and the Industry They
Created, 1865-1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1993)].
180

141

Accounts vary as to the time and place of the first
significant, aviation-specific data mechanization program
in the air service.

There are some writings that place

mechanical business equipment at McCook Field as early as
1919; others suggest an operational application at Ohio’s
Wright Field in 1926.

However, with documentation as the

best arbiter of fact, perhaps the two earliest and most
developed data mechanization accounts occurred even later
in the post-war decade – in the Inspection Division’s
Development Section in 1927 and in the Materiel Division in
1929.181
Service historians note that beginning in April 1927,
the Inspection Division’s Development Section tracked
aviation trends, especially those pertaining to improving
pilot and aircraft performance, by performing statistical
analyses using the latest mechanized data equipment.

As

aircraft enhancement programs progressed in the post-war
military, the Development Section remained focused on
studying aircraft accidents and forced landings by way of
statistical investigation.

Moreover, the unit used these

investigations to pioneer new standards for recording

Charles R. Landon, ed., United States Air Force - Review
of Statistical Services, January 1950 - July
1954 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1954), 1.
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aircraft flying hours, individual flying hours, and
aircraft engine time.

The section took on the additional

task of life insurance management, a task stemming from the
unit’s original accident documentation mission.

Using data

tabulation and calculations, these airmen were able to
examine data quicker and with greater proficiency than ever
before.

The significance of these analyses clearly

revolved around the quality and efficiency of its
information.

At the unit level, these data-focused units

grew evermore significant as this information became
essential to daily operations.

At the higher headquarters

echelons, the importance was magnified as this same
information helped determine the major organizational
decisions being made throughout the service.182
It was at these higher echelons that the Inspection
Division’s Development Section sought an even greater
impact with its information.

Given its access to mission-

critical statistical and operational data, the Section
aimed to serve as a research and planning agency for the
Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC) in hopes its
statistical methodologies and mechanized processes could

Frances Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air
Forces, Air Historical Studies: No. 57 (Washington: USAF
Historical Division, Air University, 1952), 1-3.
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formulate management control methods for Air Corps
leadership.

Even more, the unit looked at developing

special statistical studies for OCAC offices to aid with
pending Congressional legislation affecting the air
service.

Unfortunately, despite contributing numerous

reports to headquarters organizations, the unit operated
for over a decade without being credited with any major
impact on either service decision making or management.

In

fact, with the exception of providing both personnel and
products to support headquarters’ statistical support, the
Development Section’s impact up to 1939 is regarded as
nominal at best.

As fate would have it, nearly a dozen

years and countless mechanized data analyses failed to make
a significant contribution to Air Corps decision making in
the interwar years.

Just as they had prior to World War I,

senior leaders focused so heavily on service relevancy in a
fiscally-constrained military that the importance of
promoting data mechanization paled by comparison.

The

drive for statistical data did not cease in the interwar
military, but its importance remained questionable until
another world war was imminent.183
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At the same time the Development Section was advancing
data mechanization processes, a key statistical
organization inside the Air Corps’ Materiel Division began
a three-year process of installing punched card tabulators.
Beginning in 1929, the Materiel Division – the service’s
largest branch responsible for all aircraft and equipment
research, development, procurement and maintenance –
ordered the Statistics Unit of its Field Services Section
to record and preserve the consolidated records of
aviation’s critical flight development programs.

These

programs maintained an abundant amount of vital information
on all airplanes, airships, balloons, and engines in the
Division’s arsenal, including inventory totals, location,
condition, status, and flying time of each part or
aircraft.

To effectively utilize this information, the

Field Service Section installed “business machine
equipment” at Wright Field to perform analyses on aircraft
and equipment.184

In fact, without tabulating equipment,

reporting comprehensive airframe and engine statistical
data was deemed too arduous to attempt.

Although leaders

originally purchased these machines for cost accounting
purposes, their reports became a quintessential part of the

184
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Section’s operational effectiveness, not to mention a
useful tool in the Air Corps operations and logistics
management.185
By 1936, the Materiel Division’s statistical mission
officially migrated to the Air Corps Budget Office due in
large part to a continued headquarters requirement for such
reporting.

To those at the OCAC-level, it was clear these

reports and analyses represented only a fraction of the
unit’s potential, especially given its steadily increasing
use of modern business equipment.

Of course, as these

statistical programs were visible to the rest of the War
Department, the benefits of data mechanization extended
beyond the offices of the Air Service.

For example, in

1938, General George Marshall took inspiration from other
service mechanization efforts and ordered the creation of
Army electronic accounting units to handle administrative
tasks ranging from manpower to finance to logistics.

A

year later, the War Department began hiring administrative

Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, 2-4;
Review of Statistical Services, January 1950 - July 1954,
1; Arthur Tatnall, History of Computing: Learning from the
Past : IFIP WG 9.7 International Conference, HC 2010, Held
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"Air Force Materiel Command Fact Sheet," Air Force Materiel
Command, accessed December 12, 2012,
http://www.afmc.af.mil/main/welcome.asp.
185

146

specialists to coordinate with industrial experts to
establish a new service-wide accountability program, known
later as the U.S. Army Personnel Accounting System.

This

system used punched card tabulators capable of tracking
every soldier with impressive accuracy, proving even more
effective than the World War I mechanized card systems in
the Surgeon General’s office.

Installing these tabulating

units later became an integral part of the Army’s broader
plan to create mobile, truck-mounted “Machine Record
Units,” or MRUs, capable of handling the personnel
management and record keeping for deployed units and
designed with statistical control in mind.

Near the end of

the decade, it was clear that mechanization programs
symbolized the coming of a new era in information
management and control in the Army.

Soon it became

incumbent upon its Air Corps to follow suit.186
Between January 1939 and December 1941, the number of
machine tabulators and calculating machines grew
progressively throughout the Air Corps.

After nearly two

decades of meandering data mechanization programs that
received little fanfare in the service as a whole, efforts

Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, 2-4;
Norman A. Donges, "How the Army Knows Its Strength," Army
Information Digest 3, no. 7 (July 1948): 65-69;
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flourished as major organizations continued marrying their
information processes to both the manual and machineassisted statistical compilation programs of the day.

In

fact, elements of Air Corps data automation began
permeating the highest levels inside the War Department.
For example, after relocating a number of times, the
Materiel Division’s once meager Statistical Unit expanded
to become the Air Staff-Statistics Office, responsible for
liaising with the statistical sections of the Assistant
Secretary of War, War Department General Staff, and the
Office of Production Management.

In another example, after

several organizational moves of its own, the Development
Section’s statistical mission reappeared in early 1941 in
the Inspection Division’s newly organized Safety Section.
This new element became responsible for all flight records,
medical examination records, and emergency tabulations for
the numerous divisions inside OCAC, taking on an entire
Army machine tabulating unit assigned to assist with the
additional workload.

After years of changing priorities

and requirements, the organization finally processed all
Air Corps military personnel data and eventually, civilian
personnel records as well.

In the months before World War

II, there was little doubt that the service’s statistical
control was a rapidly advancing capability.
148

Its

advancement was matched only by the organization’s growing
reliance on the data machines themselves.187
In June 1941, the combination of a dependence on
statistical data and the various decentralized methods of
obtaining it was too much for Air Corps leaders to ignore.
At the time, the War Department was rewriting Army
Regulation 95-5, a critical document that gave the aviation
service the opportunity to reorganize.

This allowed Corps

leaders, anxious to make pivotal changes in departmental
operations, to take advantage of the chance to rectify data
process issues.

At the time, thirteen distinct statistical

activities operated independently throughout each major
aviation organization of the service.

A noticeable lack of

control and information integration sometimes caused more
problems than it solved.

In fact, leading up to the

reorganization, statistical reporting clearly suffered from
an operational and organizational duplication of effort
that rendered these endeavors ineffective to those who
relied on them.188
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reporting methods placed an undue paperwork and reporting
burden on field units while failing to provide the
necessary information to higher echelons who needed to
“control the increasingly complex plans and operations of a
defense organization.”189

What the Air Corps needed were

organizational structures and processes that created a
functioning relationship between these statistical units,
not to mention one that removed the data errors or
omissions caused by a lack of functional control.
Regulation 95-5 provided a catalyst for change.190
Under the authority of this War Department regulation,
the Army Air Corps reorganized as the Army Air Forces (AAF)
on 20 June 1941.

The event created an “overall

administrative command” for Army aviation that finally
oversaw all the organization’s air-centric aspects.191

At

long last, this centralization of authority allowed AAF
leaders to create headquarters-level information
organizations to be the preeminent aviation statistical
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control units, the most prominent of which became the Air
Staff-Statistics organization.

This entity initially

focused its energy on generating studies focused on AAF
personnel and materiel.

However, within its first few

months, requests from service leaders augmented its
responsibilities considerably.

The unit began producing

analyses ranging from aircraft allocation and production
reports to pilot and technician training rate studies.
What occupied a good deal of time was the creation of
tables, charts, plans, maps and general officer-purposed
statistical handbooks for the AAF Commander’s “War Room.”192
As service historians note, this was the first major step
in creating an air service statistical control entity that
not only centralized statistical reporting but also planned
and directed “a strategic program upon the basis of
statistical knowledge.”193

Overall, the leadership’s

information requirements were driving changes in service
processes as well as creating new organizations and new
strategic planning programs with data fidelity never before
encountered in the department.

These were known as “General Arnold’s Handbook” and
“General Spaatz’s Handbook” in the War Room, which was
outside of General H. H. “Hap” Arnold’s office.
192
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Over the next several months, the importance of
statistical information and the Air Staff-Statistics
organization grew throughout the service.

Another major

information organization, the Research and Statistics
Section, gave up its flight record machine tabulation
program in August in order to concentrate its resources on
developing and maintaining statistical, budgetary and other
data analysis required for aviation programs and
activities.194

Soon key officers from across the Air Staff

began studying the question of statistical controls and
associated projects throughout the headquarters.

Data

collection and exploitation duties were split up between
the statistical organizations with one organization solely
responsible for the collection and compilation of primary
and special operational data while another was responsible
for regular and special studies based on such data.

In a

memorandum signed just five days before the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor, future Air Force Chief of Staff and
current Air Staff officer Brigadier General Carl A. Spaatz

An investigation at the time found that the flight
records program, while important, took all the personnel
and machine tabulating equipment in the office. Leaders
felt there was a better use for these resources at the
time, especially given the reorganization and rise in
hostilities in Europe. See Acomb, Statistical Control in
the Army Air Forces, 6.
194
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confirmed this relationship by formally codifying that,
“[t]he Statistics Section of the Air Staff will furnish
consultation service to all Divisions of the Air Staff and
will conduct such specialized projects related to this
study as may be required, with the assistance of the
Statistics Sections, OCAC.”195

Spaatz’s involvement proved

that nearly a decade-and-a-half after the service founded
its first true statistical units, headquarters echelons
were finally solidifying the service’s information and data
mechanization processes.

The AAF was now far better

postured information-wise for war.
The three months that followed the bombing of Pearl
Harbor saw two additional headquarters reorganizations in
the air arm of the U.S. Army.

As the War Department

mobilized for this next global war, those responsible for
the framework of statistical control in Army aviation
sought to establish a more structured and standardized
state for their mission.

The crucible of war quickly

proved to a rapidly expanding air service how it was
suffering from an information management problem, one that
posed a significant threat to pursuing any form of data

Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, 5-8,
with specific reference to General Spaatz’s 2 Dec 1941
memorandum for the Chief of the Air Corps.
195
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automation and statistical control in wartime.

The issue

was not a shortage of data or the lack of report
generation.
information.

Rather, the air arm was generating too much
In all, the newly designated Army Air Forces’

produced over 2500 recurring official reports and
statistical publications, making it nearly impossible for
units to operate without them.

Moreover, despite the

preset responsibilities assigned by Spaatz and others at
the headquarters level, the AAF had done little to control
the statistical units and their data equipment in the
field.

Overall, it was clear to those at headquarters and

throughout the air arm’s reporting agencies that while
tabulating equipment was indeed essential to the service’s
statistical activities, it required centralized control to
operate effectively.196
In March 1942, the air service prepared for yet
another reorganization.

This wartime organizational

change, combined with the growing data requirements across
the major operational and support branches, led some AAF
leaders to yet again jockey for control over the nature and
missions for future statistical control organizations.
Some envisioned statistical units producing enough reports

196

Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, 5-10.
154

to cover all aspects and activities of the service.

Others

focused on creating a new officer position – the
statistical officer – who would be so important to AAF
operations that they were to be handpicked by the service,
educated at a newly established and specialized school at
Harvard University, trained by headquarters, and assigned
to nearly every squadron and headquarters unit in the
organization.

With the Army focusing its efforts on

Machine Record Units and the pre-war automated personnel
accountability system, the air forces concentrated on
creating an accountability system all their own.

They

sought more than the administrative data, personnel roster
and troop strength reports, and casualty records that made
up the mission of the MRUs.

AAF leaders wanted a system

that provided “continuous studies” of AAF requirements and
maintained a reporting system that could keep headquarters
echelons consistently updated on the status of all aviation
and supporting units.

On March 9, 1942, the War Department

performed a major reorganization creating three autonomous
Army Commands (Army Ground Forces, Services of Supply, and
Army Air Forces), a result of which was the conglomeration
of all headquarters’ statistical functions.

That outcome

created a single unit responsible for controlling the
preponderance of mission-essential information traffic
155

across the AAF worldwide.

This organization became simply

known as the Directorate of Statistical Control.197
The mission of this new directorate spoke directly to
the growing requirement for data automation in the service.
The AAF Statement of Functions specifically detailed the
organization to “provide machine tabulation and other
statistical services for all subdivisions of the AAF
located at Headquarters, and to coordinate the activities
of all machine-tabulation installations in the AAF.”198

In

charge of the directorate was Charles Bates “Tex” Thornton,
a civilian at the time but a Colonel by war’s end.

With a

mission statement rooted in machine tabulation and a
growing stable of highly-educated and extremely competent
statistical officers, Thornton’s Directorate of Statistical
Control set out to create an information environment
predicated on detailed machine-based data reporting from
field units, mechanized statistical analysis at the
headquarters level, and decision-making based on a
conglomeration of the two.

Without question, after years

"Air Force History Overview," Air Force History Fact
Sheet, accessed March 1, 2013,
http://www.af.mil/information/heritage/overview.asp.; and
Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, 8-12.
197
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of delays and setbacks, data mechanization was now an
integral function of the Army’s aviation organization.
Over the next three years of the war, statistical
control and mechanized data processing permeated nearly
every aspect of major information transfer inside the air
service.

In the field, to allow for the Army’s machine

record unit’s oversight of War Department-specific
personnel information, the AAF established “Statistical
Control Units (SCU)” throughout the American theaters of
operation and placed them in proximity to the MRUs for both
control and equipment purposes.

In many cases, the MRU

functioned as an adjunct of the SCU when attached to the
same headquarters, especially under the auspices of
equipment sharing.

Following the reorganization at

headquarters in 1942, the AAF set out immediately to
resource each statistical unit with IBM machinery.
Although this effort took time, a standard control unit
prior to D-Day in 1944 contained the following equipment:








IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM

405
513
522
080
077
031
054

Alphabetic Accounting Machine
Summary Punching Reproducer
Alphabetic Interpreter
Horizontal Sorter
Collator
Alphabetic Key Punches
Alphabetic Verifier 199

"Memorandum to Lt Col Williams, 12 Feb 44," 65th MRU to
Lieutenant Colonel Williams, US Strategic Air Forces in
199
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Moreover, each unit was staffed with at least one officer
experienced in statistical control work and machine
operations, ten enlisted men with specific machine
processing and form processing experience, and another five
to ten enlisted men with key punching or typing/clerical
experience.

Overall, the establishment of a SCU at a

designated location signified the Army Air Forces’
requirement to establish a controlling authority over that
location as well as an information hub responsible for
reporting its personnel, equipment, and readiness status on
a consistent basis.

To the headquarters, this effort was

clearly a matter of centralized control.

To the field

units, however, it sometimes seemed to be little more than
headquarters-generated paperwork.200
One of the earliest issues confronting the field
placement of SCUs was gaining the permission of the field
commanders themselves.

On one level, the control units

represented a watchdog organization for headquarters and
added little to the unit’s mission as a whole.

However, as

Europe, February 12, 1944, in U.S. Air Force Historical
Research Agency, IRIS: 00214762.
"Memorandum to Lt Col Williams, 12 Feb 44";
Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, 42.
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they also represented the potential to reduce the unit’s
administrative burden, most units were willing to yield.
Furthermore, because the SCUs were designed to alleviate
field unit paperwork, operational units could nearly rid
themselves of the administration deemed as a “great plague”
in combat arms.201

The military had made little progress

reducing the administrative burden on commanders, unit
leaders, and clerical personnel since the previous World
War.

Throughout this new conflict, the Army and its

subordinate air forces spent a great deal of effort
delineating what information they wanted from field units,
and how often, in hopes of rectifying the problem.

In one

particular example, the machine units concentrated on the
Army’s focus on personnel information by centering their
energies on “mechanizing” the Officers and Soldiers
Qualification cards (AGO Form 66-1 and AGO Form 20), as
well as the standard “Morning Report,” unit strength
report, and a change report providing supplementary
personnel information when required.

The machine record

units, oftentimes operating out of one or more heavy
vehicles, took this burden from field organizations and

Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, 42.
As stated in this section, “Anything which promised a
measure of relief from [paperwork] was welcomed.”
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transmitted the data to upper echelons via either teletype
or telephone.

With successes such as this, the AAF

statistical unit responsibilities grew even larger,
expanding in depth and breadth beyond anything imagined
before the war.202
There were many data requirements for statistical
control units in the field, most presented as official
forms to be mechanically compiled and transmitted by each
unit on a regular basis.

These documents ranged from the

standard AAF Form 120, which calculated the unit’s daily
aircraft inventory, to the more complex air mission AAF
Form 34 containing individual sortie data that included
aircraft totals, flight time, bomb tonnage, ammunition and
fuel consumption, and even approximated losses on both
sides of the equation.

However, of all the information

forms generated by the service, perhaps none were more
important than the two primary, mechanically-prepared forms
known universally as the Form 127 and the Form 110.

In

response to the data presented by the MRUs, the air arm
developed the AAF Form 127, also identified as the Weekly
Report of Personnel Status and the primary report for

Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, 42,
66.
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statistical manpower information.

The Form 127 reported

all aviation personnel by unit and military specialty,
helping to ensure headquarters leaders and unit commanders
fully understood their established personnel requirements,
unit condition and pending disposition.

The data also

ensured that decision-makers across the service received
the same information simultaneously, and that leaders based
higher echelon decisions on the same data.203
Meanwhile, the AAF Form 110 dealt with the other
critical resource for the air arm:

service equipment.

For

aircraft, the Form 110 provided a daily inventory report
that reported the type, model, and series by serial number
for every aircraft on hand at each location.

Additionally,

the form recorded the aircraft’s current status and its
total number of flying hours, a vital statistical that also
doubled as an accident and battle loss reporting mechanism
for the service’s high command.

Overall, between these two

primary forms and the additional data collected at each
location, the volume of information traversing the SCUs on
a recurring basis was staggering, not to mention complex.

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air
Forces in World War II, Chapter VI (Washington: Office of
Air Force History, 1983), 35-39; Army Air Forces
Statistical Digest World War II (Washington: Office of
Statistical Control, 1945), 111; Acomb, Statistical Control
in the Army Air Forces, 66.
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However, the large volumes of data crossing each unit gave
field commanders an entirely new perspective on information
operations, not to mention their impact on mission
success.204
Commanders with assigned statistical control units
quickly recognized that despite the volume of information
required by each unit, the hard work and dedication of the
men in statistical operations made their job easier.
Despite the initial culture shock of seemingly endless
amounts of required information, commanders recognized that
SCUs could actually contribute to the unit’s mission by
shouldering the administrative reporting burden and freeing
up valuable combat personnel resources.

Requests for SCU

assistance began to rise considerably throughout the war
theaters as commanders credited SCUs with simplifying
reporting procedures and handling their statistical
reporting tasks.

In addition, field leaders recognized

that the benefits of large volume data reporting were not
limited to headquarters elements.

Knowledge of personnel

and equipment shortages on a regular basis often translated
into quicker replacement times from manpower and supply

Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Chapter VI,
35-39; Army Air Forces Statistical Digest World War II,
111; Acomb, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, 66.
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chains, sometimes even without requiring formal
requisitioning forms on the part of the unit.

In fact, the

system appeared so beneficial that the commanding general
of Tenth Air Force went so far as to formally report that
“[t]his statistical reporting system has worked wonders for
the Army Air Forces.”205

With thousands of pieces of IBM

equipment manned by highly-trained field personnel, the
investment made in SCUs appeared to be paying off.

These

statistical units foreshadowed the ever-growing requirement
for improved information capabilities in the service.206
During the war, data mechanization permeated a number
of AAF organizations beyond the standard information
reporting chain and the purview of its statistical
organizations and data mechanization experts.

For example,

the Army Air Force climatology program used punch card
tabulators to record more than 26,000 station-months’ worth
of records during the war, utilizing nearly 20 million
cards in the process.

Additionally, after German weather

punched cards were captured, allied meteorologists
deciphered two large card decks full of climatological data
on the European and Asian theater, providing previously
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inaccessible weather information to Western forces.207

In

another instance, this time in direct support of the flying
mission, the IBM 405 accounting machine was essential to
producing Air Almanacs that delivered essential
aeronautical data used for all American flying forces
during the war, each more than 700 pages long and
containing approximately 3,000 machine-verified figures.208
In these cases and many others, it became clear that by
war’s end statistical units were not the only data
automation organizations in existence in the Army Air
Forces.

These units nonetheless provided the legitimacy

needed for other aviation organizations to procure their
own data mechanization systems that produced results
similar to those that preceded them.

As requirements for

faster calculations of larger data sets began to prevail
across the service, scientists and researchers looked for
ways to accommodate these service needs.

From these

operational requirements and efforts, the first computers
were born.

Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine: Computer Models,
Climate Data, and the Politics of Global
Warming (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010).
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Conclusion
Between 1907 and 1947, the management and application
of information played an essential role in the United
States Army’s evolving air service.

Using information to

help train, equip, and employ these growing forces
supported the air arm’s emergence from a single
administrative office to a war-changing, million-plus
airmen organization in a relatively short span of time.

In

highlighting this evolution, this chapter disproves the
assumption that air service data processes and technologies
mirrored those of its parent Army organization.

Instead,

the air arm’s information services developed at the speed
of its user requirements, which frequently outpaced
advances in aeronautical technology as well as the
organizational growth of the air service itself.
These user requirements developed early.

Although the

aviation organization did not set out to create an
independent information system before World War I, the
needs of its developing air operations necessitated unique
applications and alterations of its current data
methodologies.

Deviations from standard Army procedures

were small at first:

the addition of the Record of

Aeroplane Flights form, the reference to aeronautical
equipment in higher-order regulations, and the requirement
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to keep records on flight data, engine motor statistics,
transportation expenditures, and many data points inbetween.

Soon the information requirement grew large

enough that airmen implemented special concessions to feed
the growing aviation-centered data processes.

From

publishing aviation guidance such as 1916’s Equipment for
Aero Units of the Aviation Section to requiring an air armspecific data card recording system, the information
processes of this flying organization diverged from
standard Army procedures a little more each day.
World War I sped up this divergence considerably.
President Wilson’s approval of the July 1917 Aviation Act
rapidly increased the Army’s requirements for both pilots,
support crews and aircraft with the organization illequipped at meeting their overall needs.

The Aviation

Section attempted to mitigate these shortfalls by creating
their own manual data systems to handle the influx of
recruits and equipment.

They developed information

procedures using Hollerith systems and comprehensive data
forms (i.e. Form 609) to alleviate information shortfalls
and corral the vast amounts of data pouring into the air
organization on a daily basis.

These improvements and

others were critical to aviation’s pursuit of greater
organizational legitimacy, especially as the service
166

struggled for a more prominent War Department role by using
statistical documentation and data reports to make their
case.

This pursuit pushed the air service’s data

requirements further than ever and helped bolster future
data requirements.
The organization’s interwar years were met with
massive budget cuts and drastically reduced mission
requirements.

Some air service units, however, took these

circumstances as an opportunity to utilize information
technology and procedural applications as a means of
increasing operational efficiency.

For example, aviation

units used data mechanization to produce statistical
analyses for improving pilot and aircraft performance.
They pioneered new standards for recording aircraft and
individual flying hours, aircraft engine time, and postevent analysis for aircraft accidents and forced landings.
Aviation units also used business machines to record and
preserve the service’s flight development programs and kept
a voluminous amount of information on all its airframes.
In the months before World War II, the statistical
requirements internal to the air service had increased to
the point that centralization and consolidation of
information activities began to take shape.

Soon the

budgetary, personnel, and other supporting data analysis
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took a back seat to the operational information processes
that ran in tandem with the mechanization processes of the
Army.
World War II spawned two significant information
entities in the air arm:

the Statistical Control Units in

the field and the Directorate of Statistical Control in
Washington.

The SCUs changed the way units conveyed their

information by utilizing data mechanization gear to collect
and report critical information while simultaneously
reducing the administrative burden of its collocated,
battle ridden field units.

Meanwhile, Statistical Services

at AAF headquarters created a new and widespread mechanized
information environment that took SCU data and developed
statistical analysis and decision-making data sets that
permeated nearly every aspect of major information
transfers inside the air service.

Decisions on bombing

targets, personnel relocations, and armament procurement
were all made thanks to the information sent by field units
and exploited by its higher headquarters.

By war’s end,

the Army Air Forces were no longer an organization
operating with information . . . they were an organization
run on information.
By 1947, the air service hardly resembled the
organization commanded by General Scriven in 1913, and was
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certainly nothing like what General Allen signed into
existence with “Office Memorandum No. 6” in 1907.

After

two world wars, unprecedented technological advancement,
and a mission progression few saw coming at its inception,
the aviation mission had grown so autonomous of the Army’s
role on land that creating an entirely independent service
seemed almost anticlimactic.

While there was certainly

cause for celebration on September 18, 1947, the reality
was that the United States Air Force had earned its
independence gradually through decades of functional and
organizational change and not with the stroke of President
Truman’s pen.

The Air Force developed into a separate

service as it adapted to its operational and organizational
environment and adjusted the way it functioned.

Part of

that journey involved the way the service regulated itself,
kept track of its operations, maintained personnel data,
and sought a growing level of speed and accuracy through
task professionalization and office mechanization.

As

explained throughout this chapter, inside the history of
the air arm from 1907 to 1947 is a complex story of Air
Force evolution partially driven by the management and
application of information processes and technology.
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Chapter 3
Early Air Force Computing and Mechanized Data
Management Programs, 1947-1955
The formative years of Air Force computing and data
automation were defined by those individuals who pursued
the development of relevant technology before the service
was organized or overly interested in doing so.

Between

1947 and 1955, these advocates – civilians, military, and
contractors alike – challenged existing technological and
operational paradigms and put the service at the leading
edge of computer technology.

This period was characterized

by a lack of oversight and direction from higher echelons.
Innovations were introduced by futurists who evaluated and
anticipated service requirements even when unit leadership
was otherwise preoccupied.

While there were some official

service programs designed to harness this technology, in
reality efforts were guided by one or more key individuals,
some of whom were guided by personal aims in addition to
those of the service.

Computing and data automation arose

following the ENIAC’s (Eckert and Mauchley’s Electronic
Numerical Integrator and Computer) initial development in
the mid-1940s and evoked enthusiasm from those with the
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expertise and foresight to understand their importance to
the service’s future.209

In 1955, the Air Force assigned

computing oversight to a single office at the Pentagon –
the Directorate of Statistical Services – in an effort to
centralize responsibility inside the organization.
However, given the myriad unique computing systems cropping
up throughout the service, such consolidated oversight was
to prove virtually impossible.
In this chapter I focus on the origins of Air Force
computing and mechanized data management, not only from a
technological standpoint but also from a leadership and
organizational perspective in order to demonstrate how
important individual initiative in this sphere was to the
service’s success.

I will detail how the dedication and

tenacity of a number of key military, civilian, and
contracted individuals produced change during this period.
I will highlight how in these early years of the Air Force
key contributions and advances helped shape the operational
and organizational landscape of a service void of an

The ENIAC, or Electronic Numerical Integrator And
Computer, was the world’s first electronic digital computer
designed by John Mauchly and J. Presper Eckert at the
University of Pennsylvania and was developed to compute
World War II ballistic firing tables for the United States
Army's Ballistic Research Laboratory. See Martin H. Weik,
"The ENIAC Story," ENIAC - World Wide Web, accessed May 1,
2013, http://ftp.arl.mil/mike/comphist/eniac-story.html.
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identity beyond that of manned flight.

Additionally, this

chapter explains how and why the service chose to organize
and operate itself in the wake of these new processes, new
systems, and new possibilities.
Following an Information-fueled War
By the end of World War II, the U.S. Army Air Forces
was an organization run on information.

The service’s

statistical control operations, known in the field as the
“Stat System,” permeated nearly all organizational units
from its headquarters to its squadrons.

For over three

years, military leaders had used the information gathered
and disseminated by control units to strategically plan and
execute their war orders.

The service used the data

traversing these statistical control units to do more than
inform; it used it to influence operations affecting
millions of lives and billions of dollars.

Information was

no longer important . . . it was mission critical.210
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As the world’s “largest centrally controlled
installation of mechanical accounting equipment and
private-wire teletype” during the war, this information
monolith continued to produce new data requirements and
forced massive resource investments throughout the AAF.211
Upholding a high level of information efficiency required a
cadre of three thousand officers, fifteen thousand enlisted
personnel, and enough data machinery, support equipment,
and operating facilities to support sixty-six major SCU
locations worldwide.

After the war, budget cuts forced the

service to drastically reduce the size of the statistical
control entity, especially as it could no longer afford
such a large personnel reserve.

The requirement for

statistical information, however, did not dimish.

The

success of World War II information operations confirmed
the necessity for a centralized data control system as well
as the leadership’s desire to access large volumes of
information.

Statistical control remained an integral part

of air operations through its integration into the Office
of the Comptroller in 1947 and the service’s independence
soon thereafter.212
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Three years earlier in 1944, Statistical Control’s
Combat Analysis Branch was the exemplar for wartime
information processing in the Army Air Forces.

Operating

from a single office on the fourth floor of the stillunder-construction Pentagon building, the branch’s nine
staff members (seven of them AAF officers) spent their days
and nights translating field data into meaningful
statistical information bound for leaders across the
military.

Their director was George Dantzig, a

mathematician and statistician by trade and education, and
an expert in statistical analysis who had served in the
branch since the war began.

Over the next several years,

it was his experience in statistics and logistical planning
that placed him at the helm of Air Force information
control as well as at the forefront of its newest
information devices.213

The “Roster of Key Personnel for the Statistical Control
Division, 1944” listed 9 members of the Combat Analysis
Branch, with Dantzig as its head and 8 additional members –
1 Major, 2 Captains, 3 First Lieutenants and one Second
Lieutenant. The final individual’s status is unknown. All
were listed under room 4C1037 at the Pentagon (4th Floor, C
Ring, 10th Corridor, Room 37). Communication outside the
office was apparently not a major priority as there were
only two telephone numbers assigned to the branch (as
opposed to others who had 6-10 numbers). Dantzig was the
only individual in the branch to have access to both
numbers. See Roster of Key Personnel, Headquarters Army
Air Forces Statistical Control Division, 1944, USAF
213
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Dantzig’s experience after nearly four years of AAF
statistical analysis proved few knew more about the power
and benefits of aggregated information.

Combat Analysis

collected the predictable air combat information – sorties
flown, bomb tonnage expended, attrition rates, etc. – but
they also prepared detailed Air Staff plans covering the
gamut of service requirements ranging from the
accountability of hundreds of thousands of various material
goods to validating more than fifty thousand personnel
specialties.

Dantzig’s efforts as director proved he

clearly understood the statistical analysis capabilities of
punched card tabulators and arithmetic calculators but was
also equally aware of their limitations.

The director’s

vision of implementing supplementary and more complex
calculations was originally shelved due to the technical
constraints of existing machinery.

Fortunately, his

familiarity with parallel projects underway throughout the
Pentagon gave him both unique insight into and optimism
about new calculation possibilities for the directorate.
These projects produced machines that became known as

Official Document (Washington: United States Air Force,
1944), 1-4.
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computers and played a significant role in Dantzig’s own
logistics planning mathematical efforts.214
Before 1947, the term “computer” was multifaceted.
Its simplest definition, “something that computes,” fully
entered the AAF lexicon during the Second World War
although its use varied widely.

In 1943, General E. L.

Eubank recommended the AAF purchase a dozen Model AAF10-B
bombing error computers for its bombardment headquarters
and training units.

While the device helped analyze

bombing errors and bombsight problems caused by ground
speed, drift, and altitude, it more closely resembled a
complex calculating instrument.

Meanwhile, nearly two

hundred female workers who performed ballistic computations
for the war effort were ironically called computers
themselves.

Only in January 1946 did analysts from the

National Defense Research Committee use a more current
interpretation of the term as they foresaw a War Department
“Tactical-Strategic Computer” complete with dials and
controls capable of forecasting the outcomes of battles and
wars.

In all, the first “computers” took many forms:

electronic calculators, machine programmers, tabulating

Information on Dantzig’s role at headquarters derives
from the USAAF’s “Roster of Key Personnel, Headquarters
Army Air Forces Statistical Control Division, 1944,” 1-4.
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machines, and so on.

Shortly thereafter, the term finally

arrived at its current definition – that of an electronic
device capable of receiving information, performing a
sequence of operations, and producing a result – in both
the Air Force and among the general public.215
The Army’s most prominent computational project during
the war was the ENIAC – the electronic calculating machine
designed to solve artillery algorithms and not the combat
statistics or logistics planning Dantzig was familiar with.
However, scientists and military leaders alike understood
this device and others that followed could become the
beasts of burden for the seemingly endless, mind-numbing
calculations required by U.S. military missions.

Boasting

computing speeds almost one thousand times faster than the
electromechanical devices in use at that time, ENIAC put to

Reference to the “Tactical-Strategic Computer” derives
from Warren Weaver, Comments on a General Theory of Air
Warfare (Washington: National Defense Research Committee,
1946), 1-24. Mr. Weaver was Chief of the Applied
Mathematics Panel at the National Defense Research
Committee. The comments directed towards the War
Department’s “research and development of computer
mechanisms” are from the report War Department Research and
Development Program, Fiscal Year 1948 (Washington: War
Department General Staff, 1947), 57. Also see Jennifer S.
Light, "When Computers Were Women," Technology and Culture
40, no. 3 (July 1999). The definition of computer derives
from "Computer - Definition," Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed June 21, 2013,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/.
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rest any John Henry-type allusions that a person could outcalculate a machine of this caliber.

In fact, no

innovation in computing since has witnessed a leap so
statistically significant.

In Dantzig’s world of seemingly

endless amounts of data and calculable statistics, such a
device might be invaluable to future operations.

Although

early computing histories do not connect the ENIAC to
Dantzig, the Office of the Comptroller, or the Combat
Analysis Division, its very presence affected them
considerably.

If there is a bridge that connects the

worlds of Air Force statistical control and its computing
programs, it is George Dantzig.216
Over time, Air Force leaders sought to utilize the
computer not just to assist airmen in their day-to-day
jobs, but in many cases to replace them altogether.

As

computers grew ever more powerful, computer applications
capable of exceeding the realm of human capability became
even more prevalent in project consideration.

The

replacement of human beings by machines had been long the
subject of speculation by cybernetics and automation
theorists such as John von Neumann, Norbert Weiner and John

The ENIAC was often referred to as an electronic
calculator. See Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing,
15.
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Diebold who all predicted (in their own way) how computers
would one day perform many of the same tasks as humans of
the previous era.

To some, this was simply futuristic

fantasy. However, over the decade following the appearance
of ENIAC, the operational and administrative requirements
of modern industry and the federal government helped create
a growing role for such computers in society.217
The Origins of Air Force Computing
In 1949, the United States Navy began publishing the
Digital Computer Newsletter, a semi-annual publication
designed to provide a “medium for the interchange, among
interested persons, of information concerning recent
developments in various computer projects.”218

The Office

of Naval Research’s Mathematical Sciences Division
published the first volume that April and included as much
recent information on current military systems as members

See Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When
Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York: Penguin
Books, 1999); Peter Galison, "The Ontology of the Enemy:
Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision," Critical
Inquiry 21, no. 1 (Autumn 1994); and Henry Edward
Lucas, Automation: A Study of Basic Concepts and of Factors
Influencing the Decision to Automate., thesis, University
of Texas., 1955, 2.
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United States Navy Office of Naval Research Mathematical
Sciences Division, Digital Computer Newsletter 1, no. 1
(April 1949), 1-6.
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could locate.

At the forefront of the newsletter were

those projects under the direction of the United States
Army’s Ordnance Department, which included the ENIAC,
EDVAC, ORDVAC and the Institute for Advanced Study
Computer.219

The same edition credited the newly-formed

United States Air Force with two of its own computing
projects after little more than a year-and-a-half as a
separate service – the National Bureau of Standards Interim
Computer and the Institute for Numerical Analysis Computer.
However, absent from the newsletter was the full story of
the Air Force’s computing journey that had begun years
prior to the Newsletter and exhibited a far broader scope
than the numerical analysis requirements offered in the
Navy’s publication.

That journey centered on Project

SCOOP.220

The ENIAC and EDVAC (Electronic Discrete Variable
Automatic Computer) were successive products of Eckert and
Mauchley. The ORDVAC (Ordnance Discrete Variable Automatic
Computer) and the IAS (Institute for Advanced Studies)
Computer were both built using the Von Neumann
architecture, with the former built for the Ballistics
Research Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground through the
University of Illinois. See Ceruzzi, History of Modern
Computing; and Thomas J. Bergin, 50 Years of Army
Computing, from ENIAC to MSRC: A Record of a Symposium and
Celebration, November 13 and 14, 1996, Aberdeen Proving
Ground (Aberdeen, MD: U.S. Army Research Laboratory, 2000).
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United States Navy Office of Naval Research Mathematical
Sciences Division, Digital Computer Newsletter 1, no. 1
(April 1949), 1-6; Ralph J. Slutz, "Memories of the Bureau
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Without question, Project SCOOP (Scientific
Computation of Optimum Programs) became the most
significant venture in early air service computing efforts
and evolved as a result of staffing efforts directed at
improving the service’s program planning process.

Program

planning during World War II meant fundamentally
understanding and planning for all the resource
requirements of a specified program or project, including
all associated costs.

The planning process then translated

that data into an expected financial figure representing
the program’s impact on both the military establishment as
well as the civilian economy.

In early 1942, the Office of

Statistical Control first attempted to mechanize this
process but met with poor results due to insufficient data
(caused by system reporting deficiencies) and inadequate
mechanical calculating equipment.

Two years passed before

service leaders devised a viable alternative to existing
planning processes.221

of Standards' SEAC," in A History of Computing in the
Twentieth Century: A Collection of Essays, by N.
Metropolis, J. Howlett, and Gian-Carlo Rota (New York:
Academic Press, 1980), 471-477.
Direct reference is made by Lieutenant General E. W.
Rawlings and Mr. Marshall Wood in United States Air Force,
"Scientific Planning Techniques." (Special Air Staff
Briefing: 5 August 1948, Pentagon, Washington), 4-8; Edward
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By 1944, data reliability and consistency allowed
Pentagon planners in the Office of Program Control to
develop a more systematic program scheduling procedure, due
in large part to the success of the centralized statistical
reporting system.

The procedure was led by service

programming leaders Dr. Edward Learned and Marshall Wood
and involved coordination between a great many staff and
command agencies across the service.

Both Learned and Wood

believed that if they could time when each agency entered
its statistically-generated data, and then plot out when
each agency required such data for their own inputs, they
could schedule the inputs in order to optimize the process
without bottlenecks.

The entire system became a well-

orchestrated symphony of data reporting, analysis, and
computation synchronized for maximum efficiency over the
course of many months of trial and error.

In effect, what

they developed was a “program for programming.”222
Unfortunately, it simply was not good enough . . . not
for Learned and Wood, and certainly not for service leaders
both during and after the war.
speed:

The crux of the issue was

the entire process still took a grueling seven

Dunaway, "U.S. Air Force Oral History Interview: Interview
of Edward Dunaway," interview by Dan Mortensen, 1-4.
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months to complete per program.

Command decisions,

planning factors, and on-the-ground situations changed so
quickly that any major fluctuations within such a long time
span could throw off the entire process and make the
programming result worthless.

Additionally, time-

sensitive reliability in such a slow program made it nearly
impossible to have alternative solutions by the end of the
process.

Program scheduling became incredibly difficult in

peacetime as more limitations, especially on funding, were
placed on the military establishment.

Air Force

Comptroller Lieutenant General E. W. Rawlings pointed out
years later that perhaps the greatest limiting factor to
the entire problem “was a matter of simple arithmetic,”
noting that the Air Staff probably had more people working
on arithmetic than any other single work item in the
Pentagon.223

The viability of programming was in question

throughout the Pentagon and the service required a new
methodology if the Air Staff process were to continue.

The

onset of the military’s first computers in the mid-1940s
made that new methodology possible.224
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In 1946, the Comptroller’s Office began building a
“mathematical model” of the entire planning process.

The

diligent workers of Statistical Services using Air Staffprovided data calculated how to generate enough information
over the next year to analyze the incredibly difficult
mathematical functions and the dependent variable data from
other agencies.

To make this work, to actually generate

the information, required finding a vendor who could
produce a large-scale digital electronic computational
device that could not only make the necessary calculations
but also systematically classify and store all the
requisite data.

At the time, the United States Bureau of

the Census was under contract with ENIAC’s J. Presper
Eckert and John Mauchly in their attempt to create a
computer capable of storing a program internally while
running at “electronic speeds.”

Air Force programmers

understood that if something akin to the ENIAC could assist
their situation, the Census contract was the most viable
option available to them.225

Ibid; Slutz, “Memories of the Bureau of Standards’
SEAC;” Russell A. Kirsch, "Computer Development at the
National Bureau of Standards," in A Century of Excellence
in Measurements, Standards, and Technology a Chronicle of
Selected NBS/NIST Publications, 1901-2000, by David R. Lide
(Gaithersburg: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Technology
Administration, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2001), 86-89.
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The air service needed a bureaucratic go-between in
order to quickly latch on to the Eckert and Mauchly
contract.

In cooperation with the Departments of the Army

and Air Force, the National Bureau of Standards acted as
the contract’s technical monitor in light of its
established expertise with electronic component design.
The Air Force Comptroller initiated this process by
transferring to the Bureau $400,000 in June 1947 so that
Eckert and Mauchly could produce an electronic computer
built to military specifications.

This first commercial

computer would be known throughout the industry as Univac
and was to be the result of a three-machine order that
would send one unit to the Census Bureau and the other two
to the military departments (the second going to the Air
Force).

The air service needed a mathematical expert to be

a part of this monumental and groundbreaking effort.

That

expert turned out to be the former director of the Combat
Analysis Branch, George Dantzig.226
Dantzig did not stay with the service long after World
War II.

After his term in Statistical Control, the

mathematician departed Washington to complete his doctoral
program at the University of California-Berkeley, which he
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did in a single semester.

The newly-appointed Dr. Dantzig

turned down the opportunity to stay on as a professor and
returned to the Pentagon as the Office of the Comptroller’s
Mathematical Advisor, which included Project SCOOP.

By

1948, this effort had progressed from a project
investigating theoretical mathematical and electronic
computer applications to a full-fledged acquisition program
with a number of project publications already underway.
SCOOP personnel ensured the purposes of the Air Force’s
first computer project were abundantly clear:


Most importantly, develop an advanced design for an
integrated and comprehensive system for the planning
and control of all Air Force activities.



Prepare the Air Force to take maximum advantage of the
recent developments in high speed digital electronic
computers, especially as extensions of
mathematical/quantitative management problems.



Simulate Air Force operations using large sets of
equations, effectively designated as mathematical
models of operations.



Free up personnel and resources, especially those
bogged down in day-to-day arithmetic and clerical
calculation duties.227

On 13 October 1948, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S.
Vandenberg codified these elements in Air Force Letter 1703, an official document formally identifying the Air
Vandenberg’s Air Force Letter 170-3 is found in
"Scientific Planning Techniques," 4-12.
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Force’s entrance into this new era of computing by
demanding “all echelons…support Scoop to the fullest
possible extent.”228

The letter modified the earlier

statements of Chief Comptroller General Rawlings who
stated, “…if we can work this out…it will be possible for
the Staff to spend more of its time in developing proper
factors, in doing some real planning.”229

All Dantzig and

the Project SCOOP team had to do was make it work.
1948 was not a good year for the development-stage
Univac system.

After a series of technical difficulties

and subordinate projects delayed its completion, the
absence of a Univac delivery forced the Air Force to seek
an immediate, near-term solution.

The problem was that

Dantzig was not happy with his current choices.

He was

familiar with the systems either already in industry or
under contract and determined Project SCOOP required a
computer solution as fast as possible.

The mathematical

advisor told a panel of Air Staff leaders in August that of
the fourteen large scale “digital computer” projects in the
United States at the time, the ENIAC at Aberdeen was the
only system built that he actually considered an electronic

Ibid. Note that the Air Force Chief of Staff is the
highest ranking military position in the service.
228
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computer.

The other “computers” in operation (e.g. the

Mark I, the Mark II, and the IBM Selective Sequence
Electronic Calculator) were in his opinion little more than
electromechanical relay machines.

Calculation-processing

speed was a major factor in Dantzig’s assertion as earlier
relay-based computers were not comparable to the systems
currently under construction by Eckert and Mauchly.
Dantzig and the other team members were confident that the
right machine could do in a few hours what it would take a
large staff several months or years to accomplish, but it
was clear that the Univac was not going to be that machine
any time soon.230
In an effort to obtain a temporary machine, or what
Marshall Wood called “a pilot model,” Dantzig advised the
Air Force to contract with the National Bureau of Standards
(NBS) to develop a machine that in the interim could
fulfill a number of their growing computing requirements.
The Standards Bureau was already hard at work developing
its own computer for both scientific research and the
upcoming American census.

By 1950, years of computer

Dantzig’s comments come from his briefing portion in
"Scientific Planning Techniques," 13-15. The remaining
information regarding the condition of the Univac project
is Kirsch, "Computer Development at the National Bureau of
Standards,” 86-89.
230
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development at the Washington Laboratory produced a machine
that could service NBS organizational needs plus meet Army,
Air Force, and Census Bureau requirements equally.

Such a

computer would allow the Air Force to perform a number of
important mathematical- and programming-based functions,
serve as an investigative tool for certain specialized
problems, solve general mathematical problems, and conduct
performance tests on various types of supplementary
equipment.

For project leaders like Dantzig and Wood, this

machine’s best attribute was that the Air Force would
possess it more than a year before the delivery of the
first Univac.

Early publications called this machine the

National Bureau of Standards Interim Computer or the
Interim SCOOP Computer until it was formally renamed the
Standard Eastern Automatic Computer (SEAC) after its
operational debut.

To most of those involved in the

process, it remained known as Interim as those who
understood its purpose thought the name a better and
historically-accurate fit.231

See Kirsch, "Computer Development at the National Bureau
of Standards." Information on the SEAC’s abilities for the
Office of the Comptroller come from Computer Branch,
Mathematical Sciences Division, Physical Sciences Group,
Office of Naval Research, A Survey of Large-Scale Digital
Computers and Computer Projects, report (Washington: Office
of Naval Research, Department of the Navy, 1950), 10.
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SEAC was the first operational internally-programmed
digital computer in the United States with capabilities so
newsworthy it joined the ENIAC in sparking the imagination
of the public.232

The New York Times published a piece

entitled “Air Force Unveils Fastest Computer” the day after
its unveiling in June 1950, praising the system:
“Bewildering in its scope, speed and accuracy, it
multiplies or divides eleven-digit numbers in 250 onemillionths of a second” and for being the “first
automatically-sequenced super-speed computer to be put into
useful operation.”233

While NBS Director Edward Condon

received high billing for this accomplishment, it was
General Rawlings as Air Force Comptroller who sang its
praises in the Times.

Referencing its four main sections –

input/output, memory, control and arithmetic units –
Rawlings discussed its service-wide importance through
Project SCOOP and the “mathematical model” of programming
equations pivotal to Air Staff budgetary and planning
elements.

For Danztig and others who had programs that

had been awaiting the arrival of a computer, SEAC – the

Department of Commerce, The Retirement of SEAC:
Thursday, April 23, 1964 (Washington: Department of
Commerce, 1964).
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Austin Stevens, "Air Force Unveils Fastest
Computer," New York Times, June 21, 1950, 5.
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“Mechanical Brain” – was a colossal success from its first
day forward.

Even after the Univac’s arrival, this “pilot”

computer remained operationally relevant for well over a
decade.234
The Univac computer’s eventual entry into Air Force
operation in 1952 was met with far less fanfare thanks to
the success of SEAC.

Given the long delay in the Univac’s

delivery, the development and acquisition of the
Interim/SEAC computer appeared as a stroke of genius on the
Air Force’s part, especially George Dantzig.235

SEAC

Between June 20-21, 1950, both the Air Force and the
National Bureau of Standards produced a number of documents
to help accentuate the excitement of the SEACs unveiling.
These include the SEAC Dedication Program documents (June
20, 1950), the NBS Press Release TRG 6099 (June 21, 1950),
the official transcript of Lt Gen Rawlings’ address at the
dedication (20 June 1950), and the official transcript of
the Chief of the NBS’ Applied Mathematics Laboratories’,
Dr. John H. Curtiss’, address at the dedication (20 June
1950). See these referenced articles in the collection:
United States Air Force, Comptroller of the Air Force, SEAC
Dedication Program Documents, comp. Air Force Historical
Research Agency, IRIS 01016559 (Washington: SEAC (Standards
Eastern Automatic Computer) Collection, 1950).
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Interestingly, opinions and memories vary as to why he
wanted the Interim Computer so quickly, whether it was to
solve the Air Force’s mechanization edict or to solve his
own mathematical issues. In his article "Memories of the
Bureau of Standards' SEAC," Slutz claims Dantzig became so
impatient with the some of the pending mathematical models
(to include the von Neumann constant) that he refused to
wait for the Univac’s completion. Regardless, NBS
scientists were able to make good on producing a computer
that not only worked provisionally, but also stayed as a
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designers ensured success by utilizing corollary successes
from a number of contemporary projects in the automatic
computer field.

The machine employed the acoustic memory

achievements of the EDVAC project, the effective germanium
diode uses from the BINAC system, and pulse transformer
applications from an ongoing MIT Servomechanisms Laboratory
project for the Navy (Project Whirlwind). Its use
eventually stretched well beyond the Office of the
Comptroller by performing computations as operationally
relevant as the first Hydrogen bomb’s production in 1952.
Although SEAC was clearly a monumental step in industry
computing, its impact on the air service was even bigger.
What the Navy’s first Digital Computer Newsletter edition
left out in 1949 was how the individual initiative of one
man – George Dantzig – helped galvanize top-level service
support, push the organization’s computing success forward
by two years, and automate programs and processes in time
to assist with the war in Korea.

The SEAC Interim Computer

changed the scale and scope of Air Force operations through
its very use and thus became a monumental factor in the
evolution of computing in the Air Force.236

useful computing system until April 1964. See Slutz,
"Memories of the Bureau of Standards' SEAC.”
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Early Computer Development in the Air Force
The SEAC computer drew a great deal of attention in
both the Pentagon and the media but was not the only air
service computing program under development at the time.
The early success of ENIAC spurred the development of a
number of Federal Government computer programs with many
assisted or guided by the National Bureau of Standards.
The developmental momentum from Project SCOOP and the
Interim/SEAC Computer aided the creation of a second major
calculation computer known as the Institute for Numerical
Analysis Computer.

In October 1948, the National Bureau of

Standards’ Applied Mathematics Executive Council sought to
develop its own electronic digital calculator.

The project

was sponsored by the Air Force’s Office of Air Research to
provide high-speed electronic computational ability and an
electrostatic memory capacity to the National Bureau of
Standards’ Institute for Numerical Analysis – a field
station at the University of California at Los Angeles.
Leaders in this effort, which included George Dantzig,

Comments from the US Navy derive from the Computer
Branch, A Survey of Large-Scale Digital Computers and
Computer Projects. Information on other projects’
influence on the development of SEAC, as well as the
computer’s use on the Hydrogen Bomb project can be found in
Department of Commerce pamphlet, “The Retirement of SEAC:
Thursday, April 23, 1964.”
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intended that the machine should engage in long-range
mathematical research as well as calculations for presentday problems originating with the Air Force, its
contractors, and other governmental agencies.

The service

deemed the computer system so important to the development
process that it diverted nearly $200,000 in funding away
from other projects.237

Like its SEAC predecessor, this

highly-anticipated computer carried many primary
requirements and was to be built “as quickly as
possible.”238
Work on the Institute for Numerical Analysis Computer
began in earnest in January 1949 under the direction of the
National Bureau of Standards’ Dr. Harry Huskey.

This

computer veteran was another member of the University of
Pennsylvania’s former faculty who worked on the ENIAC
project in the mid-1940s.

Huskey was fond of a strong

technical ensemble and built his high-speed electronic

The funds were previously earmarked for the Air Force’s
Air Materiel Command’s effort with NBS’ National Applied
Mathematics Laboratories before being diverted for the IAS
computer.
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See United States Air Force, Comptroller of the Air
Force, SEAC Dedication Program Documents, “SEAC Dedication
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Large-Scale Digital Computers and Computer Projects, 13.
Additional information on the IAS computer came from the
National Bureau of Standards, Transcript: “SWAC Dedication
Ceremony,” (August 1950).
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digital computer construction team complete with nearly a
dozen senior and junior engineers, technicians, and
mathematicians.239

Plans for the computer that April

included an electrostatic memory of approximately 1000
words and cutting-edge storage capabilities developed under
the direction of renowned data storage pioneer (and Chair
of Electrotechnics at England’s Manchester University) Dr.
Frederic Calland Williams.

Huskey attempted to speed up

the development process by allowing his team to let
industrial contracts for a number of items, including 80
chassis support units for the arithmetic unit and 45 units
for the cathode ray tube memory systems.240

Despite an

attempt to complete the project by year’s end, the December
progress report regrettably conveyed the fact that only
eighty percent of the project was complete.

It was obvious

to Huskey that the new machine would have to be scaled back
in computational power.241

In actuality, there ended up being only one
mathematician whose responsibility it was to perform the
coding and programming for the equations destined for
machine calculation.
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This was not an uncommon practice in industrial
development. However, accounts of the SWAC’s development
seem to emphasize this point considerably, especially given
the speed at which they were trying to build the computer
and the specification concessions made during that process.
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The development team began January 1950 by looking for
ways to complete the project within requirements but even
more expeditiously than before.

For example, Huskey and

his team reduced the once lofty goal of a 1024-word memory
to 512 words as memory capacity became one of the principle
bargaining points among system developers.

The engineers

then agreed the computer would begin operations with only
256 words of electrostatic memory instead of their most
recent 512-word goal.

This allowed the team to expedite

completion under the provision that memory would at least
double as soon as practicable following initial operation.
Other early expectations soon followed suit and were
downgraded in an effort to meet development timelines.
Originally espoused expectations that included an
electromatic typewriter, a standard teletype-tape unit, and
magnetic-tape storage units were sadly reduced in 1950 to
only typewriter and teletype-tape unit input/output
mechanisms.242

What could be attained in the short term

See Harry D. Huskey, Harry D. Huskey: His
Story (Charleston, SC: BookSurge Pub., 2004); Computer
Branch, A Survey of Large-Scale Digital Computers and
Computer Projects, 13-14; and Office of Naval Research,
Digital Computer Newsletter Vol. 1. no. 1, 1-6.
Additionally, data on Dr. Frederic Williams originates from
the webpage: http://www.todayinsci.com/W/Williams
_Frederick/Williams_Frederick.htm (accessed 3 Apr 12).
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prevailed over what might be attained in the longer term
during this critical construction phase.243
On August 17, 1950, Huskey and his team officially
completed their project just two months after the SEAC
dedication.

Rather than retain its original name, the

Institute for Numerical Analysis Computer’s designation
formally changed to the National Bureau of Standards
Western Automatic Computer (SWAC) in an effort to align it
with its SEAC cousin on the East coast.

The Bureau

followed the formal dedication ceremony by holding a oneday symposium on digital computing machine applications
(specifically focusing on scientific problem solving) and
honed in on methods studied by West Coast laboratories and
universities at the time.

Huskey’s team maintained big

plans for SWAC which, despite a shoestring budget of
$170,000 still included upgrading its auxiliary memory,
upgrading the input-output unit, and an improved chassis
for integrating new hardware systems.

Meanwhile, the Air

Force’s plans for SWAC did not change over time – service

Huskey’s expectations of attaching one or more magnetictape units were put on hold until the computer reached
initial operational capability, and even then further
conciliations were made.
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experts remained vigilant in wanting a computer system that
could help solve mathematical and statistical problems.
SWAC’s ability to solve pressing service calculation
problems – aeronautical engineering issues, biological and
radiological experimentation calculations, and differential
equations based on von Neumann’s “Monte Carlo” method –
proved its usefulness to Air Force leaders.244
While the SEAC and SWAC computers represent the first
direct computing efforts of the Air Force, the air service
itself was involved in a number of programs predating those
mentioned in the Navy computer publication.

While not

necessarily specific to flight operations they provided
greater capabilities to the Air Force mission at the unit
level.

These systems did not show up in the pages of the

Digital Computer Newsletter until years later, and even

Historical information on SWAC derived from United
States Navy Office of Naval Research Mathematical Sciences
Division, "Digital Computer Newsletter," 2, no. 4 (December
1950), 3; and Harry D. Huskey, "Technical Developments:
Characteristics of the Institute for Numerical Analysis
Computer," in Mathematical Tables and Other Aids to
Computation (April 1950), 103-108. For additional
information on SWAC, including its costs relative to SEAC,
see Kenneth Flamm, Creating the Computer: Government,
Industry, and High Technology (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1988), 74. Finally, applications for SWAC
were found in "SWAC: National Bureau of Standards Western
Automatic Computer – Recent Developments and Operating
Expertise," National Bureau of Standards Technical News
Bulletin 37, No. 10 (October 1953), 146-150.
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then the Navy did not necessarily attribute their use to
the Air Force.

These operational systems, clearly vital to

the service’s efforts in the modern computer era, are an
integral part of the Air Force’s computer history.
The first such computer system took form in 1946 when
the Northrop Aircraft Corporation earned a government
missile system contract for a “unique, automatic, extremely
accurate guidance system for long-range missions.”245

This

system was named Project MX-775 by Northrop but eventually
known throughout the service as the “Snark” missile
project.

The endeavor was based on a contract so specific

that it demanded all the innovative and engineering talents
the company could muster.

The contract required a delivery

range greater than 5,000 miles, a flight path at altitudes
between 30,000 and 50,000 feet, and a delivery accuracy of
one-tenth of a nautical mile (a tremendous feat undoubtedly
requiring some form of an electronic navigational
computation system).

Already immersed in early computer-

See D.E. Eckdahl, I.S. Reed, and H.H. Sarkissian, "West
Coast Contributions to the Development of the Generalpurpose Computer. Building Maddida and the Founding of
Computer Research Corporation," IEEE Annals of the History
of Computing 25, no. 1 (2003), 4-33. Additionally, see
"The Dawn of the Computer Age," Engineering & Science,
2006, 7-12; and "G. Floyd Steele: Computer Oral History
Collection, 1969-1973," interview by Robina Mapstone,
January 16, 1973, 1977.
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related technology, Northrop engineers assumed their most
recent innovation could fill the Service’s requirement:

a

newly-developed digital differential analyzer, nicknamed
DiDA, capable of evaluating and solving ordinary
differential equations.

Workers in the company’s “computer

group” assumed this system could solve MX-775’s
navigational issues.

However, Northrop’s Assistant Project

Engineer for Guidance Robert Rawlins decided to outsource
the Snark’s computational issue instead of using the DiDA
system, a wholly unpopular internal decision but one that
inevitably had a major impact on early Air Force and
industry computing.246
Rawlins’ decision to contract the navigational
computer system shocked those inside Northrop but was a
nearly impossible option for company leaders to overlook.
The airborne digital computer contract Rawlins let went
once again to industry experts and ENIAC producers Eckert
and Mauchly who were in the process of developing the
Univac.

Few doubted their Philadelphia-based computer

corporation possessed the capability to deliver a workable
system both on time and within specifications.

To Rawlins’

benefit, rumors surrounding the computer corporation pegged
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the duo as being in dire need of cash, presumably to help
fund Univac’s development.

This was all but confirmed when

Eckert and Mauchly’s submission of a ridiculously low
$100,000 contract bid gave Northrop little option but to
accept on the basis of low cost and proven expertise.

For

nearly a year-and-a-half, the Philadelphia team made
extraordinary efforts designing and building a pair of
systems capable of fulfilling the range, altitude, and
accuracy specifications for the system.

The only contract

specification they could not meet was the original
intention have it airborne as well, but systems development
problems made this requirement ancillary in comparison to
overall project completion.

After tens of thousands of

dollars in cost overruns, Eckert and Mauchly convinced
project managers to drop the airborne condition in an
effort to meet or exceed the remainder of the
requirements.247
Eighteen months after Rawlins let the contract, the
result was a computer system the corporation officially
named BINAC, an obvious derivation of the machine’s binary
number system operation and a similar-sounding moniker to
its ENIAC predecessor.
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BINAC was a sophisticated, high-
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speed calculation device that could produce up to 3500
additions or subtractions, or 1000 multiplications or
divisions, per second.

Moreover, it was a bit-serial

binary computer that hosted two independent processing
units, each with its own 512-word acoustic mercury delay
line memory.

BINAC was not groundbreaking but was rather

an evolutionary step in the creation of the faster, more
powerful computer systems that developed later.

Perhaps

its greatest achievement was that both contractor and
customer achieved a satisfactory end-state by the time the
contract ended.

Eckert and Mauchly’s computer corporation

received enough funding and experience from BINAC to
utilize the computer as a partial prototype for the longerawaited Univac venture.

As for the Northrop Corporation –

and by default, the U.S. Air Force – immediate possession
of one of the smallest and most powerful computational
systems available further solidified their contributions to
the rapidly developing computer industry.248
The second computer deriving from Rawlins’ decision
came directly from within Northrop itself – the
aforementioned DiDA.

Northrop engineers worked tirelessly

to modify the system in order to make it compatible with
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the Snark’s navigational requirements until such time as
the project went to contract.

That contractual change

became the catalyst for Northrop executives to realign the
computer group and reevaluate new uses for both the project
and its previous personnel.

One of the most significant

changes was the addition of magnetic drum memory as DiDA’s
primary storage device, allowing Northrop’s computer
experts to repackage the machine and allow the company to
seek to market the product in new and different ways.

The

end-result was called Maddida, short for Magnetic Drum
Digital Differential Analyzer, and was significant enough
to attract the attention of other military and industrial
organizations.249
Northrop may have performed the work for this project
but the system truly belonged to the Air Force given its
development under the pre-existing Snark contract.
Regardless of ownership, the company still had to prove the
computer’s worth to the air arm as an improved differential
analyzer.

Maddida was an impressive machine to those who

studied these machines, employing sixty-eight vacuum tubes,

Ibid. Additionally, information on Maddida’s progress
came from the numerous editions of the Navy’s Digital
Computer Newsletter – specifically, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Aug
1950), Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jul 1951), and Vol. 4, No. 1 (Jan
1952).
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one magnetic drum, and the integrating capacity of twentytwo differential analyzers.

Reports in the mid-1950

editions of the Digital Computer Newsletter portray Maddida
as a developing system built to solve differential
equations and thus making it a viable system for both the
military’s scientific and its operational communities.
Northrop believed in the product to such an extent that
they sent Maddida prototypes to educational and military
institutions across the country to prove its capabilities.
By July 1951, Maddida was in use in several Air Force
locations while new and improved versions remained
throughout the service until the middle of the decade.
What was once thought to be a casualty of corporate
competition turned out to be a viable machine in the
military’s growing computer arsenal.250
Scientists and developers throughout this period built
on one another’s successes as the interest and funding for
computer programs continued to escalate.

Air Force

officers and senior civilians who engaged in these projects
soon realized that program funding was often easier for
systems that directly supported the service’s primary

Ibid.
Also see United States Navy Office of Naval
Research, A Survey of Large Digital Computers and Computer
Projects, report (Department of the Navy, 1950), 17.
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operational mission of manned flight.

While there were a

number of systems in significant competition for funding
and resources midway through the decade, few if any fit the
mold of an Air Force operational system quite as well as
did the illustrious Whirlwind Computer.
During World War II, the U.S. Navy contracted with the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to develop a
“computer-aided” system to support its pilot training
program.

The project began in 1944 through the Office of

Naval Research at MIT’s Servomechanisms Laboratory and was
specifically developed as a crude computer-aided flight
simulator (simulated aircraft telemetry connected to a
cockpit mock-up) for the U.S. Navy.

The post-war

environment and changing military priorities completely
changed the course of the program by 1949 and was
transformed into Project Whirlwind, a high-speed electronic
digital computer system capable of solving complex problems
through the repeated use of fundamental arithmetic and
logical operations.

Its first demonstration on 20 April

1951 quickly earmarked this electronic high-speed digital
computer as a landmark machine as it was not only a pioneer
effort in real-time information processing but also the
first digital computer capable of displaying real time text
and graphics on a video terminal (at the time, a large
205

oscilloscope screen).

The possibilities for Whirlwind

continued to grow following this demonstration, but so too
did the requirement costs.

With their stake in the program

waning and expenditures more than twenty-five percent over
budget, the Navy soon lost interest.

By 1953, the Navy had

abandoned Whirlwind and left the Air Force as the project’s
sole military user.251
The Whirlwind’s impact on computing over the next
decade extended well beyond the innovations displayed in
1951.

One significant development involving Whirlwind was

the Lincoln Laboratory, a joint venture between the
military and MIT that bonded the educational institution
with the research and development programs of the air
service’s Scientific Advisory Board.

This innovative

combination of organizations became the forerunner for
other similar research and development agencies such as

Information on the progress of the Whirlwind computer
can be found throughout multiple editions of the United
States Navy’s "Digital Computer Newsletter," specifically
from January 1950 to April 1955 (see specifically United
States Navy Office of Naval Research Mathematical Sciences
Division, "Digital Computer Newsletter," 2, no. 1 (January
1950): 1; Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1998), 22-67, 118; "Computer History: CHM
Revolution," Whirlwind: Preparing the Way for SAGE,
accessed March 20, 2012, http://www.computerhistory.org/
revolution/real-time-computing/6/123; "MIT Whirlwind
Computer from 1951," CED in the History of Media
Technology, accessed March 20, 2012,
http://www.cedmagic.com/history/whirlwind-computer.html.
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MITRE and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).

A

second effort connected with Whirlwind was the invention of
magnetic-core memory, which altered the course of computer
storage technology that had seemed stuck utilizing lessreliable storage-tube memory systems.

Companies such as

IBM and RCA soon applied this core memory in their
commercial computer projects and it became a fundamental
stepping stone in their success.

However, of all the

groundbreaking aspects arising from the Air Force’s Project
Whirlwind, few compare to the computer’s use in the AN/FSQ7 combat direction computer and its connection to the
service’s other critical operational effort:

Project SAGE.

SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Equipment) was a groundbased air defense system initially designed to help protect
the United States against long-range bombing attacks.
Historians credit the project as the first major real-time,
computer-based command and control system, of which the
AN/FSQ-7 was a central unit.

SAGE weighed 250 tons and

contained more than 60,000 vacuum tubes, making it the
biggest and heaviest computer system ever built.

At a cost

of more than $8 Billion, it was also the most expensive
computer system in history.

The program also consumed some

of the greatest computer experts and technical resources of
the age, including over 800 programmers from the military,
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a number of the country’s leading computer corporations,
and field “pioneers” Jay Forrester, George Valley, and
J.C.R. Licklider.

The integration of Whirlwind technology

and the constant innovations pushed by Lincoln Labs and
SAGE vendors advanced the Air Force’s computer technology
baseline beyond comparison with standard industry
systems.252
The Whirlwind/SAGE computer efforts in the early 1950s
dramatically changed the Air Force’s computer research and
development efforts, even though SAGE did not achieve its
initial operational capability until 1958.

This was

because beyond the advances in air defense and telemetry
calculations, SAGE was first and foremost a calculation
machine that was built on the algorithmic programming
required of an air defense system.

As Thomas Hughes

clarifies in his book Rescuing Prometheus, “[t]hough SAGE
is conventionally portrayed as an air defense system, it

For information on SAGE, see "IBM-SAGE-Computer,"
Computer Museum, accessed May 13, 2013,
http://www.computermuseum.li/Testpage/IBM-SAGEcomputer.htm. Also, the Air Force’s movie In Your Defense
also provides an effective background and mission utility
demonstration of the SAGE system, albeit considerably overcomplimentary of its capabilities. See In Your Defense,
prod. Western Electric and United States Air Force, perf.
United States Air Force - Defense Projects Division (New
York: Audio Productions, Inc.), accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=06drBN8nlWg.
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can also be described as an information-processing and
real-time control system.”253

SAGE may have been a

programmatic disappointment by the late 1950s, but its
involvement with Whirlwind throughout the early part of the
decade ensured it became an essential part of some notably
groundbreaking events.254
By the time SEAC, BINAC, Whirlwind, and many of the
other aforementioned projects reached completion, the scope
of the computing environment was still expanding.

By the

end of 1955, the list of distinct, major computer models in
use throughout government, industry, and academia had grown
to several dozen.

The decisions made in response to

potential evolutionary changes and innovative improvements
produced calls for systems upgrades or component
conversions with the United States Air Force at the
forefront of expansion.

The air service had clearly

established itself as a leader in the fields of scientific
and mathematical computing by the middle of the decade,
most especially in the research and development segments of
the organization.

Programs like SAGE and the ATLAS missile

project continued to push the envelope of Air Force
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scientific development for the next several years, and
computers played a major role in such programs.

Were it

not for the proactive nature of Air Force scientists,
systems developers, and leaders, the history of specific
computer mission systems might look considerably different
today.
Part III - Early Air Force Data Management and
Mechanization
Statistical control and data mechanization pervaded
most Army Air Force operations and administration during
World War II.

The AAF’s Statistical Control Units in the

field delivered essential information to upper echelons on
a regular basis as part of the most comprehensive data
collection and exploitation mechanism ever used in the
United States military.

This management of data and

statistics was integral to the tactical and strategic
decisions of AAF generals such as Hap Arnold, Carl Spaatz,
and Curtis Lemay, and became a natural function of daily
operations throughout the service.
These data processes endured long after World War II
was over.

The Army expended a great deal of post-war

effort eliminating extraneous organizations and personnel,
but the offices and operations of statistical services were
not among them.

Instead, branch requirements for
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comprehensive data and statistical information remained an
important feature in military operations and planning, and
enabled the service’s use of punched card machines and data
tabulators until the days of Project SCOOP and Univac.

It

became incumbent upon the division chiefs and project
leaders in Statistical Services to find new ways to harness
this information in forms that benefited all levels of the
service.

The AAF decision maker’s growing reliance on

information mechanization was no longer a wartime
phenomenon; it was now an embedded reality in the very
culture of the air arm.
Statistical Service’s first comprehensive, mechanized
data management effort began in the waning years of World
War II.

Departmental leaders sought to compile the vast

amount of statistical information acquired annually through
the punched card to teletype delivery system.

So much

information traversed air service units that the immediate
solution seemed almost elementary – compile an annual, allinclusive compendium, using the latest in data exploitation
techniques, which could be distributed across service
organizations and would promote the impressive statistical
processing capabilities of the statistical services unit.
In 1945, the Army published its first major data collection
volume:

the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest (World War
211

II).255

The AAF’s intention was to prove to service leaders

the value of widespread statistical mechanization and
display the breadth and depth of the information such
automation could attain.

Along with a large supplemental

addendum, the digest contained a voluminous amount of
mission and support information covering everything from
combat and operational data to training and recruiting
statistics.

Even as the air arm transitioned out of the

Army organization in 1947, the service’s year-end
statistical data requirement remained unchanged and
continued to provide data and statistical continuity
throughout its transition.256
By 1950, the officially renamed United States Air
Force Statistical Digest was christened as “the official
Air Force statistical yearbook for the presentation of
summary statistics on all phases of Air Force activity,
strength, and operations.”257

The fifth annual compilation

Army Air Forces Statistical Digest World War
II (Washington: Office of Statistical Control, 1945), iii.
255

Operations Statistics Division of the Directorate of
Statistical Services, Deputy Chief of
Staff/Comptroller, United States Air Force Statistical
Digest, Jan 1949-Jun 1950, Fifth Edition (Ft. Belvoir:
Defense Technical Information Center, 1950).
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Operations Statistics Division, United States Air Force
Statistical Digest, Jan 1949-Jun 1950.
257

212

was more than just a large accumulation of data:

it had

grown into an enormous, multi-disciplinary anthology.

This

installment was a mammoth undertaking containing over four
hundred pages of numerical tables and figures of a quantity
rarely consolidated in one volume.

Its sixteen major

sections comprehensively represented each phase of Air
Force activities and represented months of data collection
and exploitation even with the assistance of card machines
and tabulators.

This inclusive and wide-ranging compendium

was so vital to service reporting and statistical
evaluation that Air Force officials refused to cut back on
it despite pending budget reductions.

The United States

Air Force Statistical Digest in 1950 was not just an
important document in the service’s administrative arsenal;
it had become common, essential, and expected regardless of
cost.258
The digest was indicative of an information landscape
where such publications – along with the daily, weekly, and
monthly reports due to headquarters – were regarded as
invaluable to service decision makers and the
organization’s operational tempo.

These reports were part

of a much larger service reporting system known as Reports
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Control and were a carry-over from Army information
administration.

Each report (noted by its Reports Control

Symbol, or RCS) consisted of official data compilations
that were each formally approved by the Comptroller’s
office and sanctioned by higher headquarters.259
Facilitating these transactions were each base’s own
statistical personnel made up of primarily keypunch
operators and machine accountants who spent their workdays
gathering, consolidating, and processing data for virtually
all major Air Force activities.260

As the central

controlling authority for this data, Statistical Services
became the critical link for information management across
the Air Force.261

Each RCS report carried a specific alphanumeric
designation distinguishing it from the myriad of other
documents passing through the headquarters at that time.
RCS reports included daily maintenance activities,
personnel status reports, supply levels and budgetary
analyses.
259

“Processing” included encoding data on cardboard punched
cards and then electronically transmitting it to higher
headquarters for utilization.
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Service histories of this period are replete with
information on RCS reports and PCAM usage as these were a
primary function of the operation. See United States Air
Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical
Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Periods of 1 January – 30
June 1950 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1950) and
United States Air Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Periods of 1
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In the early 1950s, the importance of these daily
information activities were matched in significance by the
strategic statistical information compiled and utilized by
department planners and tacticians.

At the hub of this

activity was Marshall Wood, the civilian scientist who in
1947 became the division chief of Planning Research and the
Assistant Director of Management Analysis.

More

importantly, Wood was at the forefront of the Univac
acquisition and Project SCOOP along with George Dantzig and
the Air Force’s top military leaders.

While the Air Force

awaited computerized solutions to its pending problems and
studies, Marshall Wood and his staff developed key manuals
and data management directives that gave utility to the
information analysis and exploitation already underway at
the Pentagon.

Of these publications, one of the most

important was simply known as WPF-50.262
The Wartime Planning Factors Manual, or WPF-50,
provided contemporary and realistic planning information to
the Air Staff and became an essential data set for

July – 31 December 1950 (Washington: United States Air
Force, 1950) for the periods between 1950-1955.
For more information on Marshall Wood, see "Pioneer in
Government Computer Planning," Washington Post, February
09, 2009, accessed May 3, 2013, http://articles.washington
post.com/2009-02-09/news/36782416_1_secret-servicegovernment-service-pentagon.
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commanding air generals during the Korean War.

Wood’s

statisticians built the manual from World War II
statistical records and applied the data to current war
planning factors to illicit statistical data comparisons
between like air-centric operations.

Such analysis was the

result of years of statistical compilations and reporting,
and provided valuable information that allowed air leaders
and planners to update and modernize their tactics,
aircraft and equipment data.

In one particular case,

Wood’s division used a statistical data set built in 1945
to compare the relationship between operational aircraft
damage and loss rates (fighters and bombers) in World War
II to help the Air Force’s acquisition planners consider
the newest suite of aircraft to come off the line for
Korea.

In turn, the Korean War provided a tremendous

opportunity to review previous war planning calculations
and data sets and improve upon them by giving statisticians
the opportunity to hone operational reporting skills not
utilized since the previous war.263

Information covering the application of WPF-50 manual in
the Korean War is located in United States Air
Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical
Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 January – 30
June 1950 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1950), 1518.
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The end of the Korean War did not diminish the demand
for statistical data across the service.
instead demanded statistical services keep

The Air Force
“tight

administrative control and disciplined planning” over the
service’s data, especially when examining logistics
resources, detailing materiel resources and equipment, and
accounting for air service readiness in any of its primary
missions.264

Moreover, in light of the computing progress

made during the war, the Air Force could now employ its new
calculation technology to enhance its information
reporting.

Data management leaders like Dantzig and Wood

were instrumental in helping Air Force developers compile
special programs for the Project SCOOP (SEAC) and Univac
computers and thereby integrate the two worlds of data
processing and computing. In fact, the Air Staff created an
entire subsection of operations entitled “Special Program
Computations” to handle the headquarters’ requests
requiring unique computational or methodological assistance
that fell into this category.

This integration between

systems – between the Pentagon’s data processing and
reporting processes and its newest computing projects –
helped formalize the field of Air Force data automation, to

264

Ibid.
217

include developing statistical services into its own
automation organization.265
The post-war propagation of RCS reports and other data
compilations contributed to the service’s growing need for
electric accounting machines and punched-card accounting
machine (PCAM) equipment.

By the end of 1953, Headquarters

Air Force’s requirement for field reports topped more than
450 individual compilations by year’s end, which was in
addition to nearly 300 additional reports for the Secretary
of Defense and another 308 for internal use.

Senior

leaders relied so heavily on this information that they
began including data reporting and mechanization objectives
in their strategic guidance to their staff and field units.
This tone was first set by Air Force Assistant Vice Chief
of Staff Major General William F. McKee in 1952 when he
informed the Directorates of Installations and Statistical
Services that base-level reporting mechanization was now

Data on post-war activities, see United States Air
Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical
Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 July – 31
December 1951, 9. Finally, information on the integration
of SCOOP (SEAC) and Univac computing for statistical
reporting purposes can be found across service histories
during the war, but specifically in Section II, Activities
of Planning Research Division, in United States Air
Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical
Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 July – 31
December 1951 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1950),
16-22.
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one of his top objectives.

Air logistics leaders echoed

this sentiment by publishing (under the Deputy Chief of
Staff of Materiel) their own strategic guidance promoting
the use of advanced electronic information-handling devices
in order to increase materiel logistics efficiency.266
Experienced logisticians understood how automation could
replace time-consuming paperwork and increase the
effectiveness of the service-wide system as a whole.
General McKee’s edict in 1952 only solidified their desire
for data processing expansion and kept their interest in
data mechanization high.267
Yet another example of this senior level guidance
derived from the Air Force’s Office of the Comptroller

This strategic plan was entitled “Logistics for 1956”
and was published by the Office of the Assistant for
Logistics Plans in 1953.
266

Report data for the period comes from United States Air
Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical
Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 July – 31
December 1953 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1950),
9. Information on Air Materiel Command and mechanized
supply comes from D. B. J. Bridges, Elements of a
Mechanized Supply Information Flow System(Dayton, OH:
Battelle Memorial Institute, Wright Development Center,
1953), 10-12; United States Air Force. Historical Summary:
Directorate of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for
the Period of 1 January - 30 June 1954. (Arlington, VA:
United States Air Force, 1954): 9, 10; and United States
Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical
Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 June - 31
December 1954. (Arlington, VA: United States Air Force,
1954): 4-35.
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itself.

Air leaders gathered from across the department

at the service’s annual Worldwide Comptroller’s Conference
to speculate on the practicality of mechanizing the Air
Force’s budget system.

The conference aimed to accomplish

this by appointing the task to a joint committee made up of
directorate representatives from Budget, Accounting, and
Statistical Services.

The committee took only a few months

before they first submitted plans to use data mechanization
equipment to improve the Directorate of Budget’s processes
. . . a plan that was immediately approved.

With the

program underway so quickly, the Comptroller wasted little
time in seeking opportunities to “mechanize” or “automate”
existing paperwork systems using the Univac and other
proposed computers planned for acquisition.

The

Comptroller and other senior Pentagon offices looked to
data mechanization as part of their directorate’s future.
Air Force leaders began publically praising the benefits of
information automation in their correspondence.268
The primary focus of the statistical services at the
end of 1953 remained data production and transfer.

Air

Force data integration efforts only confirmed the division
between what the air service expected electric/punched card
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accounting machines to accomplish and what the Univac
computer could calculate and produce just a few floors down
in the Pentagon’s basement.

The Univac’s use for

Programming and Budgeting projects highlighted the
connection between the two processes, especially since the
Univac’s data most often derived directly from Statistical
Services’ PCAM-generated data and reports in the first
place.

Throughout the year, indeed, and at the Worldwide

Comptroller’s Conference, the idea that the Univac computer
should take Statistical Services punched card output to
perform further “immensely complicated calculations”
involving personnel, training, and requirements issues was
considered.269

Statistics leaders even pondered the

possibility of a new device that collected data like
accounting machines, processed information like the Univac,
but included more memory to store the entire inventory of
Air Force items.

Such a machine was to be known as a

“data-processing” machine and was thought to have great
strategic value for the organization and became a model for
what mechanization might look like in the future.270
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of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of
1 January - 30 June 1954; United States Air Force.
Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical Services,
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As 1954 began, the Air Force’s data management
successes remained a direct reflection of its lead
statistical office and the hard work of many personnel.

It

was additionally a direct reflection of the efforts of the
organization’s experienced leader, Director of Statistical
Services Major General Charles Raeburne “C. R.” Landon.
Landon had led the data management unit since 1950 and was
one of a select group of commanders who possessed a
background in operations, supply, and personnel
administration.

One of his most significant contributions

came early in his tenure when he established the unit’s
four primary mission areas:

directive and report

verification; data consolidation and recording; statistical
and mathematical data application; and data interpretation
and presentation.

As a former enlisted Marine and longtime

veteran of the Army’s Adjutant General Corps, Landon was no
stranger to administrative paperwork and fully understood
the possibilities for data automation across the
information-heavy directorates.

His guidance and

leadership during the migration of PCAM and computing
equipment into statistical operations placed him on the

DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 June - 31 December
1953, 1-8; and United States Air Force. Historical Summary:
Directorate of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for
the Period of 1 January – 30 June 1953, 1-10.
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leading edge of Air Force data automation.

Moreover, his

leadership through both the Air Force’s early strategic
changes as well as the tactical challenges of the Korean
War became a testament to his information management vision
for the service.271
1954 marked General Landon’s fourth and final year as
director.

When he took over in February 1950 his

responsibilities predominately surrounded the rapidly
increasing use of electrical accounting techniques.

Over

the next four years, however, Landon served out his third
“war” overcoming two well-engrained paradigms in Air Force
field units:

first, that base mechanization was primarily

a unit accounting function; and second, that such
activities were mostly confined to the Pentagon or Air
Materiel Command.

These patterns made sense at the time as

pre-1950 unit involvement included only localized baselevel processing that fed a headquarters-derived
requirement.

In order to ensure the entire air arm

understood his current automation methodology, the general
authored the Directorate’s strategic “Planning for Calendar
Year 1954” report, stating that “[t]he contributions of
Statistical Services to Air Force management may be
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measured in terms of the continuing improvements in the
accuracy and timeliness of basic data, and the continuing
progress in the extension of sound, modern mechanized
business techniques to Air Staff Operations.”272

His goals

to “explore and develop further mechanization of new
reporting systems in major management areas” and to
“continue expansion of base mechanization as a means of
increasing the efficiency of administrative or support
activities” set the tone for the future of the statistical
services.273
Landon retired in July 1954 after more than four years
in Statistical Services.

Brigadier General Llewellyn O.

Ryan took over the unit whose rise in importance was
reflected by its increases in personnel and machinery.

General Landon’s specific quote is from the official
historical record: United States Air Force, Historical
Summary: Directorate of Statistical Services,
DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 January - 30 June 1954,
4.
272

For information on Major General Charles Raeburne “C.
R.” Landon, his official military biography can be found at
"Major General Charles Raeburne “C. R.” Landon," Air Force
Senior Leader Biographies, accessed April 10, 2012,
http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6135. For
information on the Office of the Comptroller and
Statistical Services, see United States Air Force,
Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical Services,
DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 January - 30 June 1954,
4, 5; and United States Air Force, Historical Summary:
Directorate of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for
the Period of 1 June - 31 December 1954, 4-35.
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With a worldwide statistical organization of 11,000
military and civilian personnel structured in a network
across all Air Force bases, Ryan’s new unit used
approximately one hundred million dollars’ worth of
electronic and electric accounting machines and amounted to
the “largest application of modern business equipment ever
developed in industry or government.”274

The general began

his tenure by charging the directorate to seek new ways to
manage the volume of statistical data requirements.

One

solution involved centralizing information responsibility
into one headquarters unit, which Ryan accomplished by
appointing the Materiel Statistics Division as the primary
manager of all data reporting on Air Force installations.
Another was assigning responsibility for technology
integration across the service by delegating it to the
Machine Accounting Division.

This division became

responsible for merging the air service’s electronic data
processing equipment with existing punched-card systems.
Finally, the directorate spent a considerable amount of
effort modifying and refining existing reporting systems to
ensure its baseline programs remained reliable and

Ibid. Inside the organization, the Plans & Liaison
(P&L) Group promoted this frequency by steering an official
“Base Mechanization Program,” of which P&L was formally
charged with planning and implementing.
274
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effective.

The efforts of General Ryan and his staff

prepared the organization for an unknown operational and
administrative future in the wake of two wars and periods
of great organizational and technological growth.275
The increasing quantity of service statistical
requirements sent Air Force researchers looking for systems
with greater capacity and speed than those currently in
inventory.

Program managers began looking to their sister

services and industry to survey the latest data processing
equipment the market had to offer.

Experts directed

project managers to companies such as Remington Rand, RCA,
and IBM.

Headquarters programmers tested the IBM 650 drum

calculator as a solution for several existing data
processing projects, culminating in an air service purchase
of a dozen machines by year’s end.

Air Materiel Command

already employed eight of its own IBM 650 units plus a
newly acquired Remington Rand Univac.

While the number of

Statistical Services computers was significantly on the
rise, these were still heavily outnumbered by the existing
data processing machines remaining in the field.

By

comparison, the Air Force still had 4,946 electric

United States Air Force, Historical Summary: Directorate
of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of
1 June - 31 December 1954, 4-35.
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accounting machines in use at 170 installations across the
Service by the end of 1954, up from 4,417 machines and 122
installations the previous year.

The service was therefore

clearly approaching a data machinery decision point and its
leaders had little choice but to begin deciding which
equipment to pursue for its future.276
In 1955, the United States Air Force formally decided
to pursue a data processing environment beyond its
traditional World War II-era reporting system.

To do so

necessitated extending the scope of mechanized reporting
and creating an integrated reporting system that
encompassed the entire service.

Moreover, it required

improving the quality and speed of its current systems,
installing newer high-speed computing equipment at both the
headquarters and in the field, and ensuring base
mechanization became the organization’s principle
management tool.

To manage and lead the post-war Air

Force meant abandoning older information management
techniques and embracing a single, integrated program that
could handle the service’s mounting information
requirements.

276

1955 was an important year in the branch’s

Ibid.
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data processing history and heralded the beginning of a new
Air Force data automation era.277
On January 20, 1955, the Air Force officially
recognized data automation as a legitimate departmental
mission by establishing the first centralized office
assigned to integrate it into service operations.

This

Office of the Special Assistant to the Directorate for Base
Mechanization commandeered the data processing function out
of its home in the Plans and Liaison (P&L) Group and
created a separate office within the headquarters where it
no longer shared the data mission responsibility.

The

decision to create such an office was not an easy one for
Air Staff leaders.

However, the growth of data processing

throughout the air service – generation, transmission,
exploitation, and distribution – simply grew too large and
too important to leave in either a bifurcated or
subordinate position.

The Air Force charged former World

The service history of this period covers all the
individual branches and divisions of the larger Statistical
Services organizations, each from their own perspective.
However, as a whole, this period history is replete with
details of a new era of base mechanization with an
excitement missing in the year’s previous histories. Thus,
between this period and the next six-month installment, it
becomes clear that 1955 was a unique and exciting period in
Air Force data mechanization history. See United States
Air Force, Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical
Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 January - 30
June 1955, 1-4.
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War II B-24 Liberator pilot Colonel Thomas E. Peddy and a
senior staff consisting of a pair of former P&L majors,
Wesley Saville and Seymour Colman, to run the unit.

All

three understood this was not a permanent assignment, but
each also understood the importance of making this new
mission work.278
The base mechanization environment Peddy and his staff
faced in 1955 was incredibly convoluted, especially after
years without central direction.

The majority of service

equipment originated from the IBM inventory but its
acquisition and distribution had been haphazard across the
major commands.

Leaders outside the Statistical Services

were not surprised by the lack of service-wide
standardization, but they certainly were alarmed.

The

staff of the Special Assistant’s office attempted to
rectify the situation by taking a number of immediate
actions.

First, they developed an Air Force policy

directive that covered the application of data machine

Specific data on Colonel Peddy found in several
locations. 11th Bomb Group (H): The Grey Geese. (Paducah,
KY: Turner Pub., 1996); "Colonel Peddy Heads ROTC
Unit," The Gettysburg Times, September 1, 1949, 1-6; and
"Lt Col Peddy, ROTC Officer, Is Transferred," The
Gettysburg Times, July 24, 1951, 1. Outline of history
covered in United States Air Force, Historical Summary:
Directorate of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for
the Period of 1 January - 30 June 1954.
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procedures, including base-level operations, record keeping
and reporting.

Second, the staff built an implementation

schedule for the entire service base mechanization effort.
With 144 bases contemplating mechanizing, as well as 74 of
them already mechanized in one or more subject matter
areas, such a schedule provided a baseline for
implementation that had been non-existent in years past.
Third, a Base Mechanization manual was developed to ensure
the existence of standardized automation implementation
procedures.

Finally, the office sponsored and formed a

Base Mechanization Coordinating Committee to assist and
advise the Air Staff on all relevant automation matters.
These initial actions played a significant part in
providing the much needed structure absent in previous
program management activities.

Unfortunately, it was not

enough to counteract them all.279
One of the biggest issues facing a service-wide base
mechanization effort was enlisted training.

At the end of

1954, an Air Proving Ground Command evaluation of the
Machine Accountant training course highlighted the same
issues many Major Command leaders found in previous program

See United States Air Force. Historical Summary:
Directorate of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for
the Period of 1 January - 30 June 1955, 3-4, 17-47.
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efforts.

The training course was located at Sheppard Air

Force Base in Texas and trained all new career field
entrants in preparation for any Air Force statistical
machine operator position.

Commanders concerned about the

lack of continuity between base mechanization programs
found the training courses ineffective at preparing
trainees for their positions in the field.

The issue

became so pronounced that the de facto trainee solution was
for them to learn what they could at Sheppard but be
prepared to receive their meaningful, full-qualification
training “on-the-job” at their duty location. The Command’s
own evaluation not only highlighted the problems inherent
in service training, but also illuminated the
standardization problems across the service itself.

Its

findings were but one of the challenges Colonel Peddy and
his office would face all year.280
The training course staff had several objectives in
mind for each trainee.

First, course instructors educated

Information on the Machine Accountants Course is found
in United States Air Force Air Proving Ground
Command, Final Report on Evaluation of Graduates of Machine
Accountants Course, Project Number APG/CSC/388-A (Dayton,
OH: Armed Services Technical Information Agency, 1954).
Additionally, the number of equipment items per month is
derived from United States Air Force, Historical Summary:
Directorate of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for
the Period of 1 January - 30 June 1955, 6.
280

231

new Machine Accountants in the wiring and operation of the
IBM 402 Accounting Machine, along with its corresponding
sorter, interpreter, and collator.

Additionally, they

familiarized the students with the IBM 407 Accounting
Machine, a successor to the 402, and its associated sorter
and collator.

Both of these accounting machines (and their

peripherals) were late 1940s-era machines and were in
widespread use across the service.

However, instructors

understood these two systems only covered a portion of the
machines that future machine accountants would face on
active duty.

For example, those students returning to a

base with an IBM 063 Card Controlled Tape Punch Machine had
no training opportunities at Sheppard, and those who
learned to operate the IBM 514 Automatic Reproducing Punch
Control Machine could only do so on the older models as the
newer models were not covered at all.

Moreover, evaluators

at Air Proving Command noted that trainers spent an entire
week familiarizing students with the IBM 101 Electronic
Statistical Machine, which leaders deemed wasteful due to
the 101’s limited service use across the Air Force.

Coping

with this cornucopia of accounting machines, along with the
discontinuity issues, was naturally relegated to Colonel
Peddy’s organization.

With more than fifty new pieces of

electronic accounting equipment entering the air service
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each month, equipment standardization remained an issue for
Peddy for the remainder of his tenure.281
The remainder of the year witnessed the continued
progress of programs established in January, including the
consolidation of the Air Force’s integrated RCS reporting
system.

Progress also involved the continued increase in

the number of Air Force bases with punched card equipment,
a corresponding increase in the utilization of each machine
(indicated by the number of reports processed each period),
a sustained emphasis on machine processing procedure
standardization (to counteract the formal and OJT training
issues), and the modification and refinement of existing
reports.

Additionally, Peddy’s office made a concerted

effort to recruit more military and civilian personnel into
the career field to deal with a shortage of trained machine
operators caused by widening the program.

Finally,

headquarters began preparations for a service-wide project
that included installing high-speed electronic computing
equipment at each base location, presumably to take over
the data management task of personnel report processing.282

281

Ibid.

Information comes directly from the directorate and
branch histories listed in United States Air Force,
Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical Services,
282
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Colonel Peddy and his staff decided in September that the
program was finally stable enough to update commanders on
the office’s progress, which they did the Air Force’s
first-ever Base Mechanization Conference.283
On December 31, 1955, after a full year dedicated to
little but base mechanization, the Air Force formally
disbanded Colonel Peddy’s Office of the Special Assistant
to the Directorate for Base Mechanization.

Managing all

punched card tabulating machines and electronic data
processing equipment over the previous year amounted to
successfully attaining a statistical reporting process at
nearly all Air Force base-level organizations.

This

milestone meant a special program office was no longer
needed.

A more formal and long-lasting office to oversee

the program’s future was now required.

The Air Force

seemed pleased with the role of the Special Assistant’s
office, but especially with the work of Major Saville who
earned an Air Force Commendation Medal for his work during

DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 July – 31 December
1955.
Air Training Command played host to the first official
Base Mechanization Coordinating Committee Conference held
at Scott Air Force Base. See United States Air Force,
Historical Summary: Directorate of Statistical Services,
DCS/Comptroller for the Period of 1 July – 31 December
1955, 11-12.
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the program’s test period.

Peddy left the Special Program

Office in phenomenal shape, having truly become a catalyst
for service-wide data automation in the Air Force.284
To replace the Special Assistant’s office, the Air
Force formally appointed the Comptroller’s Directorate of
Statistical Services as the program manager for all punched
card and electronic data processing equipment in the air
arm at the end of 1955.

This meant that any piece of

electronic equipment designed to record, communicate, and
process data now came under the purview of the directorate.
Operational and scientific computers like those in the SAGE
and ATLAS programs maintained their own separate program
management.

For those focusing on data management and

exploitation elsewhere, however, responsibility fell to the
directorate.

The service was on track to implement base

mechanization systems for 158 programs across the Air Force
by year’s end, including the maintenance, personnel, and
supply programs that made up the bulk of the air service’s
data reporting.

With so many base mechanization programs

in place, it finally appeared as if the Department of the

284

Ibid, 5-14.
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Air Force – all of it – had officially embraced the
computer as the newest phase of its information journey.285
Conclusion
Unlike other programs and procedures that ended with
World War II, August 1945 did not mark the termination of
air service data and statistical control.

Quite the

contrary: such procedures became more entrenched and
organized, with the greatest surge coming after
independence a few years later.

The statistical services

worked through the war using the information technology
available, primarily punched card tabulators and
electromechanical calculators.

AAF leaders meanwhile

received their information through this “stat system” with
little need for major process improvements during the war.
With the development of the ENIAC and its posited
capabilities, however, the Army computer’s reputation
opened the aperture to a future that immediately included
high-speed data proliferation.

It still took someone,

however, not just something, to make such a capability
available to the air arm in the late 1940s.

United States Air Force, Historical Summary: Directorate
of Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period of
1 July – 31 December 1955, 12-14.
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The Air Force computing programs that succeeded the
ENIAC were not isolated efforts but rather part of a
growing crescendo of interest originally billed as Project
SCOOP.

Although SCOOP had the support of the Air Force

Chief of Staff and the Comptroller General, it was civilian
mathematician George Dantzig’s insistence and perseverance
that made the venture such a meaningful endeavor.

The

documents surrounding the project’s early implementation do
not read as a downward-directed edict but rather as the
musings of leaders impressed by capabilities they hardly
understood.

In essence, while the enthusiasm for new

technology belonged to these Air Force general officers,
the actual understanding of the potential Air Force
applications of computers belonged to Dantzig, Harry
Huskey, and others.

Without Project SCOOP, Air Force

efforts like the SEAC/Interim Computer, the Numerical
Analysis/SWAC Computer, and the UNIVAC computer might not
have come to pass in the manner that they did.
The operational computer systems under development
were likewise influenced by their project managers rather
than just the expectations of those at the top.

The

development of BINAC for Northrop’s Snark missile project,
the spin-off development of the Maddida differential
analyzer, and the rescue and reapplication of the Whirlwind
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computer were all the product of service advocates who
challenged traditional practices and risked their careers
to advance computer applications.

Additionally,

information projects such as SAGE and ATLAS continued
testing computer potential driven by the scientists,
systems developers, and leaders who supported them.

In the

years between its independence and the centralization of
computer applications in Statistical Control, the number
and capabilities of service computers grew exponentially
through these often bottom-up efforts.

By 1955, the

service was firmly established as a leader in the fields of
scientific and mathematical computing.
Intertwined with all this computer system development
was the issue of data management.

Although it was

important to determine what computer system would
manipulate the service’s data, and how, it became even more
important to determine what data would be exploited, and
from where.

Data compendiums like United States Air Force

Statistical Digest and the Wartime Planning Factors Manual
(WPF-50) were as well-known and influential as the
computers (i.e. SEAC, Univac, Maddida) that manipulated
data.

While many of the statistical processes were born

in World War II, it was the Korean War that solidified the
prominence of the statistical services and led to it
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becoming the service’s computer focal point.

Through all

the top-down authorized changes, however, it was always the
individuals in the fray who made data automation a service
reality.

Civilians like Dantzig and Wood were institutions

in service computing and remained dominant voices behind
the data mechanization projects of the 1950s.

The public

face, meanwhile, belonged to military officers such as
Landon, Ryan, Peddy and Saville, whose diligence and
tenacity helped data automation become the success it was
by mid-decade.
The period September 1947 to December 1955 witnessed
the bulk of the service’s transition into the era of
computing, both in computer application and data
automation.

However, I argue this was a part of, but

should not be confused with, its longer and more
established “information age” that began almost a century
earlier.

Data mechanization and the service’s information

applications began long before 1955, but the centralization
of these activities and the application of computing mark
this as a new stage of the Air Force’s evolving information
environment.

Whether this period is lumped in with other

historical periodizations such as a “computer age,” an
“electronic age,” or a “digital age” is a matter of
conjecture and preference.

The fact is that these new
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innovations saw information continuing to grow as a
valuable Air Force commodity, with the principle difference
being how it could be harnessed and exploited.

By

officially creating a Special Assistant for Base
Mechanization in 1955, as well as formally assigning the
Directorate as the central authority for data processing
equipment, the Air Force was preparing itself to enter this
new era without abandoning older premises.

The need to

collect, manage, and exploit the service’s large data
resources remained a vital part of the organization’s
methodology.

The difference after 1955 would be how such

method’s would be achieved.286
In the early days of computing, the Air Force had the
benefit of being a new and extraordinarily technical
military department, thus granting it the latitude to
explore and contribute to the greater technological efforts
underway in industry and academia.

Early data

mechanization had everyone from the most senior Air Force
leaders to the lowest airmen looking to advances in
electronic tabulators and accounting machines to connect
geographically separated units with information and
alleviate the growing stacks of paperwork in a massive

286
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bureaucracy.

Luckily, by the end of this period, these two

endeavors began to unite.

By 1955, the same companies that

were bidding on computer contracts for aviation projects
were often the same ones that sought to create the next,
better data processing machine.

As the lines between an

electronic data processor and a general purpose computer
began to blur, these devices became more and more
commonplace in the military and in general.

For the Air

Force, the impact on the Department was clearly
substantial.

While the mission of the Air Force may have

been to fly and fight, no one was doing much of either
without the assistance of either a computer or data
processor, or both.

In time, the two machines would become

one and the same.
This chapter focuses on the origins of Air Force
computing and mechanized data management through a
leadership as well as a technological lens.

By

highlighting some of the service’s overarching
organizational and operational issues, as well as the
computer and data processing solutions designed to solve
them, this chapter hones in on not just how they were
solved, but also by whom.

Computer and data automation

history is often a narrative tightly focused on the
technology that purportedly “enabled” relevant changes in
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the industry.

However, it becomes apparent that it was the

individual leaders rather than the technology itself that
enabled change to occur.
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Chapter 4
The Origins of a Data Automation System, 1953-1968
In 1962, the United States Air Force officially
embarked on the largest and most expensive computer project
in its fifteen-year history.

Years of smaller, base- and

command-independent ventures with electronic tabulators,
punched card machines and even early computers prepared the
Air Force for a service-wide, cutting-edge upgrade that
promised to eliminate hundreds of manpower positions, save
tens of thousands of hours of work, and change the
organization’s operations by the next decade.

This system

featured the new UNIVAC 1050-II computer and was the first
data automation project in the Department of Defense to
provide “direct and immediate customer access to the
computer by remote input/output devices.”287

The Air Force

called this program the Standard Base Supply System, or
SBSS, and approved a development plan charging supply

Brigadier General A. A. Riemondy, "Supply and Service—
The Nucleus of Logistics," Air University Review,
July/August 1970, accessed January 12, 2012,
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/
1970/jul-aug/riemondy.html.
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logisticians with taking the lead role in air service data
automation.
The history of the Air Force’s first data automation
system is not a common narrative in service history.
Moreover, that such a massive investment began first in a
support operation is almost counterintuitive to those
familiar with the major investments and expenditures of the
military during this period.

It is more logical to assume

that a service devoted to aviation and aeronautical support
would aim its first major computer system directly towards
manned flight.

Such experimental and costly technological

advances are most bureaucratically palatable when falling
within the bounds of an organization’s key mission – in
this case to fly and fight.

Rather than forging their

future with flight management automation systems or
electronic air traffic control data systems, the Air Force
chose a very different route.

Service leaders instead

looked to one of the most administratively-intensive
organizations within its ranks to find the most useful and
wide-reaching applications of data automation available:
Base Supply.
In Logistics of War, a quintessential service history
published by the Air Force Logistics Management Agency in
2000, authors Scott, Rainey and Hunt give their brief
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assessment for the rationale behind the SBSS’ design and
fielding.

They suggest that with the initial elements of

the Vietnam War underway, “an enormous inflow of supplies
and equipment” going into theater was a primary requirement
for a new, Air Force computer-based supply system.
Additionally, the authors refer to a number of preexisting
and compounding problems in the service’s previous supply
system, including multiple and incongruent computer and
manual systems that often ignored the standardized supply
procedures set forth in Air Force Regulation 67-1, the USAF
Supply Manual.

Using both rationales, Logistics of War

helps detail how Air Force leaders developed the SBSS as a
reaction to both the demands of war and existing service
constraints.
Up to a point, the authors of Logistics of War are
correct; the Air Force did use the system during the
Vietnam War and did suffer from a tremendous service-wide
supply system incompatibility issue.

For example, in the

latter case specifically, Air Force Director of Supply and
Service’s Brigadier General A. A. Riemondy stated in his
Air University Review article, “Supply and Service—The
Nucleus of Logistics:”
In 1962 most Air Force base supply
accounts were managed by a mix of
manual, punch-card, or computerized
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inventory control systems. Eleven
different systems were in use, each
designed autonomously by the major
commands to fit the peculiarities of
their accounting equipment.
Proliferation of nonstandard base
supply systems, designed with minimal
Hq USAF control, restricted the Air
Staff in establishing meaningful supply
policy.288
However, Scott, Rainey and Hunt’s argument that these two
period-specific issues were somehow the genesis for this
program grossly underplays the history of the Supply Corps
and most especially its pioneering legacy.

Discussions

about such a system predate the program’s actual
establishment by almost a decade and a tradition of
integrating new logistical procedures and technologies was
part of a long heritage of organizational and operational
improvement that preceded both the first service-purchased
punched card systems of 1926 and even the card- and formbased inventory systems of World War I.

In fact, the

legacy of American supply data improvement dates as far
back to the first true form- and regulatory-based supply
methods established a full generation before the Civil War.
The airmen of Supply and the legions of Army quartermasters
that preceded them offer a long history of proactivity and
innovation.
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Riemondy, "Supply and Service—The Nucleus of Logistics."
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reactive measure to the events of the early 1960s is a
misrepresentation of the facts.
The purpose of this chapter is to place the Standard
Base Supply System in its proper historical context – as a
groundbreaking Air Force program built on years of
discussion and debate and the result of a long legacy of
logistics innovation.

To do this, I briefly explore

several key areas in the service’s long history of supply
accountability and inventory control.

Next, I review the

debates and events that led to the SBSS as the Air Force’s
singular and groundbreaking supply system.

Finally, I

review the evolution of the SBSS program itself, as well as
illuminate the critical programs that resulted both during
and after the system’s development.

Humble Beginnings
Service logisticians in the early 1950s were
accustomed to the manual, data-intensive supply inventory
system that had been initiated long before the Air Force’s
founding.

Through a series of stock card and supply form

procedures, airmen accounted for each item in meticulous
detail and produced composite tallies accordingly.

This

data was forwarded to senior echelons for reporting and
evaluation purposes, placed alongside other unit data, and
247

managed with painstaking effort.

However, on the heels of

Project SCOOP and the UNIVAC’s acceptance, Air Force
members could finally visualize a “mechanized” or
“computerized” logistics future that included data
processing and information data control across the entire
service.

The fact that the technology did not exist did

not stop service leaders from developing a requirement for
such a system, which became more and more elaborate as
technological capabilities progressed.

Years of technical

theorizing, the continued operational process, and
information improvement helped the Standard Base Supply
System come into existence.
Until the 1950’s, the origins of supply
accountability and control in the air corps could be traced
back to two founding fathers.

The first was quartermaster

pioneer Brigadier General Thomas Sydney Jesup who served as
the Army Quartermaster for an unprecedented 42 years from
1818 to 1860.

Jesup built the foundation of modern Army

supply accountability after significantly revising the War
Department’s preexisting supply methods and techniques.

By

installing a series of regulations and procedures in the
years leading up to the Civil War, the general literally
rewrote the book covering stock item purchases and supply
requisitioning.

Regarded as the “Father of the
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[Quartermaster] Corps,” the general set out to improve the
supply accountability process by creating a form-based
information process designed to facilitate supply purchases
through a voucher and receipt system, thus accounting for
all activity published in the Army’s monthly summary
reports.

The longtime Army Quartermaster was convinced

that for a large military, a supply accountability system
could be effective and efficient so long as individuals
held themselves accountable and played by the rules.

These

“rules” remained an effective model not only for the Army
Quartermaster, but soon also for its Signal Corps whose own
supply requisitions were a vital operational element.

As

the air arm began its evolution in 1907, it was these
supply regulations, forms, and procedures that guided its
processes through World War I.289
While General Jesup built the foundation for supply
processes and accountability, Colonel (eventually,
Brigadier General) Augustine Warner Robins led the Army Air
Corps through its interwar logistics transitions between
1919 and 1937 by establishing the procedural baseline for

Steven E. Anders, “The Quest for Supply Accountability,
Part I – Wholesale Logistics and the Beginnings of
Automation.” Quartermaster Professional Bulletin, Winter
2007. 12-17.
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the SBSS program.

Airmen at McCook Field (and ultimately

at Fairfield Air Depot) initially utilized the manual,
card-based accountability systems operated by the air
service before and during the war.

With tens of thousands

of stock cards in cycle each month, the job of inventory
management was both tedious and time-consuming.

After

Supply Division Lieutenant Edwin Page engineered a new
organizational scheme for the manual system, it was Robins
who advocated the design and set about revamping the
inventory system altogether.

As Air Force historians

readily point out, it was Robins who used Page’s
organizational system in tandem with the preexisting cardbased accountability system in use across the Ohio
airfields to create a supply accountability system that
remained in effect until the advent of computers thirty
years later.290
Through these early developments, the importance of
supply accountability and the necessity for an effective
base supply system was established in the air arm.

The

Standard Base Supply System was the service’s first
departmental automated data system.

The program was a

See Phillip S. Meilinger, American Airpower Biography a
Survey of the Field (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,
1997).
290

250

mammoth and costly project that diverted precious manpower,
equipment and fiscal resources away from other service
projects and was built on foresight, sacrifice, and the
inherent notion that data management of a military’s
materiel stockpile was essential to effective service
operations.

The SBSS’ success was based on the idea of

information management as a force multiplier capable of
increasing operational efficiency while saving resources.
Thus, this pioneering system, which some logistics airmen
affectionately nicknamed “the grand-daddy of them all,”
opened the door to possibilities of data automation and
consequently became the linchpin to a series of data
projects in the 1960s, 70s and 80s that completely
transformed Air Force operations and information
management.291
The Inventory Data Processing Discussion
Data reporting and exploitation during and after World
War II, along with the computer advances of the early
1950s, contributed to an organizational environment
receptive to the service-wide application of computing.

Frank Spruce, Evolution of the Supply Computer System
from Univac 1050 to the GCSS/ILS-S, Unpublished Report
(Personal Collection of Mr. Robert C. Neibling, USAF
Civilian (Ret)).
291
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This reception was further aided by government agencies’
excitement over receiving their first UNIVAC at the same
time these Remington Rand systems were correctly predicting
the 1952 election.292

Contracts for UNIVACs increased

shortly thereafter, including deliveries for such
prestigious companies as General Electric, Metropolitan
Life, U.S. Steel, DuPont, and Westinghouse.

Meanwhile,

industrial competitor International Business Machines (IBM)
simultaneously ventured out from its staple product line of
typewriters and calculating devices to start contributing
to this new age of computing.

The IBM 701 “electronic data

processing machine” was UNIVAC’s primary competitor in the
early 1950s and boasted its own major contracts with Boeing
Aircraft, General Motors, the University of California and
the Atomic Energy Commission.

The popularity of computers

and their applications continued to grow through the early
part of the decade, and the military remained a pioneering

Chronologically, the systems went to the U.S. Census
Bureau, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Army Mapping
Service respectively. When the Univac correctly projected
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s victory over Adlai Stevenson after
only receiving a small amount of early vote totals, the
electronically-induced prognostication introduced both
industry and the public to the power of modern computing
capabilities.
292
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organization.

It was, after all, become a growing part of

its operational culture.293
By 1953, computing and data mechanization had become
popular themes for discussion in numerous service
communities of the United States Air Force, but perhaps
none more so than the community of logisticians.

These

early years saw both technology experts and service leaders
alike waxing philosophic over the future of service
computing and the possibility of harnessing these machines
to control and process the immense information resources of
Base Supply.

Over the next several years, ideas and

proposals for new inventory control systems or new supply
procedures dominated logistical conferences and
publications.

A number of RAND Corporation research

memoranda were dedicated solely to such topics.

The

question for service members was no longer if Air Force
materiel information would be mechanized, but when.

Information relating to the 1952 president election was
among the following sources:
Thomas Haigh, "Computing the
American Way: Contextualizing the Early US Computer
Industry," IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 32, no.
2 (2010): 8-20; Paul Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing
(Boston: MIT Press, 1998); and Martin H. Weik, Jr. “A Third
Survey of Domestic Electronic Digital Computing Systems”
(Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland: Department of the
Army, Ballistic Research Laboratories, 1963), 390-394.
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The conversation began in earnest in 1953, just a few
years after the service received its first computer system.
At Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, officers of the
Wright Development Center were hard at work postulating the
future of a logistics function that would utilize some form
of computer automation.

Charged with evaluating the

strategies in the service’s forward-thinking “Logistics in
1956” planning document, these officers recognized they
required assistance evaluating one specific task in the
plan:

the flow of information between the materiel user

and Base Supply at a future prototypical Air Force
location.

To accomplish this, the Development Center

contracted Ohio-based Battelle Memorial Institute – known
primarily in industry for its work with fuels, metallurgy,
and dry photographic reproduction – to help the Air Force
solve its pending technical challenges.

The first

paragraph of Battelle’s report echoed the thoughts of many
computer proponents at the time:
A keystone of this plan is the application, where
feasible, of advanced electronic information-handling
devices as substitutes for time-consuming paper work.
Within their proper fields of application, such
electronic devices may replace manual handling of
data, and might (1) eliminate paper work on certain
functions, (2) cut information flow time, (3) remove
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human inaccuracies from present records [and] (4) make
data readily accessible.294
Since Air Force logisticians were no strangers to mountains
of paperwork, the prospect of the automation of their
information processes was welcomed.

Within the scope of

all logistics functions in the Air Force, no task seemed
more appropriate for data automation than the paperwork of
Base Supply.295
Across all American military departments, “supply”
organizations in the 1950s were the embodiment of
administratively inundated organizations.

Following World

War II and the Korean War, little if any equipment,
materials, or goods arrived at a military installation
without first going through these extraordinarily busy
units.

Base Supply was a service-wide function in the Air

Force, which meant airmen managed inventory control of
everything from aircraft parts to desk staplers not only at
the base-level, but also at headquarters.

The purpose of

the supply pipeline was to ensure a steady flow of parts

The specific quote is from the report is from D. B. J.
Bridges et al., Elements of a Mechanized Supply Information
Flow System (Dayton: Battelle Memorial Institute, Wright
Development Center, 1953), 1.
295 Details on the Battelle Memorial Institute come from
Battelle: 75 Years of Innovation. (Columbus, OH: Battelle,
2004).
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for immediate availability when required.

A shortage of

equipment or parts in the pipeline system meant the
potential failure of operational missions.

Of course,

managing supply levels of thousands of tons of parts,
equipment, and supplies required outstanding clerical
bookkeeping to ensure adequate stocks were always
available.

The officers at the Wright Development Center

and their contracted experts at Battelle already realized
there were fewer functions better suited for electronic
data assistance than those of Supply, and soon the
conversation extended well past these Ohio-based
organizations.296
Over the next several years, the conversation about
supply applications for computers began permeating
strategic discussions across the military and industry.
Between 1954 and 1956, reports by the National Bureau of
Standards, the University of California, RAND, and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology theorized on the
future of electronic data processing equipment and its
application in inventory and production control.

Information on Base Supply from James C. Rainey, Andrew
W. Hunt, and Beth F. Scott, USAF Supply: Pride, Dedication,
Professionalism (Maxwell AFB, Gunter Annex: Logistics
Management Agency, 2001).
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Encapsulating a number of these discussions was a student
paper published at Washington D.C.’s Industrial College of
the Armed Forces (ICAF) in May 1956.

Entitled “the

Application of Electronic Data Processing Machines to
Military Supply Systems,” this paper written by United
States Navy Commander Frank J. Roberts demonstrated how
electronic data processing machines already performed
numerous clerical-type functions with impressive speed and
accuracy.

He surmised that since military supply systems

leaned heavily on clerical work, the use of computerized
data processing would prove incredibly useful.

Roberts

concluded that although local supply offices had displayed
impressive individual initiative in starting the automation
of data, the major logistics line commands had not fully
investigated the benefits of electronic data processing
(EDP) in comparison to their minions at the station level.
In fact, he believed those minions actually were proving
the adaptability of military supply data processing through
their daily experiences.

In his summation, Commander

Roberts recommended senior level officials of all military
branches review the mass of data involved in logistics
planning, both in peacetime and war, and recognize the
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“significant” potential of electronic data processing in
the world of military supply.297
Commander Roberts’ study, however, was not the first
to discuss the automation of logistics.

Three years prior,

and just months after cybernetics pioneer Norbert Wiener
lectured at the college on “Automatic Control Techniques in
Industry,” a committee of senior-ranking military students
had developed their own study on the service-wide
applications of cyber-oriented control.

The committee

documented how a “future in the centralized handling of
military inventory control...seem[ed] almost limitless,”
adding that supply calculations necessary for efficient
operations “create a genuine demand for the utilization of
electronic computers.”298

By the mid-1950s there were in

fact several studies of potential computer applications
being conducted.

United States of America, Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, The Application of Electronic Data Processing
Machines to Military Supply Systems, by Frank J. Roberts
(Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1956).
298 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Military
Applications of Cybernetics, by Frederic H. Miller
(Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1953),
5-12. Information regarding the U.S. Army’s automation
conference is from the unpublished conference proceedings
found at “Proceedings of U.S. Army’s Automatic Data
Processing System (ADPS) Conference, 31 October - 1
November 1956,” 7-10.
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The U.S. Army’s automation conference in 1956 promoted
the “adoption of an integrated Automatic Data Processing
System” of which “logistical inventory control” and
automated supply stockpiles would be key components.299

In

1957, a Department of Defense logistics system study
identified the need “to attain a maximum of automation in
the processing of routine supply actions and attendant
record-keeping at accountable or subordinate levels.”300
Even in industry, the call for EDP in logistics was growing
too loud to ignore.

In a 1957 “Automation in the Office”

survey of nearly 4000 U.S. and Canadian companies,
researchers showed inventory control systems were either
present or planned in 98 percent of the companies staking
their future in computers.

Although scientific and

engineering computing had existed for over a decade, the
field of data automation was only now beginning to take
hold – not least in relation to the supply functions of the
U.S. military.301

“Proceedings of U.S. Army’s Automatic Data Processing
System (ADPS) Conference, 31 October - 1 November 1956,” 710.
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Supply was the first major Air Force organization to
attempt full-scale data automation due, in part, to its
previous automation efforts at base- and major commandlevel undertaken years earlier.

Bases during the 1950s

often operated using disparate computerized, manual and
punched-card procedures that often varied between major
commands, even stations.

Such diverse electronic data

processing efforts resulted in a disjointed Air Force
supply environment – one that contained eleven different
systems independently designed to meet the needs of their
specific commands.

Included in these distinct and

disjointed environments were the training regimens of each
major organization.

With so many different systems in

existence, supply airmen transferring to a new base often
found their automation knowledge and skills virtually
useless at their next assignment.

Moreover, the

proliferation of such nonstandard base supply systems,
constructed with little or no oversight from the Pentagon,
restricted higher headquarters’ ability to establish any
meaningful supply policy.

It became obvious to Air Force

leaders by the end of the decade that they had outgrown

1958," IEEE Annals of The History of Computing 23, no. 4
(2001), 75-104.
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this system of outdated equipment and training
incompatibility and that it required an immediate
upgrade.302
The Air Force was not the only organization in need of
systems enhancements by the early 1960s.

Since both

hardware and software capabilities had rapidly improved
during the previous decade, the demand to upgrade entire
systems had increased as well.

In hardware, two major

improvements marked the differences in systems design by
the end of the 1950s:

the transformation in circuit

technology as transistors replaced vacuum tubes as the
preferred computer processor; and the revolution in storage
capabilities as memory progressed from large (and sometimes
volatile) tube, mercury delay line, or rotating drum
storage to a much smaller and expandable core memory
system.

In software, improvements in assemblers and

compilers, data sorting algorithms, and programming
languages such as FORTRAN and COBOL turned these boxes of
circuits, tubes and wires into powerful data manipulation
and storage devices.

By 1961, researchers for the U.S.

Army had documented these design system upgrades by
categorizing over 220 unique systems at work throughout

302
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industry, academia and the military/government complex.
From major insurance and banking firms, to car and aircraft
manufacturers, to science and technology laboratories
across private and public institutions, leaders began
integrating computer systems and their data automation
capabilities into their operational landscape.303
Through the mid- to late-1950s, the size of the data
processing industry continued to escalate.

Companies that

had made their fortunes earlier in the century producing
cash registers, tabulating machines, and other electronic
equipment invested in this latest trend with great
enthusiasm.

A review of the vendor list supporting Air

Force systems is a glimpse of the industry’s American
computer leaders of the time.

Corporations such as

International Business Machines (IBM), Burroughs, UNIVACRemington Rand, National Cash Register (NCR), Radio
Corporation of America (RCA), Elecom, and Bendix all
supported more than one system in operation in the service.
Much like those in industry and academia, a number of Air
Force systems in the early 1960s required either
retirement, replacement, or upgrade as older variants gave

Paul E. Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing (London,
England: MIT Press, 2003); Martin H. Weik, A Third Survey
of Domestic Electronic Digital Computing Systems. (Aberdeen
Proving Ground, MD: United States Army, 1961).
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way to newer “second generation” technology.

Service

leaders understood this oversized legion of vendors and
their myriad disparate and aging data processing systems
posed a threat to a coordinated and integrated Air Force
data processing future.

Additionally, the methods the Air

Force used to contact, review, and contract these vendors
were themselves problematic as few commands possessed the
same contracting standards and implementation guidelines.
Controlling these problems quickly became a chief concern
of senior service officers.304
The lack of computer system standardization and a
systematic acquisition policy in the early 1960s became an
Air Force-wide problem extending far beyond the sterile
computing environments of the base data processing rooms.
Operating independently of higher headquarters guidance,
many of the unique major command and unit systems
disregarded standardized Air Force operational procedures
and policies.

This caused significant conflicts in

training, compatibility, and policy implementation issues
at all levels across the service.

The Air Force clearly

required a much larger effort to rectify these issues

Much of this information derives from Weik’s entire
survey. However, see introduction and overview from Martin
H. Weik, A Third Survey of Domestic Electronic Digital
Computing Systems, 3-12.
304

263

across its organizations worldwide and understood that
solving service-level automatic data processing (ADP)
standardization and obsolescence issues required a
significantly expensive and manpower intensive approach.
Leaders in the Pentagon’s Directorate of Data Automation
and the Logistics Directorate began simultaneously
advocating for an identical solution – a new era of
service-wide automation and a large organizational user to
lead the way.

Both directorates looked to Base Supply to

handle this task.305
The Birth of SBSS
The Air Force was similar to other services in that it
did not launch headlong into a service-wide logistics
automation program.

In the years prior to this effort, the

organization maintained a more ad-hoc version, the
Electronic Inventory Control System, in order to increase
responsiveness and inventory accuracy in the supply systems
throughout the Commands.

The air arm intended this

Information from this paragraph is aided by Beth F.
Scott et al., The Logistics of War: A Historical
Perspective in 2000 (Maxwell-Gunter AFB: Air Force
Logistics Management Agency, 2000). Organizational
historians Scott, Rainey, and Hunt chronicle the logistics
community through the past 50-plus years of service. The
book, especially page 133, is especially helpful in
discussing the conflicts in training, compatibility, and
policy implementation.
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program, under the authorization of Air Force Manual 67-1,
to utilize EDP equipment systems for base inventory
control, especially where they could accelerate
responsiveness and improve the accuracy and timeliness of
supply data.

Such a system aimed to take data entries from

base supply functions and transmit them to local management
and to command/support channels.

Program managers across

the Air Force in turn maintained data link compatibility
between other electronic base supply systems and
transmission systems throughout the organization.

The Air

Force designed this initial inventory system to deliver
important data such as consumption rates, supply
requirements, transaction analysis, item location and
expense distribution.

The designers were also careful to

ensure it tied in with other systems, such as the
Comptroller’s Financial Inventory Accounting System, in an
attempt to integrate technological gains wherever possible.
While not a final solution, the Electronic Inventory
Control System provided a valuable springboard from which
the Logistics community could broaden their data processing
horizons.306

United States Air Force, Directorate of Data
Automation, United States Air Force Data Systems Automation
Program, Sections I and II (Washington: United States Air
Force, 1963, 2-60 – 2-61.
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Between 1962 and 1963, after years of studying,
discussing, and prototyping supply control systems, the Air
Force took a series of steps to establishing an official
service-wide, stand-alone logistics automation program.
The process began in 1962 when the yet unnamed program
earned its official authorization from the Air Force Chief
of Staff, General Curtis E. LeMay.

It was October when the

General, better known for his role in building Strategic
Air Command (SAC), approved the concept of a standard
supply system and authorized the base-level execution of
automatic data processing management.

LeMay was familiar

with the benefits of data management having worked closely
with future “Whiz Kid” and Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara during World War II, and appeared eager to
incorporate its efficiencies in his organization.

The data

automation decision profoundly affected the service’s
organizational and operational future and eventually
outlived even the once-mighty SAC.
Eight months after disseminating the General’s
decision, the Air Force published Special Order G-58
approving the formation of the Supply Systems Design
Office, or SSDO, at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington,
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D.C.

This new organization was comprised of personnel

hailing from both headquarters and command units, and was
formally charged to "develop and control a standard USAF
base supply electronic data processing system."307

The

Directorate of Data Automation published their
comprehensive Plan for Installation of EDPE in Selected Air
Force Base Supply Activities in August that called for the
installation of electronic data processing systems at
selected Air Force Base Supply activities.

These and other

measures built enough momentum across the headquarters that
the air arm created an official program to harness all the
supply-oriented, data mechanization endeavors.

This

program was originally designated as the Standard Base
Level Automated Inventory Control System, but as the
systems’ mission grew, the Air Force renamed it to better
represent its larger purpose:

the Standard Base Supply

System.308
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The Standard Base Supply System was a formal extension
and standardization of various command systems falling
within Supply’s Electronic Inventory Control System with
the eventual intention being to replace the latter
entirely.

The program’s success relied on the purported

“many proven benefits of automated inventory control” and
the second- and third-order effects such automated
inventory control created.309

To homogenize the entire

service supply system, program managers prepared to replace
all individual Command computers, programs and external
procedures with standardized versions to enforce a firstever automated system at every Air Force location.

To

accomplish this required computers with a multitude of
complex new capabilities:

inputs receivable either at the

computer or remotely; inputs processed through detailed
edits and decisions for file/output determination; files
maintained in storage for immediate access; and outputs
that were distributed by on-line card punch or printers and
generated for a wide variety of management products.
Moreover, the task required the installation and operation
of this complex system at more than 140 bases worldwide
over the next three years.

By May 1963, the deliberation

United States of America, United States Air Force Data
Systems Automation Program, Sections I and II, 1-22.
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as to what this new system was supposed to do was over.

It

was time for the Air Force to find a vendor who could
support these new SBSS ideals.310
The task of finding a vendor to handle such a program
proved monumental for the Directorate of Data Automation.
The Data Systems Coordination Division only finalized the
method for evaluating such competitive computer proposals a
few months prior in January 1963.

Led by Colonel Kent

Prim, the division published “Analytical Technique for
Automatic Data Processing Equipment Acquisition” in order
to facilitate competitive selection of EDPE regardless of
the equipment’s purpose.

Following Colonel Prim’s

guidance, the division reported that twenty-three
interested equipment vendors had received detailed systems
specifications on the Air Force’s future supply system in
April 1963.

Shortly thereafter, in mid-May, Air Force

Systems Command’s Electronic Systems Division hosted a
vendors conference allowing interested contractors the
opportunity for an in-depth review of SBSS specifications
prior to the service’s 19 July 1963 submission deadline.

See Codlin, Implementation of the USAF Standard Base
Supply System: A Quantitative Study, v-vi, 1-10; and for an
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The Directorate held the conference at Hanscom Field in
Massachusetts and ensured vendors understood the magnitude
of the system’s set-up and operational requirements.
Specifically, planners took care to ensure they paid
special attention to the requirement for worldwide
installation of approximately 152 computers at the rate of
ten per month.

Between July and September, the Air Force’s

System Source Selection Board arduously evaluated the
submissions from a number of potential vendors.

When

Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert approved the
Selection Board’s recommendation on 4 November 1963, the
announcement signified the organization’s automation system
choice to take Supply, and its hundreds of thousands of
customers, into the next technological era.

Zuckert,

perhaps best known in military history as the initiator of
the Air Force-wide “Project Forecast” future technology
study series, appeared to be the perfect person to announce
which system would lead the department into an automation
future.

That system was the Sperry Rand UNIVAC 1050-II.311

See United States Air Force, Historical Summary,
Directorate of Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June
1963 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1963), 32-33;
and United States Air Force, Historical Summary,
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The Air Force’s order for the UNIVAC 1050 Model II was
unprecedented in Defense Department computer system
acquisition.

According to a 1964 New York Times article on

Sperry Rand, the Supply System’s Design Office’s order of
more than 150 complete computer systems represented “the
largest military order ever signed.”312

The Model II was an

Air Force-specific, augmented version of the standard
UNIVAC 1050 sent into industry.

This UNIVAC was a second-

generation computer system containing extra peripherals and
real-time memory storage/access units in an effort to
provide Air Force bases and their smaller supply satellite
installations with the latest in data processing
capability.

The computer provided “real-time processing”

according to the Times, meaning instant system updating
with each stored supply transaction to ensure information
stayed current.

Its modular, or “building-block,” design

allowed capacity expansion or reduction dependent on the
required workload and was the first in the Department of

Narrative History of the USAF Standard Base Level Supply
ADP Program, Unpublished Historical Report (1963), 1-20;
Jacob Neufeld, Bernard A. Schriever: Challenging the
Unknown (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 2005),
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Defense to offer “direct and immediate customer access to
the computer” by way of remote input/output devices.313

To

those involved, the 1050-II appeared as a true
revolutionary device in the burgeoning automation age.
However, a glaring programmatic issue with the UNIVAC
was its labor requirements.

Sperry Rand estimated the

system required a crew of 27 individuals to operate the
computer around-the-clock in jobs ranging from supervisor
to librarian.

Therefore, while the Air Force looked to

SBSS as a means of saving money through technology, the
service faced the reality of adding and justifying nearly
4000 more computer personnel to its roster.

The original

plans called for reutilizing many personnel from previous
EDP-related positions but it still remained the SSDO’s
responsibility to prove that the benefits of higher-level
automation far outweighed any additional personnel costs.
These were not unusual for computer transitions during this
period but such Air Force costs were growing given the size
of the program and its personnel load.314
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Like nearly all Air Force acquisition projects,
funding such an epic venture was possible only if the
return on investment appeared both reasonable and tangible.
Making a case for such a massive allocation of resources
required a considerable return on the government’s
investment, especially one renowned for its size and scope.
To emphasize the system’s benefits, the program management
office established project goals that were straightforward
and covered everything from fiscal, operational, and
training objectives:


Reduce overall costs, including manpower
requirements, and eliminate duplicate programming
efforts in the various commands.



Decrease response time and increase asset control in
base level supply operations.



Facilitate implementation of Air Force base level
supply policies.



Eliminate the need for each command to design,
justify, select, program, implement and control its
own base level supply EDPS.



Permit Air Training Command to
personnel, thus establishing a
program allowing inter-command
retraining (ensuring personnel
useful at any base).

train supply
uniform training
transfers without
were immediately

computer” comes directly from Riemondy, Supply and Service—
The Nucleus of Logistics. For additional information on
Univac 1050-II progress, see Martin H. Weik, A Fourth
Survey of Domestic Electronic Digital Computing
Systems (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: Ballistic Research
Laboratories, 1964), 280-284.
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Permit the compilation of standard management data
regarding base level supply operations.315

Additionally, the Air Force also believed the system could
promote better interaction among Air Force Logistics
Command depots and the Major Commands, which was a muchneeded improvement over the individualistic operations of
the past.

By eliminating duplicate operational and

programming efforts across various commands and units, the
service planned to use Supply as a test bed for a number of
other mission activities.

If the Air Force could save the

Defense Department time, money, and effort using servicewide EDP equipment, the Standard Base Supply System
developers had to prove it.316
That job fell primarily to Brigadier General Louis
Grossmith.

Grossmith was the Director of the Data

Automation Directorate and oversaw both vendor selection
and base installation preparation.
a supply guru nor a computer expert.

The general was neither
He was instead a

pilot-turned-comptroller who had earned his first star only

See United States of America, United States Air Force,
Directorate of Data Automation, United States Air Force
Data Systems Automation Program, Sections I and
II (Washington: United States Air Force, 1963).
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months prior to entering his position in 1962.

He was,

however, the Directorate’s inaugural leader and spearheaded
the organization’s transition after the Air Force moved
data automation responsibilities into the unit.

An

experienced pilot and staff officer, he was ultimately
responsible for translating the benefits of the SBSS to
those in the service – especially aviators – who knew or
understood little about the benefits of data automation.
Producing guidance for his fellow commanders on upcoming
computer-project implementation and training schedules was
not the glamorous role many senior pilots saw themselves in
late in their careers, but such was the life of a senior
staff officer in the Pentagon.317
General Grossmith’s guidance, including the unit’s
“Plan for Installation of EDPE in Selected Air Force Base
Supply Activities,” reached far beyond the Washington
beltway and was distributed to all participating service
Commands.

The general and his staff acted quickly after

Zuckert’s system selection, especially as the contract
programmed computer system installations to begin as early
as September 1964.

Headquarters personnel quickly warned

United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate
of Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1963 (Washington:
United States Air Force, 1963), 1-32.
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units of the preparation time and parameter requirements as
they simultaneously took major steps to ensure the Pentagon
met all of its own responsibilities.

For example, in

addition to the SSDO, the Air Force formed a “Central
Development Group” at Bolling AFB responsible for the
systems design, programming, testing and debugging of the
new supply system in the latter months of 1963.

Moreover,

to ensure the test base was close to the Directorate’s
Pentagon location, the Air Force chose Maryland’s Andrews
AFB as its initial site for the first operational SBSS
computer.

Finally, just days before Christmas of 1963, the

Directorate completed all initial training of programmers
and systems personnel.

By year’s end and after a

tremendous amount of program actions on the part of
Grossmith and his staff, the Air Force was officially ready
to embark on its first service-wide, base-level EDPE
system.318
The Implementation of the SBSS
As the Air Force ushered in the New Year, it
subsequently kicked off its newest era of data automation –
that of a standardized, service-wide system built on new

318
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technology and the backing of service leadership.

In

February 1964, the Air Force and Sperry Rand installed the
first 1050-II computers at two locations, Bolling AFB in
Washington, D.C. for program testing and at Sheppard AFB in
Texas for a training center.

By May, they had installed

two additional systems, the first at Texas’ Amarillo AFB in
its own training center and at Maryland’s Andrews AFB as an
operational test location.

Early on, leadership remained

positive about the aggressive implementation schedule
following “no significant problems” during installations at
Bolling and Amarillo.319

However, by the time Major General

Elbert Helton took over as the Director of Data Automation
in July 1964, a more guarded attitude prevailed across the
program.

Managers began cautiously holding in abeyance all

additional base installations remaining for that year
pending the completion of program development and
operational evaluations at the Andrews site.

Adding to the

caution were configuration changes, such as the addition of
magnetic tape recovery units, which forced planners to
alter pre-established system structures and personnel
training as test sites simultaneously underwent their

United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate
of Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1964 (Washington:
United States Air Force, 1964), 42.
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evaluations.

Making matters worse were site survey visits

like one at Holloman AFB in Nevada that revealed not all
sites were ready for an immediate computer install.

In

short, there was still much to do in preparing Air Force
bases and their personnel for this system.

For Sperry

Rand, matters went from bad to worse as the Air Force
reduced its order quantity from 154 systems to 141 due to
service-wide base realignments and closures.

As 1964 came

to a close, the program management of SBSS was more
important than ever, and the weight of such importance fell
squarely on the shoulders of General Helton and his
staff.320
Although the operational tests at Andrews eventually
worked to the Department’s satisfaction, the need for
program improvement was everywhere.

Halfway through 1965,

the Air Force and UNIVAC officials remained well behind
previous installation projections laid out by the SSDO and
implementation staff.

Only sixteen of the originally

estimated 100 1050-IIs had made it onto their sites by midyear.

Worse yet, while these sixteen units stayed busy

facilitating conversions and operator training, only two
were actually fully operational, putting the Air Force

320
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nearly a year behind its original schedule.

All of this

occurred as the Data Automation Directorate underwent yet
another leadership change that spring.

After just a single

year at the helm of Air Force data automation, General
Helton left to be the logistics (J-4) director at
Headquarters U.S. European Command in Paris, France.

While

Helton’s brief tenure was not unusual for well-regarded
aviators, it was an extremely unfortunate move given the
state of the SBSS project.

Moreover, the Air Force’s

choice of replacement – a Colonel – gives some insight into
the decreasing prestige such a position had in the service
at the time.321
Although changing leadership was a frequent occurrence
at Headquarters, doing so with a significant rank reduction
in the middle of programmatic issues was certainly
problematic in the competitive halls of the Pentagon.
Undaunted, Colonel William Pratt and his new staff went to
work immediately to correct the “numerous difficulties”
faced throughout the Directorate’s multiple divisions and
branches.

Pratt and the Data Automation Directorate fought

United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate
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hard to stay focused as Air Force organizations continued
to inundate the unit with even more grandiose automation
plans that called for replacing all Air Force punched card
machines, standardizing all non-Supply data systems, and
upgrading existing major command systems.

In addition, a

joint headquarters and major command evaluation team was
about to complete a milestone assessment of the program as
a whole.

If SBSS was to remain a beacon of hope for Air

Force automation, the Director understood that making
significant progress over the next several quarters was
vital.322
That spring, the joint evaluation team completed their
assessment of the SBSS and recommended the system was
finally ready for implementation . . . once the Air Force
and the UNIVAC team agreed to specific improvements.

Pratt

and his unit ensured that more than 50 bases received their
UNIVAC configurations with 31 of them reaching full
implementation status by the end of December.

During the

Colonel’s tenure, the system underwent considerable
optimization with more deliveries projected for the
upcoming year.

Significant workload increases at a number

of bases additionally raised the amount of system equipment

United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate
of Data Automation, 1 Jan – 30 Jun 1965, 12.
322
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configurations to five (up from three in the original
equipment approval) to better facilitate site requirements.
The rebirth of the program over the last half of 1965
impressed Pratt’s Equipment Review Branch enough for it to
theorize that all bases could complete their SBSS
conversion before the end of 1966.

This was made even more

realistic by the Air Force once again reducing the number
of required installations to 132 due to additional base
closures and mission changes.323

The Air Force, of course,

had bigger and faster-growing concerns.

The escalating war

in Vietnam and an increase in even loftier data programs
had Directorate planners readjusting their SBSS
expectations, especially since they knew it was responsible
for only a portion of the service’s mounting automation
issues.324
The Vietnam War added a new priority level as
logistics requirements picked up overseas.

The escalation

in Vietnam in the mid-1960s required the Air Force to build
up additional bases overseas, both in-theater and at

There were 154 originally allocated in the Univac
contract.
323

United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate
of Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1965; United States Air
Force, Historical Summary, Directorate of Data Automation,
1 Jul – 31 Dec 1965 (Washington: United States Air Force,
1966).
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supporting locations.

Therefore, by the end of 1966,

planners began adding additional systems to the contract
and thereby returning installation figures to near-original
projections of 148 systems.

The major issue with Sperry’s

UNIVAC and the SBSS was nonetheless the excessive downtime
involved in both installation and (computer) operation that
was causing unsatisfactory systems performance and a
significant modification of the remaining installation
schedule.

Only 126 systems actually met the end-of-year

deadline.

To rectify the slowdown, the Air Force scheduled

the installation of the remaining 19 systems for 1967, but
at half the originally projected monthly installation rate
in light of ongoing issues.

There was still much work to

be done by the Directorate in order to put the program back
on track.

Doing so required a substantial effort from not

only the Pentagon staff, but also the UNIVAC program
office, the SSBO, and SSBS sites around the world.325
The extra work began immediately and continued
throughout 1967.

First, additional challenges with

computer maintenance procedures, especially the 1050-II

United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate
of Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1966 (Washington:
United States Air Force, 1966); United States Air
Force, Historical Summary, Directorate of Data Automation,
1 Jul - 30 Dec 1966 (Washington: United States Air Force,
1967), 47, 66.
325
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systems installed in Southeast Asia, forced the
Directorate’s Plans, Policy, and Technology Division and
Sperry Rand to hold monthly meetings throughout the year to
work on improvements.

These maintenance issues

necessitated the creation of traveling military computer
maintenance personnel teams to service SBSS systems
worldwide, especially in Southeast Asia.

Next, when a fire

in the UNIVAC installation at Westover AFB caused severe
damage to the central processor, installation experts used
the experience to highlight the need to review requirements
for proper housing facilities and personnel training.
Finally, as dictated in the acquisition specifications, the
UNIVAC configurations accommodated the many smaller supply
accounts not connected to a base system by connecting these
accounts to a host 1050-II using a separate communications
link.

Between 1966 and 1968, the Air Force and Sperry Rand

spent a tremendous amount of effort trying to improve the
SBSS systems instead of merely trying to fix individual
issues.

Given the frequency of technological changes,

implementation sites, and the war in Vietnam, nearly
everything the Air Force could do to stay ahead was a
positive step in the future of SBSS.326

Primary source information derives from United States
Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate of Data
326
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Between October 1967 and February 1968, two major
incidents highlighted both the significance of the SBSS and
the unity of the teams operating and maintaining it.
First, as previously mentioned, a fire in the central
processor at Westover AFB that October destroyed the base’s
UNIVAC 1050-II.

The base, located just outside of

Springfield, Massachusetts, was the center of numerous
missions critical to both the Cold War and the war in
Vietnam.

One of Westover’s major missions was to operate

and support the 99th Bombardment Wing (Heavy), home to the
B-52D Stratofortress bomber, the KC-135 Stratotanker air
refueler, and the EC-135 Looking Glass Post-Attack Command
Control System aircraft.

With flying squadrons,

maintenance squadrons, and a whole host of support units
(civil engineering, communications, security forces, etc.),
the need for rapid and ever-present control over the supply
system was crucial.

Hence, when the fire erupted in the

data processing building on 25 October, individuals from

Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1967 (Washington: United States
Air Force, 1967), 55; and United States Air
Force, Historical Summary, Directorate of Data Automation,
1 Jan - 30 June 1968 (Washington: United States Air Force,
1968), 51-53. Additionally, clarification on the remote
linking of supply accounts is from an email interview on 1
May 12 with Robert C. Neibling to clarify Neibling, A
Narrative History of the USAF Standard Base Level Supply
ADP Program, 1-12.
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the Pentagon’s Directorate of Data Automation (Program
Management Division) and the Sperry Rand UNIVAC Division
got to work within hours to replace the damaged components.
Miraculously, in just over two weeks’ time, Air Force and
contracted professionals received, readied, and made
operational a replacement UNIVAC system at the base.

An

investigation into the fire’s causes reported there were no
indications of any faulty environmental conditions, misuse,
inexperienced personnel, accidental discharge, or neglect.
Therefore, both the rapid operational return of the UNIVAC
system and an error-free accident report proved all the
training and effort at Westover was extraordinarily
effective.

To the Air Force, Westover became an example of

what could go right even when something went horribly
wrong.327

See United States Air Force, Historical Summary,
Directorate of Data Automation, 1 July – 31 December
1967 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1968), 50-56;
and United States Air Force, Historical Summary,
Directorate of Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June
1968 (Washington: United States Air Force, 1968), 24. The
Westover Air Force Base History website was also helpful
(see "Westover Air Force Base History," Westover Air Force
Base History, accessed April 16, 2012,
http://www.westoverafbhistory.com/). Finally, oral history
interviews with Bill Stevenson and Robert Neibling in
February and March, 2012 were especially helpful in filling
in data points, especially given their experience with SBSS
in the 1950s and 60s.
327
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The second incident occurred thousands of miles in
South Vietnam on a Saturday morning in early February 1968.
With the Tet Offensive well underway, base personnel at Da
Nang Air Base, South Vietnam watched in horror as their
former safe haven far from the front lines became a
battleground for North Vietnamese insurgents.

Personnel

and equipment casualties, uncommon for a base so far south,
instantly spiked as 27 Viet Cong mortar shells exploded
across the base.

Moments later, the warehouse housing

approximately 16,000 items of armament and electronics
supplies for F-4 Phantom aircraft was gone and with it, the
base’s SBSS UNIVAC computer system and the capability of
supporting Da Nang’s strike aircraft.

Of all the training

scenarios developed by the Data Automation Directorate,
this was among the most catastrophic imaginable.

Pentagon

leaders had only hours to prove that all the system
training and redundancy was worth the effort.328
Just a few hours after the attack, the Directorate got
its opportunity.

By midday, thanks to a pre-attack

transmission by the 1050-II in Da Nang, another SBSS system
began a selective readout of every equipment item lost to

John C. Ford and Howard E. Wilson, "UNIVAC's Role in the
Pacific: Autodin and Base Level Supply Systems," Signal
Magazine, 1970, 25-26.
328
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mortar fire.

Simultaneously, Supply officials at

Headquarters 7th Air Force in Saigon, Headquarters Pacific
Air Forces in Hawaii and Headquarters Air Force Logistics
Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio laid the
foundation to establish replacement materiel to support the
base at Da Nang.

Just five days later, 78 percent of all

stock requisitions were entering the supply receiving line
in South Vietnam, which would have been an absolute
impossibility had it not been for the up-channeled supply
information sent from base-to-base by the SBSS UNIVACs.
After the case in Westover displayed the level of Air Force
disaster preparation, the case in Vietnam confirmed that
the rapid recovery had been no fluke.

The Air Force showed

it had implemented a system with both operational and
contingency conditions in mind.

Moreover, it proved that

the SBSS worked as advertised as a central repository for
supply data.329
By the end of 1968, the implementation of the Standard
Base Supply System had essentially reached its initial
completion point.

The Air Force and the UNIVAC team

completed their 167th 1050 Model II installation that
December and had installed machines at a total of 144 bases

Ford and Wilson, "UNIVAC's Role in the Pacific: Autodin
and Base Level Supply Systems," 25-26.
329
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across the air arm, including 20 in the Southeast Asia
region – overall, an unprecedented feat in data automation
to date.

Despite delays, computer downtime, and larger-

than-expected account sizes, more than four years of base
implementation experience helped reduce the average
installation time by approximately 60% compared to original
estimates.

In addition to the 167 computer installs, the

Directorate brought on 45 additional “satellite” sites
where supply accounts were too small to earn a full-scale
installation.

Seven years after General LeMay approved the

standard supply system concept, SBSS had finally reached
fruition.

The Air Force quickly reaped the benefits of

data automation and its applicability to nearly all Service
operations.330
Aftermath
In his 1970 article “The Logistics Challenge of the
Seventies” for the Air University Review, former bomber
pilot and sitting Deputy Chief of Staff for Systems and

Final tallies of total systems and bases derives from
United States Air Force, Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jul – 31 Dec 1968 (Washington: United
States Air Force, 1969), 74-76. Average installation time
quote is Codlin et al., Implementation of the USAF Standard
Base Supply System: A Quantitative Study, 31. Satellite
base information derives from Riemondy, “Supply and
Service—The Nucleus of Logistics.”
330
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Logistics Lieutenant General Harry E. Goldsworthy touted
the impact of the computer on Air Force operations as well
as the “revolution in automatic data processing.”
Goldsworthy praised the “marked improvement in resource
accounting and control, in accuracy and speed of reporting,
and in improved logistics reaction time” thanks to the SBSS
and the UNIVAC 1050-II computer.331

The General gave credit

to the system for delivering on its promise: giving the Air
Force its first real-time requisitioning and inventory
status capabilities.

However, he went much further by

elaborating on how the Directorate’s insistence of
standardizing computer hardware, data systems, and supply
procedures resulted in significant improvements in
inventory reduction, customer support, and manpower
reduction efforts.

In fact, he strongly emphasized the

improvement to the logistics system in general.

These

second- and third-order effects made the SBSS not only
successful in achieving officially projected intentions,
but also in achieving the outcomes promised by the data
automation community as a whole.

Fortunately, General

Harry E. Goldsworthy, Lieutenant General, "The Logistics
Challenge of the Seventies," Air University Review,
July/August 1970, accessed January 12, 2012,
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/
aureview/1970/jul-aug/goldsworthy.html
331
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Goldsworthy was not alone in comprehending the benefits of
the system and the precedent it created.332
In 1970, after the full integration of all satellite
bases and several years of operation at the main bases, the
Air Force began to review the post-implementation effects
of the Standard Base Supply System.

After all, feedback

from the SBSS experience would prove critical if the Air
Force wanted to further standardize data automation systems
throughout the service.

In summarizing his experience with

SBSS, Brigadier General A. A. Riemondy highlighted the
major advantages earned by the system’s implementation:


The power of centralized development: Having the
ability to make a single program modification and
having it immediately impact every location in the
system. The Air Force, and the Logistics community
especially, benefited greatly from their control over
system design, implementation, and operation.



The benefit of having a single, standardized supply
organization: In the early 1960s, the supply data
systems were as diverse as the major commands they
served. With SBSS, there was now an Air Force
standard for operations, system products, forms, and
training at all bases.

In the July-August 1970 edition of the Air University
Review, several Air Force logistics leaders came online to
publish their thoughts on the advances in their field and,
in many cases, to praise the impact of data automation. In
this instance, Lieutenant General Harry E. Goldsworthy’s
article “The Logistics Challenge of the Seventies” covers
the senior officer’s perspective on the future of logistics
systems and, specifically for this article, the impact of
the SBSS. See Goldsworthy, "The Logistics Challenge of the
Seventies.”
332
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The profits of efficiency: From Supply’s first
conversion from manual to “interim” computers in
1957, the automation of data systems consistently
paid manpower dividends. That first conversion
allowed Supply to alter their own unit manning
documents and eliminate nearly 2500 manpower spaces.
When the SBSS program began acquiring the UNIVAC
1050-II system, Headquarters cut another 862 base
supply personnel. After another cut of 290 billets
thanks to system improvement, the benefits of having
a standardized supply organization blossomed once
again. This time, such an organizational move
allowed the reengineering of manning standards for 39
base work centers and resulted in an Air Force-wide
elimination of another 3020 positions.



The effectiveness of unified training: As SBSS came
online, the need for separate and distinct training
courses quickly vanished. This allowed Air Training
Command (ATC) to develop a more effective instruction
model for the Service. SBSS allowed ATC to
completely assume total system training
responsibility. As such, by 1970, 38,000 of the Air
Force’s 49,000 supply personnel received formal
training in the Standard Base Level System…a feat
unheard of just seven years prior. 333

General Riemondy’s comments added significant depth to
those of Goldsworthy, leaving the Air Force tremendously
optimistic about data automation’s future in the air arm.
While the SBSS was not the perfect system and significant
issues were omitted from Air Force leader evaluations, the
impact of this first service-wide automation system was
undeniable across the organization.

333

Riemondy, “Supply and Service—The Nucleus of logistics.”
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In retrospect, General Lemay’s original 1962 decision
to update and standardize Air Force data automation proved
even more monumental than anticipated.

The general’s edict

acted as the catalyst for SBSS and spawned dozens of major
and minor data automation programs that completely changed
service operations.

In fact, managing the addition of data

processing systems (including several in logistics
automation) became one of the primary concerns of the
Directorate of Data Automation in the latter half of the
1960s.

Much of this was a function of two additional major

data automation programs pursued in the Air Force at that
time, Phase II and Phase III.

Phase II was the Air Force

program to automate as many non-Supply functions as
possible while Phase III focused on automating systems
above base-level (i.e. major air command, higher
headquarters).

The intent was to use SBSS, now also known

as Phase I, as a springboard for further data automation
efforts.

As an element of these programs, the Air Force

automated specific components of base maintenance,
transportation, and procurement in an effort to eliminate
the routine and tedious functions performed by thousands of
clerical and technical personnel.

However, the continuous

rise in data automation requests ensured Air Force leaders
understood this was not a permanent, long-term solution.
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From 1968 until 1975, the service grappled with new ideas
and directions in an effort to solve the data automation
issue once and for all.334
After numerous programmatic iterations, the final
answer came in April 1976 when the Air Force officially
eliminated all individual automation efforts and christened
one single program to govern all data processing in the Air
Force. It was known to some as the Base-Level Computer
Modernization Program.
Phase IV.335

Program managers simply knew it as

Phase IV established a single data processing

center at each major Air Force location and would
eventually lead the way for both “regionalized” processing
(data centered at a regional, or command-centered,
location), followed by centralized processing (data
centered at a single Air Force location) in the age of the
Internet.

Francis Hughes, Assistant Secretary of the Air

Force for Financial Management, summarized the direction

See United States Air Force, STALOG Study Group, A Study
of the Automation of the Logistics System at Base Level
(STALOG), Volume I, 1-2. The critical line in this
paragraph is in understanding that the “evolution of all
logistics automation did not wait until [SBSS] completion
before moving forward.”
334

Data derived from official Air Force historical
summaries of the Directorate of Data Automation from 19681973 and Goldsworthy, "The Logistics Challenge of the
Seventies."
335
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for Phase IV by saying, “[t]he most appropriate solution to
these problems (equipment age, increasing cost of existing
systems, and the forecasted growth of the standard base
supply system)--and the policy of this office--is
replacement of base level computers with equipment from a
single vendor.”336

With Phase IV, the Air Force achieved

yet another milestone in their “information age,” all made
possible through the efforts of the data automators and
logistician pioneers who had helped develop the SBSS
decades earlier.337
Reviewing the history of logistics-centered data
automation helps illuminate how United States Air Force
leaders thought about the future performance of their
organizational functions, especially given the success of
Base Supply automation in the 1960s.

Nearly two decades

after the Supply automation conversation began in earnest,
the addition of automatic data processing functions to
base-level logistics operations was universal.

This soon

became the catalyst for even larger programs and projects

The quote itself is from the official memorandum: "Base
Level ADP Program," ASECAF/FM to AF/CVA, July 30, 1976.
336

Hughes’ intentions are referenced in United States Air
Force, Historical Summary, Directorate of Data Automation,
1 Jul – 31 Dec 1976 (Washington: United States Air Force,
1977), 14.
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that led to the Phase IV initiative and the automation
phases that preceded it.

Were it not for the dialogue and

experimentation of the 1950s and the early automation
programs in the 1960s it is quite likely the history of Air
Force data automation would look considerably different
today.

Thanks to the achievements of dozens of logistician

visionaries, paired with their partners in the Air Force
Comptroller’s Directorate of Data Automation (and its
organizational predecessors), it is difficult to conceive
an Air Force data automation environment in the 1980s and
1990s without the innovations of the Standard Base Supply
System.
In the end, the deceptively obvious decision to choose
Supply as the test bed for service-wide automation turned
out to be an incredibly intelligent selection.

As a

system, it delivered data automation for requirements
computation, inventory control, fund control,
requisitioning, issuing, receiving, and records maintenance
for an entire Air Force.

The SBSS proved once and for all

that data automation, despite its large initial expenditure
of money, manpower, and time, could save the Air Force
valuable resources in the long run.

The Air Force, as

General Goldsworthy claimed, definitely took advantage of
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the automatic data processing revolution…and it was the
Standard Base Supply System that led the way.338

Many sources list the total billets saved by SBSS.
Although the number often varies between 4,000 and 4,200,
the variation does not change the overall impact
whatsoever. See Kenneth B. Heitkamp, Air Force Base-Level
Information Systems (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University,
1987); and Goldsworthy, "The Logistics Challenge of the
Seventies."
338
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Conclusion
This dissertation has examined service information
operations dating back to the Civil War and continuing well
into the 1960s and Vietnam.

It reveals that while the USAF

did not exist independently until 1947, it inherited an
emerging culture of information dependence formed through a
series of methodological and technological advances.

These

advances grew out of initiatives most often generated from
the ground-up – at the individual and unit level – and
helped develop the service’s information environment for
what became the most information-dominant organization in
the federal government.

This dissertation also illustrates

the extent to which Air Force information developed in the
context of particular periods rather than as part of a
monolithic “Information Age”.339
It thereby challenges service perceptions that have
prevailed for decades.

At the same time it makes clear the

This theory derives from Hobart and Schiffman’s work
regarding multiple information ages. However, the theory
and its relationship to this argument is better found in
Cox’s analysis of Hobart and Schiffman’s theory and its
application. See Richard J. Cox, "The Information Age and
History: Looking Backward to See Us," accessed March 03,
2013, http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/2698/1/ r_cox_1.html.
339
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extent to which the service and its predecessors grew
increasingly reliant on access to statistical information.
Such dependence began building in earnest as far back
as the Civil War.

By the time the war ended, the average

Union Army field commander had grown accustomed to an
operating environment that included more access to, and
requirements for, operational and intelligence information
than ever before.

Thanks to the creation of the Signal

Corps, the Military Telegraph Corps, and the Government
Printing Office (all organizations founded on growing
information requirements), information transmission and
reproduction capabilities became greater than in any
previous conflict.

The next half-century witnessed further

service developments shaped by three factors:

a reluctance

to appear retrograde in information capability, a drive to
improve on existing information standards, and a budding
interest in the information technology of the private
sector.

The regulatory and technological improvements in

this fifty-year period suggest an Army coming to understand
its information needs and exploring new solutions to
improve the service information environment.

Therefore, by

the time the Army established the Aeronautical Division in
1907, information was already a critical aspect of unit
operations.
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The four decades that preceded Air Force independence
in 1947 witnessed the emergence of air-specific information
needs.

While the Army sought to improve its data

management methods and technologies, airmen separately
looked for ways to modify such tools to best suit the
aeronautical environment.

The period prior to and during

World War I became a catalyst for such modifications,
especially as the air arm came into its own as a formidable
military entity.

Information became an important commodity

as personnel, equipment, and maintenance needs ballooned in
the context of the service’s sudden exponential growth.
The later interwar manual- and punched-card accountability
systems were indicative of the increasing demand for data
and the unique purposes for which it was used.

By the time

World War II began, the Army and its air forces became so
reliant on information for operational sustainment and
decision-making that internal units (MRUs and SCUs) were
created which were specially designed to collect, exploit,
and transmit data throughout the entire service.
Information was now not only an aspect of mission
capability; it was essential to it.

The formation and

proliferation of statistical control in the Army Air
Service is indicative of a service wholly dependent on
information to accomplish its mission.
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By the time the Air Force gained its independence
following the war, it was an organization with decades of
experience with aeronautical and logistical information
requirements that had themselves emerged from the Army’s
general operational and administrative data environment.
The subsequent rise of computers became the focus of a
number of projects and programs designed to improve service
decision-making and administrative statistical control.
Finally, as the air arm launched its first service-wide
data processing system in the 1960s, the organization
became inextricably tied to the systemic electronic
collection, exploitation, and distribution of huge
quantities of information for its everyday activities. This
was a significant achievement: but this new “information
age” was in key respects the latest iteration of a process,
or series of “information ages”, that had been underway for
a hundred years.
This process, however, is not a simple matter of
technological determinism; of one clearly delineated age –
that of the bound ledger, mechanical device, and automated
system – succeeding another.

As the preceding chapters

have shown, there was rarely an instance where one way of
doing things was suddenly and universally replaced by
another via command fiat.

Change occurred more commonly as
300

the result of limited and often localized initiatives, some
of which were deemed failures and not pursued further by
those in overall charge.

In the latter part of the

nineteenth century unit- or base-specific initiatives
produced local variations on standard practice.

In the

first half of the twentieth century, to be sure, overall
and urgent necessity in the form massive wartime service
expansion forced more widespread and top-down change in the
way information was gathered, processed, and used.

Even

then, however, a new age did not dawn at the single stroke
of a pen in Washington in either 1917 or 1941.

As for the

decades after World War II, it was the actions of certain
key individuals that determined how the Air Force would
react and adapt its information environment to the
computer.

Even SBSS, as the final chapter shows, had a far

from straightforward, top-down development history.
The tendency in certain circles to imply that Air
Force information operations arrived along with the term
“cyberspace” in the early twenty-first century, or perhaps
with the flowering of the internet in the 1990s, or – for
those with a sense of history – the adoption of computers
after World War II,

is misleading.340

The amassing,

See “Letter to Airmen”, Secretary of the Air Force
Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff General T. Michael
340
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processing, interpretation, and utilization of large
quantities of data by the military have a background in
relation to the air service in its various early guises
that predates both the computer and the formation of the US
Air Force.

Moreover, though intertwined with the emergence

and development of new technologies, that history was not
simply driven by an unspoken and universally accepted
assumption by those in uniform that “new” automatically
denoted “better” and therefore required universal adoption
by the service. The actions and initiative of groups and
individuals – not always those close to the seats of power
– in combination with external events, were what defined
perceived needs and the means of meeting them that were (or
were not) adopted at least until the 1960s.

The

informational “Wild New Yonder” of today, therefore, has a
long and often far from simple history behind it.
.

Moseley, 7 December 2005; Cox, “The Information Age and
History: Looking Backward to See Us”; Gordon T. Gould, Jr.,
Computers and Communications in the Information Age”, Air
University Review (1970).
302

Works Cited
Acomb, Frances. Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces,
Air Historical Studies: No. 57. Washington: USAF
Historical Division, Air University, 1952.
An Act Establishing Rules and Articles for the Government
of the Armies of the United States: With the
Regulations of the War Department Respecting the Same,
to Which Are Added, the Several Laws Relative to the
Army, the Militia When in Actual Service, Volunteers,
Rangers, Ordnance Department, and the Quarter Master's
and Commissary General's Department. Albany: Websters
& Skinners, 1812.
"Air Force Careers." Cyberspace Operation Officer. Accessed
July 03, 2013.
http://www.airforce.com/careers/detail/cyberspaceoperation-officer/.
"Air Force History Overview." Air Force History Fact Sheet.
Accessed March 1, 2013.
http://www.af.mil/information/heritage/ overview.asp.
"Air Force Materiel Command Fact Sheet." Air Force Materiel
Command. Accessed December 12, 2012.
http://www.afmc.af.mil/main/welcome.asp.
"Air Force Space Command." U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet.
Accessed July 1, 2013.
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp
?id=155.
Air Force Systems Command. Data Systems Automation Program:
Sections 1 and 2. Andrews AFB, MD: Air Force Systems
Command, 1963.
American Military History. Washington: Center of Military
History, United States Army, 1989.
Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers to the Secretary of
War upon the Improvement of Cumberland River,
303

Tennessee and Kentucky, and of Obion and Forked Deer
Rivers, Tennessee. Washington, D.C.: S.n., 1896.
Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, United States
Army, to the Secretary of War for the Year 1894, Part
IV, 53d Congress, 3d Session. House of
Representatives. Vol. II. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1894.
Annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army to
the Secretary of War for the Year 1889. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1890.
Annual Report of the Chief Signal-Officer to the Secretary
of War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1873.
Annual Report of the Secretary of War 1913. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1914.
Annual Report of the Secretary of War. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1881.
Annual Report of the Surgeon General, United States Army,
to the Secretary of War. Washington: Surgeon General's
Office, 1899.
Annual Reports of the War Department, 1899. Vol. 1. Series
3. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899.
Annual Reports of the War Department. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1885.
Armstrong, Lancelot W. Proceedings of UNIVAC Conference,
May 17-18, 1990, Smithsonian Institution, Washington.
Washington: Smithsonian Institution Archives, 1990.
Army Air Forces Statistical Digest World War II.
Washington: Office of Statistical Control, 1945.
Army Circular No. 29, Headquarters of the Army, AdjutantGeneral's Office (August 22, 1900). Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1900.
"Augustine Warner Robins." American Airpower Biography.
Accessed March 20, 2013.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/ro
bins.html.
304

"Base Level ADP Program." ASECAF/FM to AF/CVA. July 30,
1976.
Batiz-Lazo, Bernardo, Carles Maixe-Altes, and Paul Thomes,
eds. Technological Innovation in Retail Finance:
International Historical. New York: Routledge, 2012.
Battelle: 75 Years of Innovation. Columbus, OH: Battelle,
2004.
Beeton, Samuel Orchart. Beeton's Dictionary of Universal
Information; Comprising Geography, History, Biography,
Mythology, Bible Knowledge, Chronology, with the
Pronunciation of Every Proper Name. London: S.O.
Beeton, 1859.
Bergin, Thomas J. 50 Years of Army Computing, from ENIAC to
MSRC: A Record of a Symposium and Celebration,
November 13 and 14, 1996, Aberdeen Proving Ground.
Aberdeen, MD: U.S. Army Research Laboratory, 2000.
Bingham, Walter Van Dyke. Army Personnel Work, Vol II.
Washington: American Psychological Association, 1919.
Bohme, Frederick G., and J. Paul. Wyatt. 100 Years of Data
Processing: The Punchcard Century. Washington: U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Data User
Services Division, 1991.
Bonn, Keith E. Army Officer's Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA:
Stackpole, 2005.
Boring, Edwin Garrigues. Psychology for the Armed Services.
Washington: Infantry Journal, 1945.
Bridges, D. B. J. Elements of a Mechanized Supply
Information Flow System. Dayton, OH: Battelle Memorial
Institute, Wright Development Center, 1953.
Brown, Jerold E. Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Army.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001.
Buchan, Glenn C. Information War and the Air Force: Wave of
the Future? Current Fad? Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996.
Business Methods in the War Department: Report of the Board
305

Appointed in Compliance with the Request of the Senate
Select Committee to Investigate the Methods of
Business in the Executive Departments. Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1889.
Business Methods in the War Department: Report of the Board
Appointed in Compliance with the Request of the Senate
Select Committee to Investigate the Methods of
Business in the Executive Departments. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1889.
Byler, Charles A. Civil-military Relations on the Frontier
and Beyond, 1865-1917. Westport, CT: Praeger Security
International, 2006.
Byrd, Martha. Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987.
Case, Theodore S. Quartermaster's Guide Being a Summary of
the Army Regulations of 1863, and General Orders from
the War Dept. from May 1861 to April 10, 1865 Which
Affect the Quartermaster's Dept., with All General
Orders from the Quartermaster General's Office to
April 10, 1865. St. Louis: P.M. Pinckard, 1865.
"The Census of the United States." Scientific American 63,
no. 9 (August 30, 1890): 132.
Ceruzzi, Paul E. A History of Modern Computing. London,
England: MIT Press, 2003.
Chambers, William, and Robert Chambers. Chambers's
Information for the People: Being a Series of
Treatises on Those Branches of Human Knowledge in
Which the Greater Part of the Community Are Most
Interested, and Designed to Serve the Chief Uses of an
Encyclopedia, at a Price beyond Example Moderate.
Edinburgh: W. and R. Chambers, 1835.
Clement, Edward E. "This Years Progress in Telephony and
Telegraphy: Electrical Engineering and Telephone
Magazine, Vol XIII, No.89, February 1899, Chicago."
Telephone Magazine: An Illustrated Monthly Magazine,
Volumes 12-13, Aug-Dec 1898, 57-60.
Cockrell, Francis Marlon. Report [of] the Select Committee
of the United States Senate: Appointed under Senate
306

Resolution of March 3, 1887, to Inquire into and
Examine the Methods of Business and Work in the
Executive Departments, Etc., and the Causes of Delays
in Transacting the Public Business, Etc. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1888.
Codlin, K. E., W. H. McGlothlin, A. H. Schainblatt, and R.
L. Van. Horn. Implementation of the Usaf Standard Base
Supply System: A Quantitative Study. Ft. Belvoir:
Defense Technical Information Center, 1968.
Coffman, Edward M. The War to End All Wars: The American
Military Experience in World War I. Norwalk, CT.:
Easton Press, 1986.
Command and Control (Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6).
Washington: Department of the Navy, 1996.
Committee on Civilian Industrial Technology, comp.
Technology in the National Interest. Washington:
Executive Office of the President, National Science
and Technology Council, 1996.
Compilation of Supply Circulars and Supply Bulletins of the
Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division, General Staff,
War Department. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1919.
"Computer - Definition." Oxford English Dictionary Online. Accessed June 21, 2013.
http://oxforddictionaries.com/.
Computer Branch, Mathematical Sciences Division, Physical
Sciences Group, Office of Naval Research. A Survey of
Large-Scale Digital Computers and Computer Projects.
Report. Washington: Office of Naval Research,
Department of the Navy, 1950.
"Computer History: CHM Revolution." Whirlwind: Preparing
the Way for SAGE. Accessed March 20, 2012.
http://www.computerhistory.org/revolution/ real-timecomputing/6/123.
Congressional Seriel Set, 64th Congress, 2d Session,
December 4, 1916-March 4, 1917: House Documents. Vol.
117. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917.

307

Cortada, James W. Before the Computer: IBM, NCR, Burroughs,
and Remington Rand and the Industry They Created,
1865-1956. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1993.
Cortada, James W. Making the Information Society:
Experience, Consequences, and Possibilities. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002.
The Cosmopolitan, March-August 1886, 1-415.
Cox, Richard J. "The Information Age and History: Looking
Backward to See Us." The Information Age and History:
Looking Backward to See Us. Accessed March 03, 2013.
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/2698/1/r_cox_1.html.
Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate. The Army Air
Forces in World War II, Chapter VI. Washington: Office
of Air Force History, 1983.
Cuff, Robert D. The War Industries Board; Businessgovernment Relations during World War I. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
Damos, Diane L. Foundations of Military Pilot Selection
Systems: World War I. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences, 2007.
Damos, Diane L. A Summary of the Technical Pilot Selection
Literature. Randolph AFB, TX: Air Force Personnel
Center Strategic Research and Assessment, 2011.
Davenport, Charles Benedict, and Albert Gallatin Love. Army
Anthropology: Based on Observations Made on Draft
Recruits, 1917-1918, and on Veterans at
Demobilization, 1919. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1921.
Dawson, Joseph G. The Late 19th Century U.S. Army, 18651898: A Research Guide. New York: Greenwood Press,
1990.
Department of Commerce. The Retirement of SEAC: Thursday,
April 23, 1964. Washington: Department of Commerce,
1964.

308

Donges, Norman A. "How the Army Knows Its Strength." Army
Information Digest 3, no. 7 (July 1948): 65-69.
Dunaway, Edward. "U.S. Air Force Oral History Interview:
Interview of Edward Dunaway." Interview by Dan
Mortensen.
Eckdahl, D.E., I.S. Reed, and H.H. Sarkissian. "West Coast
Contributions to the Development of the Generalpurpose Computer. Building Maddida and the Founding of
Computer Research Corporation." IEEE Annals of the
History of Computing 25, no. 1 (2003): 4-33.
Edwards, Paul N. A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate
Data, and the Politics of Global Warming. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2010.
11th Bomb Group (H): The Grey Geese. Paducah, KY: Turner
Pub., 1996.
"Engineering Branch of Shop Engineering Section."
Slipstream I, no. 3 (September 15, 1919).
Equipment for Aero Units of the Aviation Section (Signal
Corps), Tentative, 1916. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1916.
Essinger, James. Jacquard's Web: How a Hand-loom Led to the
Birth of the Information Age. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004.
The Evaluation of Concepts for the Integration of the
Military Supply Systems. Washington: Team 4, DOD
Logistics Systems Study Project, 12 Dec 1957.
Farwell, Byron. The Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-century Land
Warfare: An Illustrated World View. New York: W.W.
Norton, 2001.
Fifty Forms, Company and Regimental U.S. Army Paper Work,
with Instructions and Sample Forms (to Date, July 1,
1918). Tacoma, WA: Pioneer Bindery & Print., 1918.
Flamm, Kenneth. Creating the Computer: Government,
Industry, and High Technology. Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1988.

309

The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S.
McNamara. Directed by Errol Morris. Performed by
Robert S. McNamara and Errol Morris. Hollywood: Sony
Pictures Classics, 2003. DVD.
Ford, John C., and Howard E. Wilson. "UNIVAC's Role in the
Pacific: Autodin and Base Level Supply Systems."
Signal Magazine, 1970.
Fouste, Darcie. Smith Premiere Typewriter Advertisement.
Adjutant General Collection, United States Army
Adjutant General Museum, Fort Jackson, SC.
"G. Floyd Steele: Computer Oral History Collection, 19691973." Interview by Robina Mapstone. January 16, 1973.
Galison, Peter. "The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener
and the Cybernetic Vision." Critical Inquiry 21, no. 1
(Autumn 1994): 228-66.
Gardner, Lester Durand. Who's Who in American Aeronautics.
Los Angeles: F. Clymer Publications, 1925.
"General Montgomery Cunningham Meigs." Scientific American
66 (1892): 71.
General Orders by the United States War Department, United
States Adjutant-General's Office, United
States.Military Secretary's Department. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1894.
General Orders, Quartermaster General’s Office 1868.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1869.
General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations, Signal
Corps, United States Army. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1912.
General, Property, and Disbursing Regulations, Signal
Corps., United States Army. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1915.
The Gettysburg Times. "Colonel Peddy Heads ROTC Unit."
September 1, 1949.
The Gettysburg Times. "Lt Col Peddy, ROTC Officer, Is
Transferred." July 24, 1951.
310

Goldsworthy, Harry E., Lieutenant General. "The Logistics
Challenge of the Seventies." Air University Review,
July/August 1970. Accessed January 12, 2012.
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1
970/jul-aug/goldsworthy.html
Gould, Gordon T., Jr. "Computers and Communications in the
Information Age." Air University Review. Accessed
March 1, 2012. May-Jun 1970.
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/
airchronicles/aureview/1970/may-jun/gould.html.
Grandstaff, Mark R. Foundation of the Force: Air Force
Enlisted Personnel Policy, 1907-1956. Washington: Air
Force History and Museums Program, 1997.
"The Growth of the Capital in War Time." Air Service
Journal, Vol I, November 29, 1917, 666.
Haigh, Thomas. "The Chromium-Plated Tabulator:
Institutionalizing an Electronic Revolution, 19541958." IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 23, no.
4 (2001): 75-104.
Haigh, Thomas. "Computing the American Way: Contextualizing
the Early US Computer Industry." IEEE Annals of the
History of Computing 32, no. 2 (2010): 8-20.
Harrison, James L. 100 GPO Years: 1861 - 1961; a History of
United States Public Printing. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 2010.
Head, William P. Every Inch a Soldier: Augustine Warner
Robins and the Building of U.S. Airpower. College
Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1995.
Heater, Bonnie. "Historic Semaphore Flags to Signal
Commands." Fort Gordon Signal. July 20, 2012. Accessed
April 13, 2013.
Http://www.fortgordonsignal.com/news/2012-0720/News_Update/Historic_semaphore_flags_to_signal_comm
ands.html.
Heide, Lars. Punched-card Systems and the Early Information
Explosion, 1880-1945. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2009.
311

Heitkamp, Kenneth B. Air Force Base-Level Information
Systems. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1987.
Henmon, V. A. C. "Air Service Tests of Aptitude for
Flying." Journal of Applied Psychology 3, no. 2
(1919): 103-09.
Hennessy, Juliette A. The United States Army Air Arm April
1861 to April 1917. Washington: Office of Air Force
History, U.S. Air Force, 1985.
Hogue, James E. Automated Logistics Information Systems: A
Case Study. Dayton, OH: Air Force Institute of
Technology, 1992.
"How Army Aviators Are Trained." Air Service Journal,
September 28, 1917, 370.
Hughes, Thomas P. Rescuing Prometheus. New York: Pantheon
Books, 1998.
Huskey, Harry D. Harry D. Huskey: His Story. Charleston,
SC: BookSurge Pub., 2004.
Huskey, Harry D. "Technical Developments: Characteristics
of the Institute for Numerical Analysis Computer." In
Mathematical Tables and Other Aids to Computation.
April 1950.
IBM Highlights: 1869-1969. Washington: International
Business Machines (IBM), 2011.
"IBM-SAGE-Computer." Computer Museum. Accessed May 13,
2013. http://www.computermuseum.li/Testpage/IBM-SAGEcomputer.htm.
In Your Defense. Produced by Western Electric and United
States Air Force. Performed by United States Air Force
- Defense Projects Division. New York: Audio
Productions, Inc. Accessed May 2, 2013.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=06drBN8nlWg.
"Information Definitions." Merriam-Webster. Accessed June
06, 2013. http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/information.

312

"Information." Oxford Dictionary - Online. Accessed June
06, 2013.
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_e
nglish/information.
"Interview with Darcie Fouste, United States Army Adjutant
General Historian and Curator, Adjutant General
Museum, Fort Jackson, SC." E-mail and personal
interviews by author. November 11, 2012 – January 15,
2013.
"Interview with Diane L. Damos, PhD, President, Damos
Aviation Services, Inc." E-mail and personal
interviews by author. December 10, 2012 – January 5,
2013.
"Interview with Kenneth B. Heitkamp, United States Air
Force Civilian (Retired)." E-mail and personal
interviews by author. February 11, 2011 – January 9,
2013.
"Interview with Leo P. Hirrel, United States Army
Quartermaster Historian, Fort Lee, VA." E-mail and
personal interviews by author. December 10, 2012 –
January 9, 2013.
"Interview with Luther D. Hanson, United States Army
Quartermaster Historian and Curator, Adjutant General
Museum, Fort Lee, VA." E-mail and personal interviews
by author. December 10, 2012 – January 9, 2013.
"Interview with Paul Morando, United States Army
Quartermaster Historian and Museum Director at the
Army Quartermaster Museum, Fort Lee, VA." E-mail and
personal interviews by author. November 19, 2012 –
January 15, 2013.
"Interview with Robert C. Neibling, USAF (Ret)." Personal
interview by author. May 2, 2012.
"Interview with William R. Stevenson, Stevenson Consulting,
LLC." E-mail and personal interviews by author. May 2,
2011 – December 29, 2012.
Johnson, Mary Ann. McCook Field, 1917-1927: The Force
behind America's Golden Age of Flight. Dayton, OH:
Landfall Press, 2002.
313

Kane, Thomas M. Military Logistics and Strategic
Performance. London: F. Cass, 2001.
Kautz, August V. The Company Clerk: Showing How and When to
Make out All the Returns, Reports, Rolls, and Other
Papers, and What to Do with Them. How to Keep All the
Books, Records, and Accounts Required in the
Administration of a Company, Troop, or Battery in the
Army of the United States. Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott &, 1863.
Keene, Marcel S., Clay S. Worick, Ralph G. Hersey, and H.
M. McLarin. War Department Correspondence File: A
Subjective Decimal Classification with a Complete
Alphabetical Index for Use of the War Department and
the United States Army. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1918.
Kerns, Patricia A. The First 50 Years: U.S. Air Force Judge
Advocate General's Department. Washington: U.S. Air
Force Judge Advocate General's Dept., 2003.
Kirsch, Russell A. "Computer Development at the National
Bureau of Standards." In A Century of Excellence in
Measurements, Standards, and Technology a Chronicle of
Selected NBS/NIST Publications, 1901-2000, by David R.
Lide. Gaithersburg: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Technology
Administration, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2001.
Kroll, Harry David. Kelly Field in the Great World War. San
Antonio: Press of San Antonio Print., 1919.
Kurzweil, Ray. The Age of Spiritual Machines: When
Computers Exceed Human Intelligence. New York: Viking,
1999.
Landon, Charles R., Major General, ed. United States Air
Force - Review of Statistical Services, January 1950 July 1954. Report no. K134.01-00468883. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1954.
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Appropriation Bill,
1921: Hearing before Subcommittee of House Committee
on Appropriations ... in Charge of the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Appropriation Bill for 1921.
314

Sixty-sixth Congress, Second Session ... Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1920.
Leib, Charles. Nine Months in the Quartermaster's
Department; Or, the Chances for Making a Million.
Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, Keys &, Printers, 1862.
Light, Jennifer S. "When Computers Were Women." Technology
and Culture 40, no. 3 (July 1999): 455-83.
Losee, Robert M. "A Discipline Independent Definition of
Information." Journal of the American Society for
Information Science 48, no. 3 (1997): 254-69.
Love, Albert Gallatin, Eugene L. Hamilton, and Ida Levin
Hellman. Tabulating Equipment and Army Medical
Statistics. Washington: Office of the Surgeon General,
Dept. of the Army, 1958.
Lubar, Steven. ""Do Not Fold, Spindle or Mutilate": A
Cultural History of the Punch Card." The Journal of
American Culture 15, no. 4 (1992): 43-55.
Lucas, Henry Edward. Automation: A Study of Basic Concepts
and of Factors Influencing the Decision to Automate.
Thesis, University of Texas., 1955.
Lynch, Charles. The Medical Department of the United States
Army in the World War. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1921.
"Major General Charles Raeburne “C. R.” Landon." Air Force
Senior Leader Biographies. Accessed April 10, 2012.
http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6135.
Manual for the Medical Department. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1896.
Manual for the Quartermaster Corps, United States Army,
1916. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917.
Mattoy, George C. "The Flying Telegraph." The Army
Communicator, Fall 1981, 30-36.
Meilinger, Phillip S. American Airpower Biography a Survey
of the Field. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,
1997.
315

"Memorandum to Lt Col Williams, 12 Feb 44." 65th MRU to
Lieutenant Colonel Williams, US Strategic Air Forces
in Europe. February 12, 1944. In U.S. Air Force
Historical Research Agency, IRIS: 00214762.
"Mimeograph." RedOrbit - Inventions Reference Library.
Accessed February 20, 2013.
http://www.redorbit.com/education/reference_library/te
chnology_1/inventions/2583628/mimeograph/.
"MIT Whirlwind Computer from 1951." CED in the History of
Media Technology. Accessed March 20, 2012.
http://www.cedmagic.com/history/whirlwindcomputer.html.
Moss, James A. Army Paperwork, a Practical Working Guide in
Army Administration ... (Printed March, 1917).
Menasha, WI: George Banta Pub., 1917.
Motten, Matthew. "Who Is a Member of the Military
Profession?" Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 62 (2011):
14-17.
Neibling, Robert C. A Narrative History of the USAF
Standard Base Level Supply ADP Program. Unpublished
Historical Report. 1963.
Neufeld, Jacob. Bernard A. Schriever: Challenging the
Unknown. Washington: Office of Air Force History,
2005.
Neufeld, Jacob, George M. Watson, and David Chenoweth.
Technology and the Air Force: A Retrospective
Assessment. Washington: Air Force History and Museums
Program, U.S. Air Force, 1997.
Operations Statistics Division of the Directorate of
Statistical Services, Deputy Chief of
Staff/Comptroller. United States Air Force Statistical
Digest, Jan 1949-Jun 1950, Fifth Edition. Ft. Belvoir:
Defense Technical Information Center, 1950.
"Patent 395782." Patent 395782. Accessed February 14, 2013.
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/methods/afmdpm/
examples/395782.jsp.

316

The Personnel System of the United States Army. Washington:
National Publication-U.S. Army Adjutant-General’s
Office, 1919.
"Pioneer in Government Computer Planning." Washington Post.
February 09, 2009. Accessed May 3, 2013.
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-0209/news/36782416_1_secret-service-government-servicepentagon.
Plum, William Rattle. The Military Telegraph during the
Civil War in the United States with an Exposition of
Ancient and Modern Means of Communication, and of the
Federal and Confederate Cipher Systems ; Also a
Running Account of the War between the States.
Chicago: Jansen, McClurg &, 1882.
Pratt, Jerome J. Courageous Couriers: Memoirs of a Pigeon
Soldier. Warrenton, MO: American Pigeon Journal, 1977.
Proceedings of U.S. Army’s Automatic Data Processing System
(ADPS) Conference, 31 October - 1 November 1956.
Property and Disbursing Regulations, including
Miscellaneous General Regulations. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1912.
Property and General Regulations of the Signal Corps, U.S.
Army. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898.
Province, Charles M. General Patton's Punch Cards: A Short
History of Mobile Machine Records Units and IBM Punch
Card Machines in World War II. [S.l.]: CMP
Productions, 2009.
"Quartermaster History." US Army Quartermaster School, Fort
Lee, Virginia. Accessed April 5, 2013.
http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/qm_history.html.
Raines, Rebecca Robbins. Getting the Message Through: A
Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps.
Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army,
1996.
Rainey, James C., Andrew W. Hunt, and Beth F. Scott. USAF
Supply: Pride, Dedication, Professionalism. Maxwell
AFB, Gunter Annex: Logistics Management Agency, 2001.
317

Rainey, James C. Logistics and Warfighting: Thinking about
Agile Combat Support. Maxwell AFB, Gunter Annex, Ala.:
Air Force Logistics Management Agency, 2003.
Reed, Irving S. "The Dawn of the Computer Age." Engineering
& Science, 2006, 7-12.
Register of the War Department:January 1, 1889. Washington:
[s.n.], 1889.
Regulations for Operation and Maintenance of U.S. Military
Telegraph Lines. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1892.
Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1895, with
Appendix Separately Indexed Showing Changes to January
1, 1899. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899.
Regulations for the Army of the United States, Appendixes
No. 8. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895.
Regulations for the Operation and Maintenance of United
States Military Telegraph Lines: And General
Regulations of the Signal Corps, United States Army.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899.
Regulations of the Army of the United States and General
Orders in Force on the 17th of February, 1881.
Codified and Published by Order of the Secretary of
War ... With an Appendix Containing All Military Laws
in Force February 17, 1881, Not Contained in This
Code. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1881.
Report of the Chief Signal Officer, United States Army, to
the Secretary of War. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1914.
Reports of Committees of the Senate of the United States
for the First Session of the Fiftieth Congress, 188788. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1888.
Reprint and Circular Series of the National Research
Council. Washington: National Research Council, 1919.
Riemondy, Brigadier General A. A. "Supply and Service—The
Nucleus of Logistics." Air University Review,
318

July/August 1970. Accessed January 12, 2012.
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1
970/jul-aug/riemondy.html.
Risch, Erna. Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History
of the Corps, 1775-1939. Washington: Center of
Military History, U.S. Army, 1989.
Roster of Key Personnel, Headquarters Army Air Forces
Statistical Control Division, 1944. USAF Official
Document. Washington: United States Air Force, 1944.
Scheips, Paul J. Darkness and Light, the Interwar Years,
1865-1898. Washington: Government Printing Office,
1971.
"Scientific Planning Techniques." Special Air Staff
Briefing: 5 August 1948, Pentagon, Washington.
Scott, Beth F., James C. Rainey, and Andrew W. Hunt. The
Logistics of War. Maxwell AFB, Gunter Annex, Ala: AF
Logistics Management Agency, 2000.
Short, Lloyd M. The Development of National Administrative
Organization in the United States,. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1923.
Shrader, Charles R. U.S. Military Logistics, 1607-1991: A
Research Guide. New York: Greenwood, 1992.
Shurkin, Joel N. Engines of the Mind: A History of the
Computer. New York: Norton, 1984.
Slutz, Ralph J. "Memories of the Bureau of Standards'
SEAC." In A History of Computing in the Twentieth
Century: A Collection of Essays, by N. Metropolis, J.
Howlett, and Gian-Carlo Rota. New York: Academic
Press, 1980.
Smith, Gene. "Past and Present Officials Deny Wall St.
Rumor of Univac Woes." The New York Times, August 27,
1964. 45.
Spruce, Frank. Evolution of the Supply Computer System from
Univac 1050 to the GCSS/ILS-S. Unpublished Report.
Personal Collection of Mr. Robert C. Neibling, USAF
Civilian (Ret).
319

Stehr, Nico. "Theories of the Information Age." In
Historical Developments and Theoretical Approaches in
Sociology, by C. Crothers. Vol. II. Oxford: Eolss
Publishers, 2010.
Sterling, Christopher H. Military Communications: From
Ancient times to the 21st Century. Santa Barbara, CA:
ABC-CLIO, 2008.
Stevens, Austin. "Air Force Unveils Fastest Computer." New
York Times, June 21, 1950. 5.
"SWAC: National Bureau of Standards Western Automatic
Computer – Recent Developments and Operating
Expertise." National Bureau of Standards Technical
News Bulletin 37, No. 10 (October 1953).
Sweetser, Arthur. The American Air Service; a Record of Its
Problems, Its Difficulties, Its Failures, and Its
Final Achievements, New York: D. Appleton and, 1919.
Tatnall, Arthur. History of Computing: Learning from the
Past : IFIP WG 9.7 International Conference, HC 2010,
Held as Part of WCC 2010, Brisbane, Australia,
September 20-23, 2010 : Proceedings. New York:
Springer, 2010.
"Telephone History." The Telephony Museum. Accessed April
10, 2013. http://www.telephonymuseum.com/telephone
history.htm.
Testimony before the Joint Commission to Consider the
Present Organizations of the Signal Service,
Geological Survey, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the
Hydrographic Office of the Navy Department, with a
View to Secure Greater Efficiency and Econommy (sic)
of Administration of the Public Service in Said
Bureaus,. Washington: Government Printing Office,
1886.
Unit Equipment Manual for the Aviation Section, Signal
Corps. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917.
United States Air Force Air Proving Ground Command. Final
Report on Evaluation of Graduates of Machine
Accountants Course, Project Number APG/CSC/388-A.
320

Dayton, OH: Armed Services Technical Information
Agency, 1954.
United States Air Force. Comptroller of the Air Force. “NBS
Press Release TRG 6099” (June 21, 1950. Compiled by
Air Force Historical Research Agency. IRIS 01016559.
Washington: SEAC (Standards Eastern Automatic
Computer) Collection, 1950.
United States Air Force. Comptroller of the Air
Force. “SEAC Dedication Program” (June 20, 1950).
Compiled by Air Force Historical Research Agency. IRIS
01016559. Washington: SEAC (Standards Eastern
Automatic Computer) Collection, 1950.
United States Air Force. Comptroller of the Air
Force. “Transcript of Dr. John H. Curtiss, Chief of
the National Bureau of Standards’ Applied Mathematics
Laboratories, Dedication Address” (20 June 1950).
Compiled by Air Force Historical Research Agency. IRIS
01016559. Washington: SEAC (Standards Eastern
Automatic Computer) Collection, 1950.
United States Air Force. Comptroller of the Air
Force. “Transcript of Lt Gen Rawlings’ Dedication
Address” (20 June 1950). Compiled by Air Force
Historical Research Agency. IRIS 01016559. Washington:
SEAC (Standards Eastern Automatic Computer)
Collection, 1950.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1963. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1963.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1964. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1964.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jan – 30 Jun 1965. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1965.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1966. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1966.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
321

Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1967. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1967.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jan - 30 June 1968. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1968.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jul – 31 Dec 1963. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1964.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jul – 31 Dec 1964. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1965.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jul – 31 Dec 1965. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1966.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jul - 30 Dec 1966. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1967.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jul - 30 Dec 1967. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1968.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jul – 31 Dec 1968. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1969.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary, Directorate of
Data Automation, 1 Jul – 31 Dec 1976. Washington:
United States Air Force, 1977.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 January – 30 June 1950. Washington: United States
Air Force, 1950.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 January – 30 June 1951. Washington: United States
Air Force, 1951.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
322

of 1 January – 30 June 1952. Washington: United States
Air Force, 1952.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 January – 30 June 1953. Washington: United States
Air Force, 1953.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 January – 30 June 1954. Washington: United States
Air Force, 1954.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 January – 30 June 1955. Washington: United States
Air Force, 1955.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 July – 31 December 1950. Washington: United
States Air Force, 1951.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 July – 31 December 1951. Washington: United
States Air Force, 1952.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 July – 31 December 1952. Washington: United
States Air Force, 1953.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 July – 31 December 1953. Washington: United
States Air Force, 1954.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 July – 31 December 1954. Washington: United
States Air Force, 1955.
United States Air Force. Historical Summary: Directorate of
Statistical Services, DCS/Comptroller for the Period
of 1 July – 31 December 1955. Washington: United
States Air Force, 1956.
323

United States Air Force. STALOG Study Group. A Study of the
Automation of the Logistics System at Base Level
(STALOG), Volume I. Washington: Headquarters USAF,
Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics, 1973.
United States Air Force. "Study of the Role, Organization
and Management of Automatic Data Systems in the Air
Force." Headquarters, USAF Management Engineering
Project 56-3, 1956.
United States Navy Office of Naval Research Mathematical
Sciences Division. “Digital Computer Newsletter.” 1,
no. 1 (April 1949).
United States Navy Office of Naval Research Mathematical
Sciences Division. "Digital Computer Newsletter." 2,
no. 3 (August 1950).
United States Navy Office of Naval Research Mathematical
Sciences Division. "Digital Computer Newsletter." 2,
no. 4 (December 1950).
United States Navy Office of Naval Research Mathematical
Sciences Division. "Digital Computer Newsletter." 3,
no. 2 (July 1951).
United States Navy Office of Naval Research Mathematical
Sciences Division. "Digital Computer Newsletter." 4,
no. 1 (January 1952).
United States Navy Office of Naval Research. A Survey of
Large Digital Computers and Computer Projects. Report.
Department of the Navy, 1950.
United States of America. Industrial College of the Armed
Forces. The Application of Electronic Data Processing
Machines to Military Supply Systems. By Frank J.
Roberts. Washington: Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, 1956.
United States of America. Industrial College of the Armed
Forces. Military Applications of Cybernetics. By
Frederic H. Miller. Washington: Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, 1953.
United States of America. United States Air Force.
324

Directorate of Data Automation. United States Air
Force Data Systems Automation Program, Sections I and
II. Washington: United States Air Force, 1963.
"Univac 1050." Computer History Archives Project. Accessed
March 3, 2012.
http://sites.google.com/site/computerhistoryarchivespr
oject/1/univac-1050.
US Army Air Forces. Statement of Functions: 6 Mar 42. 1942.
US Congressional Serial Set, 66th Congress, 2nd Session,
December 1, 1919-June 5, 1920, Senate Documents. Vol.
15. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920.
Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from
Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1977.
Walker, Lois E., and Shelby E. Wickam. From Huffman Prairie
to the Moon: The History of Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base. Washington: Air Force Logistics Command, 1986.
War Department Research and Development Program, Fiscal
Year 1948. Washington: War Department General Staff,
1947.
Weaver, Warren. Comments on a General Theory of Air
Warfare. Washington: National Defense Research
Committee, 1946.
Weik, Martin H. "The ENIAC Story." ENIAC - World Wide Web.
Accessed May 15, 2013.
http://ftp.arl.mil/mike/comphist/eniac-story.html.
Weik, Martin H. A Fourth Survey of Domestic Electronic
Digital Computing Systems. Aberdeen Proving Ground,
MD: Ballistic Research Laboratories, 1964.
Weik, Martin H. A Third Survey of Domestic Electronic
Digital Computing Systems. Aberdeen Proving Ground,
MD: United States Army, 1961.
Weller, Charles Edward. The Early History of the
Typewriter. La Porte, IN: Chase & Shepard, Printers,
1918.

325

"Westover Air Force Base History." Westover Air Force Base
History. Accessed April 16, 2012.
http://www.westoverafbhistory.com/.
Winthrop, William, and Charles McClure. A Digest of
Opinions of the Judge-Advocates General of the Army.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901.
"Wood, William Robert - Biographical Information." Wood,
William Robert - Biographical Information. Accessed
April 1, 2013.
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?ind
ex=W000706.
"World of Wings: Military Pigeons." World of Wings:
Military Pigeons. Accessed April 13, 2013.
http://www.pigeoncenter.org/militarypigeons.html.
"World War II American Air and Nautical Almanacs." World
War II American Air and Nautical Almanacs. Accessed
February 04, 2013.
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/almanac.ht
ml.
Yerkes, Robert Mearns. Psychological Examining in the
United States Army. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1921.
Yerkes, Robert Mearns. Report of the Psychology Committee
of the National Research Council, 2nd ed. Vol. 26. The
Psychological Review. Washington: National Research
Council, 1919.

326

